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ABSTRACT
Worldwide, water resources are undergoing rapid changes emerging from both manmade and natural factors. Increasing demands for water for agriculture, industry, power
generation, and domestic use combined with more intense and variable weather patterns are
negatively affecting water availability and escalating the potential for conflict between entities
sharing these critical resources.
This study examines the Delaware River Basin federal-interstate compact to determine
how these agreements provide a means by which several competing states can develop and
implement an effective regional governance system. Using a grounded theory case study
approach, it uses documents, surveys, and interviews to examine how the Compact emerged, the
nature of the problems leading to the Compact, and the mechanisms that were developed to
address the basin issues. Several theoretical concepts emerged from this study that help to
explain the success of the Delaware River Basin Compact.
Overall, this study found that a successful compact begins with certain properties that
help determine, within the context of the natural, social, and political environments, how the
compact is structured and what mechanisms are used. These findings suggest that future
compacts may be more successful if careful attention is paid to beginning with the framework
properties identified here and closely aligning the compact structures and mechanisms with the
needs of the various environments. These results have implications for managing current and
future transboundary water resource conflicts by aiding in the development of interstate
compacts and the evaluation and modification of current compacts.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In an era of growing population pressures, climate change, and increasing demand from
agriculture and industry, water may eventually rival or overtake oil as a source of conflict
worldwide (CNA, 2017; Ward, 2017). An assessment by the United States Defense Intelligence
Agency predicts that, without more effective water resource management, between now and
2040 the demand for fresh water will outstrip the supply. This situation will lead to increased
tensions between water users and a critical need for effective and efficient water sharing
agreements (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2012).
Water shortages impact the ability of countries in their efforts to produce food and
generate energy, resulting in risks for global food markets and negatively affecting economic
growth. Water shortages, in combination with other factors such as poverty, political and social
uncertainty, poor leadership, and weak political institutions, can lead to the collapse of
governments (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2012; Levy & Sidel, 2011). The critical nature of
water scarcity is such that it is now considered by military experts in the United States as likely
to become increasingly prominent as a non-traditional security challenge (CNA, 2017).
Climate change is likely to be a major factor in water scarcity and, by extension, water
conflicts. Climate change will result in new problems, including extreme changes in supply and
demand (Hall, 2010). It will impact the distribution of water within and across states and, in
doing so, increase uncertainty, water stress, and the likelihood of conflict (Honkonen, 2017).
Climate change has already altered the water cycle, affecting the availability of water and
resulting in greater burdens on systems that were already strained. Floods and droughts are likely
to become more common and more intense. California and other western states will experience
1

significant loss of surface water due to reduced snowpack. The water supply of the Great Lakes,
with over ninety percent of the available fresh water in the United States, will be impacted. There
will be changes in the quality and quantity of both surface and groundwater. Higher temperatures
will result in increased demand for water as well as lower oxygen levels in lakes and streams,
affecting aquatic animals and decreasing the ability of rivers to handle pollutants. Reduced
precipitation can impair water available to recharge aquifers while changes in soils or vegetation
due to fire or pests can affect groundwater recharge. Without significant reduction in energy use,
demand for water for hydropower may increase as a result of efforts to reduce the carbon
footprint. Sea-level rise, along with excessive groundwater pumping, will continue to contribute
to saltwater intrusion into aquifers, threatening municipal and private water supplies (Hall, 2010;
Karl et al., 2009).
The Global Water Partnership (2000) defines the water crisis as “mainly a crisis of
governance” (p.17). Poor management leads to resource depletion and water quality issues
(Kammeyer et al., 2020) while competition for water can pose a threat to social, political, and
economic systems all over the world. In order to avoid devastating water shortages and even
conflict, nations and states must develop and utilize ways to improve ecological sustainability,
economic efficiency, and to share water equitably. Because both current and past approaches to
water resource management have contributed to many of the existing problems, it is critical that
new methods be utilized to counter these negative trends. These new methods often mean using
approaches that are comprehensive, integrated, and collaborative (Huffman, 2009; Kammeyer et
al., 2020). These methods must also provide an environment and institutions that enable
stakeholders to work together successfully (Global Water Partnership, 2000).
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One such approach is the interstate compact. Because of their flexibility and adaptive
organizational structures as well as their unique position as regional bodies located between state
and federal governments, interstate compacts can provide a form of governance that can counter
negative trends and provide new and varied approaches to transboundary water resource
management (Frankfurter & Landis, 1925; Larson, 2015). Compact commissions provide
authority and structure for agreements (Stephenson, 2000) as well as coordination and
integration for various agencies and organizations.
Researchers have addressed various aspects of interstate water compacts with some
investigators taking a broad view of interstate water disputes, including examining compacts as a
part of an overarching water resource management strategy (Clemons, 2004; Mandarano et al.,
2008). Other researchers focus on specific compacts while addressing larger issues such as what
works and what does not (Featherstone, 1999; Kauffman, 2014; Stephenson, 2000; Wehr, 2014).
Still others emphasize models for developing interstate water compacts (Draper, 2002;
Karkkainen, 2018; Muys et al., 2007). However, Florestano (1994) has suggested that there is a
general deficiency in scholarly interest in compacts due to the fact that compacts are often
focused on “narrow issues of little public concern rather than on major policy issues” (p. 25). She
adds that while the increase in federal activities in general has over-shadowed interstate issues,
scholars should again consider the importance of these more regional relationships. More
recently, Finkel (2019) decried the lack of concern over compacts as he says, “…they are
increasingly important in an age of polarization, as they form between the lines of state and
federal power….” (p. 1578).
While previous research provides a substantial body of knowledge about water compacts,
this study builds on prior research by expanding and integrating established theories to explain
3

transboundary water resource management in general and interstate compacts in particular. This
research examines the context of the problems faced by transboundary states and how these
affect the structure of the compact. The study addresses implementation issues, identifies the
mechanisms or means that facilitate compact development and operation, and describes the
outcomes that emerge from using such mechanisms. This study adds depth to previous research
and adds new theoretical constructs with regard to managing shared waters. Lastly, it suggests
ways to apply these new concepts more widely to transboundary water conflicts.
To achieve these goals, this study focuses on the Delaware River Basin Compact
(Compact) as a case study. Draper (2002) has noted that some type of interstate compact is in use
in most of the river basins in the United States with varying degrees of success. However, the
Delaware River Basin Compact has proven to be “extraordinarily successful in resolving
interstate conflicts over the water rights and water management of the Delaware River Basin…”
(Draper, 2002, p. 84), a basin that encompasses four states; New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
and Pennsylvania and serves over 13 million people (Delaware River Basin Commission,
2020a).
The Delaware River Basin Compact is a comprehensive agreement through which states
share authority through a river basin commission with broad powers to carry out its
responsibilities. As such, it is able to address issues in the basin holistically; coordinating and
integrating federal, state, municipal, and private agencies as well as conducting long range
planning and overseeing development of basin water resources (Delaware River Basin Compact,
1961; Muys, 1995). Because of the success of the Delaware River Basin Compact, it served as a
model for the 1970 Susquehanna River Basin Compact and has been incorporated into model
water sharing agreements for new compacts in other areas of the country (Draper, 2002).
4

Given the success of the Delaware River Basin Compact, it is inherently suitable as a
case study for developing a better understanding of how interstate compacts can be used for
managing shared water resources. Utilizing the Delaware River Basin Compact, this research
identifies, describes, and analyzes institutions, mechanisms, and relationships that contribute to
the successful operation of the Compact. Finally, it integrates the findings into a broad
explanation of compact function that can be used for future analysis and compact development.
Chapter One discusses the extent of water scarcity and its impacts both internationally
and in the United States. Chapter Two provides an overview of resource policy beginning with
federalism and moving to increasingly shared governance systems culminating with interstate
compacts. Chapter Three describes the grounded theory case study approach used in the
research. The findings of the case study are presented in Chapter Four, including an in-depth
examination of the Delaware River Basin and the history of the development and implementation
of the Compact. This section also includes a detailed study of the Delaware River Basin
Commission (DRBC) and the mechanisms that it utilizes as the primary governing body in the
Basin, including how the Commission is dealing with current challenges. Chapter Five discusses
and integrates the findings and explores ways to utilize these results in the development of new
and more effective compacts.
Sharing Water Across International Boundaries
Severe freshwater scarcity currently affects four billion people, or two-thirds of the
world’s population, at least one month of the year. Half a billion people experience severe water
scarcity year round (Mekonnen & Hoekstra, 2016). This situation is exacerbated by the fact that
almost three-fifths of the world’s water, encompassing some 268 river basins is shared by two or
more countries. In many cases, these shared resources have led to conflicts between states or
5

nations (transboundary water conflicts), over water allocation and equitable sharing (Phelps,
2007).
In Pakistan, for example, 76 percent of the water resources originate in another country.
In India, a country with 18 percent of the world’s population, just over one-third of the water
resources begin in another country. The Nile Basin consists of 11 countries with diverging
interests between upstream and downstream countries pitting Egypt and Sudan against upstream
nations, especially Ethiopia (Detges et al., 2017; Greenberg, 2009).
Syria, a part of the Euphrates-Tigris basin, is located in one of the driest areas in the
world. It has experienced growing pressures on its water resources for the last 25 years. A severe
years-long drought in the area has resulted in the movement of large groups of people from rural
to urban centers, food insecurity for more than a million individuals, and increased
unemployment and political instability (Gleick, 2014). In Ethiopia, Afghanistan, India, China,
and other water stressed countries, civil unrest resulting in fatalities has emerged due to issues of
water scarcity, allocation, and environmental degradation (Phelps, 2007). Other areas of
transboundary conflicts are the Helmand and Harirud rivers in Afghanistan and Iran and the
Mekong River in Southeast Asia. In India, there is a long standing conflict over the Cauvery
River where violent protests have emerged over water distribution between two states (Detges et
al., 2017).
Internationally, the United States shares the Columbia River basin, the St. Lawrence
Basin (including the Great Lakes), the St. Croix, the Nelson-Saskatchewan, the Yukon, and
several smaller basins with Canada. It also shares the Colorado and the Rio Grande basins with
Mexico (Veilleau, 2012). Although there are presently a number of agreements between the
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United States and these countries (Adler, 2008; Karkkainen, 2018; Payne, 2019), as climate
variability and populations increase so does the potential for international conflict.
Transboundary Water Sharing Issues in the United States
In the United States, disputes between states over water have a long history and the
potential to increase with the uncertainty related to climate change and population shifts. The
many lakes, rivers, and groundwater sources that are shared by two or more states provide ample
opportunity for conflict. George Sherk (2005), a noted environmental resource scholar, observed
that –
Of the fifty states that comprise the United States of America, only two – Alaska
and Hawaii—do not share a ground or surface water resource with another state.
Accordingly…the forty-eight contiguous states fall into one of two categories:
those states that are (or have been) involved in an interstate water conflict or those
states that are going to be involved in an interstate water conflict. (p. 765)
In the arid western United States, conflict over water has been especially protracted,
intense, and acrimonious with litigation between various states not uncommon. In the West, the
Colorado River supplies water to seven states; California, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico,
Utah, Wyoming, and Nevada. Because the demand for the water in the river often exceeds the
supply, the Colorado is known as “the most legislated, most debated, and the most litigated river
in the entire world” (Reisner, 1993, p. 120).
The Klamath Basin, located in Oregon and California, is home to agriculture,
hydropower, Indian tribes, fishermen, and at least two endangered species. It has become a fierce
battleground between competing users (Doremus & Tarlock, 2008). At least one western “water
war” nearly escalated beyond the courts. In 1934, California’s planned construction of the Parker
Dam on the Colorado River resulted in Arizona’s governor mobilizing the National Guard,
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bringing construction to a halt. Only after an intervention by the Secretary of the Interior, the
U.S. Supreme Court, and Congress, was the project finally completed in 1938 (Harrison, 2015).
Even in the more temperate eastern United States, as water stresses continue to grow,
competition for water resources will increase, resulting in more frequent and more intense
conflicts (Karl et al., 2009). In the Northeast, hydraulic fracturing or fracking has emerged as an
issue in the Delaware and Susquehanna river basins, leading to intense discussions focusing on
water use and regulatory authority (Craig, 2013). Maryland and Virginia have contested
sovereignty over the Potomac since the 17th century (Christie, 2013). In the South, Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia have been engaged in the “Tri-State Water Wars” for more than 30 years.
At stake here, at the very least, is water for agricultural use, domestic water supply (especially
for the growing city of Atlanta), and a coastal fishery. Out of this conflict has developed what
has been called a “cottage industry of ACF-related litigation” (Wehr, 2014, p. 213). In the
Southeast, an area for future contention exists between South Carolina and Georgia over the
Savannah River and between South Carolina and North Carolina over the Catawba (Roper, 2015;
Williams, 2020).
Seeking a Solution
As the planet grows warmer, as populations increase and move, as regulations stepping
back environmental protections are implemented, the need for better water resource management
will increase. As the need increases, so does the complexity of both the problems and the
solutions. Across the country, water agencies and the private sector are seeking to improve
technical and scientific approaches to water resource management while developing new waterefficient technologies. As one author has pointed out, “The sustainable management of water
resources in times of global change is one of the most pressing challenges of the 21 st century”
8

(Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010, p. 571). Ultimately, though, containing the threat posed by water
scarcity will depend on finding and utilizing effective legal, political, and administrative
mechanisms to manage these resources (Muys & Sherk, 2016).
Challenges arise from several sources including the fact that water flows across borders
without regard for political boundaries. A river can flow through any number of states or
territories, significantly expanding the number of agencies and organizations involved in
managing the resource thus increasing the likelihood of conflict (Craig, 2008). In addition,
federalism means that governmental functions are dispersed among different levels and branches
of government, and policy solutions and institutional structures differ both within and across
jurisdictions, and different levels of government (Christy, 2014; Garrick & De Stefano, 2016;
Larson, 2015).

9

CHAPTER TWO
WATER RESOURCE POLICY: AN EVOLUTION FROM FEDERALISM TO
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS
To better understand the development of water resource policy, it is helpful to have some
understanding of federalism. In the United States, federal and state governments receive their
authority from the Constitution1 with those powers not explicitly allocated to the federal
government being retained by the states or the people (Anderson, 2015). In a federal system such
as the United States, the government consists of several tiers – federal, state, local, sometimes
regional2 – that must function together. However, given this structure, the different levels of
government often overlap or shift, causing confusion and sometimes leading to conflict. An
example of this juxtaposition of authority is in the areas of water allocation and water rights.
While these issues usually lie within the purview of the states, they become a federal matter
when water crosses a state boundary or navigation is an issue (Craig, 2010; Kraft & Furlong,
2018).
Obviously, the federal and state governments are not the only entities involved in water
resource issues. Local governments, non-governmental agencies, non-profits, individuals, and
other interest groups also have a stake in water resource policy (Kraft & Furlong, 2018; Sabatier
et al., 2005; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005; Wright, 1988). Intergovernmental relations is a more
comprehensive approach to governance that includes the entire range of federal, state, and local
interactions. This method is extremely interdependent with any number of levels of government

The tenth amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”
2 Power is sometimes shared with Native American tribes (Kraft & Furlong, 2018). This is especially relevant in water policy
where the Winters Doctrine acknowledges implicit water rights for reservations (Cech, 2018).
1
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involved in a specific issue or area (G. R. Stephens & Wikstrom, 2007; Wright, 1988). Even
more inclusive, adaptive governance further expands participation in water resource policy,
enlarging governance institutions to include previously independent experts, critical users,
authorities, interest groups, and others as a way to develop sustainable, long-term policy
solutions (Scholz & Stiftel, 2005, p. 5). Integrated water resource management (IWRM) expands
the development and coordination of water resources to include social, economic, environmental,
and technical aspects of water resource management (The World Bank cited in Davis, 2007).
Furthermore, IWRM coordinates the management of water, land, and other related resources in a
way that equitably and sustainably maximizes economic and social welfare (Agarwal et al.,
2000).
The interstate compact is one approach that has been used on many of the river basins in
the United States (Draper, 2002). Interstate compacts are agreements between states, much like
treaties (Schlager & Heikkila, 2009). They provide a means to address issues that cross state
lines and that are not amenable to ordinary regulation in a multi-jurisdictional environment (Sax
et al., 2006). While water compacts have become a critical, and often successful, mechanism for
managing water resources across the country (Christie, 2013; J. F. Zimmerman, 2012), many
were developed in the early 20th century and are inadequate to resolve the more complex water
sharing issues in today’s environment (Draper, 2002; Payne, 2019).
In moving from federalism to interstate compacts, these increasingly complex and
inclusive approaches to water resource governance provide a framework for examining how
water policy functions within interstate compacts as well as how water policy has transformed to
meet changing environments. These governance approaches also offer insight into the policies
and mechanisms that contribute to compact success or failure.
11

Federalism
Federalism is crucial to the study of conflict resolution in the field of water policy
because it generates the structure for interaction between the different government entities
involved in the development and implementation of water policy. Water resource management is
further complicated by the discrepancies between political boundaries and the boundaries of river
basins. That is, political boundaries do not always neatly align with basin boundaries. Given
those disparities, it comes as no surprise that, “Few functions of the American Federal system
seem less suited physically to state boundaries than the management of our water resources”
(Lepawsky, 1950, p. 631). Mandarano, Featherstone, and Paulsen (2008) expand on that
assertion:
Water and federalism are a complicated mix as water flows through the hydrologic
cycle without regard to political boundaries. The physical boundaries of river basins
do not coincide with the geographic boundaries of political jurisdictions. The
management of interstate water resources is complicated by the multiple,
conflicting, and overlapping functions and interests of federal and state
governments, and is further complicated by conflicting regulatory authority and
policy priorities between different federal agencies. (p.138)
From the late 1700s, states have had the primary responsibility for water resource
management within their borders (Huffman, 2008). Nevertheless, the federal government has
gained significant authority over water resources under the Commerce Clause, the Rivers and
Harbors Act (1889), the Federal Clean Water Act (1972), and the Endangered Species Act
(1973). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is responsible for licensing non-federal
hydropower projects (Muys, 1995) while the Army Corp of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation build and control large-scale reclamation and flood control projects (Reisner, 1993).

12

A Brief History of Water Federalism
Initially, dual federalism characterized the relationship between the state and federal
governments in the area of water resource management. State governments oversaw water
allocation, fisheries, and water pollution abatement (J. F. Zimmerman, 2012) with the federal
government almost exclusively maintaining oversight over navigation and interstate commerce
(Craig, 2010). Given the diversity of local conditions, the federal government has generally
delegated control of water allocation to states, rejecting a “one size fits all” approach to water
management. Dual federalism also recognizes that water law and water policy choices often
reflect a state’s contention as to which decisions best serve the state’s development and welfare
needs. In essence, this type of local control is acceptable as long as a state’s water allocation
policies are of limited scope. However, as the actions of one state began to affect other states or
the interests of the federal government, a need for a new, more comprehensive system emerged
(Craig, 2010).
Gerlak (2014) suggests that historically water federalism in the United States has
developed through five stages; state-based federalism, centralized federalism, cooperative
federalism, devolution, and pragmatic federalism. From 1776 to the early 20th century, statebased federalism saw early, and not always successful, efforts at flood control and canal building
(Lepawsky, 1950). In 1784, the Bi-State Commission between Maryland and Virginia was
developed as a response to the need for improved navigation on the Potomac River. This
agreement was the first interstate commission and heralded the beginning of water resource
management built on cooperation among states (Interstate Council on Water Policy cited in
Gerlak, 2014).

13

While much of the control of waterways remained with the states, the federal government
began to increase its involvement in water resource management. From 1787 to 1838, tensions
grew between the expanding federal water agencies and the states over control of the waterways.
It was during this period that conflict between the states and the federal government became
common due to efforts by the federal government to increase its influence over water governance
(Shallat, 1992).
The Gallatin Report, published in 1808, was the first centralized effort to manage water
resources at the regional level as Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin requested $20 million to
build a system of roads and waterways (Shallat, 1992). By the 1850s, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers was involved in river and canal development, navigation, and flood control as well as
large-scale flood prevention planning in the Mississippi River Basin (Clarke and McCool cited in
Gerlak, 2014, Shallat, 1992). In 1879, the Mississippi River Commission became the first federal
commission to emphasize both flood control and navigation. Increased efforts by the federal
government in river and canal development, navigation, and flood control and prevention
notwithstanding, states still maintained control over water allocation (Gerlak, 2014).
Centralization of water federalism continued from 1900 through 1960. The Reclamation
Act of 1902 funded dams and reservoirs in the arid west while in the 1920s, the federal
government began taking an active role in navigation, hydropower development, and flood
control. The Federal Power Act of 1920 gave the Federal Power Commission the authority to
manage the sale of power from federally owned and operated dams as well as to license nonfederal power generating stations on navigable waters (Gerlak, 2014). The Army Corps of
Engineers, under the authority of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925, was tasked with surveying
all navigable waters and to engage in planning for irrigation, navigation, power production, and
14

flood control. Created by Congress in 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority is an example of the
integrated planning and development of an entire river basin by the federal government. The
Flood Control Acts enacted by Congress in 1936 and 1944 provided funding for hundreds of
projects and gave the Corps of Engineers wide-ranging authority to build and maintain these
facilities. An unintended consequence of these activities was an increase in jurisdictional
disputes between federal agencies and between the federal and state governments due to the
overlapping purposes of many of the projects (Gerlak, 2014). However, as Huffman (2008)
concludes:
The scope and magnitude of all this federal water development activity over the
first sixty years of the twentieth century cannot be overemphasized. It gave the
federal government a much expanded role in water management, but did not
significantly interfere with state responsibilities for the assignment and
enforcement of water rights. (p.681)
Cooperative federalism was the dominant form of water federalism from the 1960s to the
1980s and resulted in legislation such as the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968), the Clean Water
Act (1972), and the Endangered Species Act (1973). Signed into law by President Nixon, the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) signified a major regulatory shift in the management of
environmental resources, including water resources, into federal control (Gerlak, 2014). Even so,
states remained important actors in water resource policy even with this significant rise in federal
legislation. As the federal government increasingly leveraged funding to move its agenda
forward, programs such as the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund (§6 of the
ESA) were used to provide grants to states and territories to enable their participation in
conservation efforts (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2016).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), now known as the Clean Water Act,
was enacted by Congress in 1948. Beginning in 1956, a number of changes were made to the
15

FWPCA, notably the 1972 amendment calling for restoring and maintaining “the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” (Clean Water Act, 1972, §1251(a)).
These amendments resulted in a substantial shift in water quality regulation from state level to
federal level water standards. As a result of this new regulation, states were required to make
extensive and costly improvements in their municipal water treatment facilities. However,
substantial federal funding was allocated to pay for these changes, giving state and local
governments much needed assistance (Landy cited in Gerlak, 2014; Keiser & Shapiro, 2018).
In the 1980s, the national government moved from using fiscal incentives to smooth and
encourage intergovernmental relations to enacting a more regulatory approach (Kincaid, 1990),
ushering in an era of more coercive than cooperative water policy. While cooperative federalism
brought about political change “without seeming to do violence to tradition and by compensating
state and local officials for federal intrusions into their authority with fiscal assistance” (Kincaid,
1990, p. 140), this later period of federalism was criticized by Gerlak (2014) as one of
“devolution and penny-pinching” (p. 45). States were given more responsibility for water policy,
including cost sharing and a reduction in overall federal funding. President Reagan also
withdrew federal participation and funding for institutions supporting regional water planning
(Christy, 2014; Walker cited in Gerlak, 2014; Loucks, 2003).
At the same time, changes in the Clean Water Act brought about partnerships between
the EPA and the states, while the 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement resulted in a federal/state
effort to protect and restore the bay. Federal and state officials worked together to develop
cooperative agreements between the Department of Interior and the states in the upper Colorado
basin to manage the river with environmentalists and other water resource users also included in
this process. However, as states improved their ability to manage their water resources, the
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relationship between the states and the federal government grew increasingly acrimonious, the
result of decreasing funding and increasing power issues (Gerlak, 2014).
The devolution of water resource management that commenced under President Reagan
continued under President Clinton; however, environmental restoration emerged as a focus area
for this new administration (Gerlak, 2014). This approach was the result of mounting concern for
environmental protection that had emerged in the last half of the 20th century. The practice of
dam removal illustrates this new focus. As Huffman (2008) points out:
During the height of the federal dam building boom in the middle decades of the
last century, any environmental objections that existed could barely be heard above
the din of support for federally financed water related infrastructure. Today, the
prospects for any proposed new dam is nil. Indeed the prospects for the survival of
some existing dams are growing dimmer by the day….” (p. 688)
Although it’s not likely that any large dams will be removed to promote environmental
rehabilitation, smaller dams have already been taken down. Significant amounts of funding from
the federal government helped support these efforts on a project by project basis (Huffman,
2008).
In addition to restoration, the easing of regulatory barriers for state and local governments
encouraged collaborative intergovernmental partnerships. In 1996, the Safe Drinking Water Act
of 1974 was amended to provide additional funding to support states in complying with
environmental standards. States were also allowed more authority over drinking water standards
and their enforcement. Complaints from local governments about the high costs of compliance
with EPA standards increasingly resulted in small entities being allowed to apply alternative
treatment and monitoring standards (Kincaid, 1998). The 1998 Clean Water Action Plan sought
to increase the coordination of federal water quality efforts dealing with non-point source
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pollution.3 The plan offered funding and technical assistance to partnerships between state, tribal,
and local governments. Efforts by later administrations have focused on encouraging
collaborative partnerships in areas such as the Great Lakes and the Florida Everglades (Gerlak,
2014).
The final stage of water federalism, pragmatic water federalism, employs collaborative
partnerships and adaptable management strategies, and is problem and process oriented (Gerlak,
2014). Collaboration has become a critical facet of water resource management because the
traditional response to greater demands for water, increasing the supply by impounding it in
lakes and reservoirs or moving it through large, expensive, and inefficient canals and pipes is no
longer viable (Reisner, 1993). Often, the only solution available now is shifting water away from
one use and moving it to another.4 Given the lack of local and interstate water markets, the shifts
rely solely on the political process. It is here and now that collaboration becomes critical
(Huffman, 2008). Pragmatic water federalism also supports adaptable management strategies.
These strategies focus on “learning by doing,” recognizing the inherent uncertainty in water
resource management and encouraging flexibility when making decisions (Gerlak, 2014).
In the latter part of the 20th century, there was a significant shift in the way water
resources were managed, moving away from large federal infrastructure projects such as dams
and levees to integrated and systems-based approaches (Mandarano & Mason, 2013). These
approaches are much more suitable to the regional and watershed-based applications found in
basin commissions and interstate compacts. Finally, current water federalism is focused on
processes and problem solving with federal, state, and local governments engaging in planning

3

Pollution whose source cannot be pinpointed directly. One example is fertilizer run-off from farm fields. No one individual or
firm can be held responsible for the problem.
4 Such as water recycling in metro areas or moving water from hydropower to ecosystem restoration

18

within collaborative partnerships. In this way, transboundary water issues can be dealt with in a
way that is more sensitive to the various contexts found in these systems rather than using a more
conventional and rigid “stove pipe” approach (American Water Resources Assoc. cited in
Gerlak, 2014).
Rhett Larson (2015) suggests an alternative approach to “traditional” federalism for
managing transboundary common-pool resources such as rivers. Rather than use a binary state or
federal approach, he proposes what he refers to as “interstitial federalism” or “that level of
governance between state and federal jurisdiction” (p. 908). He uses the river basin commissions
formed by interstate water compacts as examples of institutions operating in this manner.
Interstitial federalism differs from cooperative federalism in that it forms a new
jurisdiction under the compact agreement that effectively crosses existing boundaries and
conforms to the confines of the resource. Unlike horizontal federalism, which consists of
relationships between two or more states or between local governments (Sbragia, 2013),
interstitial institutions such as the river basin commissions formed by compacts are the primary
regulatory bodies. They are made up of state and federal officials who jointly implement the
compact and administer the river basin. With appropriate authority to carry out dispute
resolution, regulatory functions, permitting, monitoring and other activities, river basin
commissions can improve resource management in “the most critical and hotly contested
interstate basins….” (Larson, 2015, p. 952).
This section has examined the emergence of water federalism over time, moving from a
working model of dual federalism to interstitial federalism that combines the authority and
functions of different layers and branches of government into a singular whole within the federal
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system. The next section expands on the idea of federalism to include governments at all levels
as well as stakeholders who are non-governmental entities.
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations
While federalism continues to be a major concept when discussing the distribution of
power, authority, and responsibility across national and state governments, an expanded, more
inclusive model has emerged. This approach, Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), originally
developed as a pragmatic approach for using policy to mitigate the economic and social issues
emerging from the Great Depression (G. R. Stephens & Wikstrom, 2007; Wright, 1988).
Although federalism has historically focused on national and state relationships, IGR
deals with interactions among officials across all levels and branches of government. Federalism
also differs from IGR in that IGR goes beyond the legal focus of federalism to include the
informal and often less visible actions of officials. IGR also taps into more subtle nuances of
government, including the thoughts and perceptions of officials who make and carry out
decisions at the various levels. While federalism is based on a hierarchical model of authority,
IGR recognizes that these power differentials exist without suggesting that the national level is,
by default, superior. Although federalism is still an important concept, IGR “suggests the utility
of a different way of referring to the multiple and complex interjurisdictional relationships found
in the United States” (Wright, 1988, p. 39).
Although Stephens and Wikstrom (2007) state unequivocally that none of the models
used to explain the overall complexity and interactions of the U.S. federal system are adequate,
they suggest that Deil Wright’s (1988) “overlapping authority model” describes at least some of
that complexity. Wright’s model proposes that any jurisdiction is a mixture of areas of exclusive
control by national, state, and local entities comingling with areas where two or more entities are
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involved to various degrees. He defines these relationships as overlapping among national, state,
and local units of government. There are three characteristic features of Wright’s model: First,
there are substantial areas of governmental operations that are comprised of national, state, and
local units or officials functioning simultaneously; second, autonomous areas or single-unit
jurisdictions are limited, and third, the power and influence available to any one unit or official is
limited resulting in the need to bargain or compromise (G. R. Stephens & Wikstrom, 2007;
Wright, 2013, p. 57).
Agranoff and Radin (2014) expand on Wright’s overlapping authority model to more
closely align with the more recent inclusion of additional stakeholders such as non-governmental
agencies, non-profits, companies and corporations, and other interested parties. Agranoff and
Radin also emphasize bargaining as a critical component of the decision-making process. While
Wright’s model suggests a bargaining method that is not hierarchical or market-based,
realistically, the legal and formal structures found in federal program implementation tend to
follow those two approaches. As a result, attempts to establish decision making processes that
are more in line with this model have not resulted in significant positive outcomes (Agranoff &
Radin, 2014).
Wright’s model provides a foundation for replacing a somewhat static model of
federalism, involving either a state or a federal jurisdiction, with a more dynamic one of
collaboration across program areas, between states, between states and the federal government,
and between states and local entities (Agranoff & Radin, 2014). Given that water resources often
span a number of political jurisdictions, the overlapping authority model can be expanded to
include the many types and levels of actors that make up water resource governance.
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Adaptive Governance
For decades, an assortment of federal, state, and local agencies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), citizens groups, and other stakeholders have struggled to sustainably and
effectively manage water resources. The current uncertainty due to climate change, population
growth, declining ecosystems, aging infrastructure and other factors is creating additional
pressure on these resources. Meanwhile, water users with various needs and priorities are mired
in conflicting and overlapping layers of government (Doremus, 2011; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005).
Water resource management is further complicated by incongruences between the natural bounds
of river basins and political boundaries as well as conflicting regulatory power and political
agendas among diverse federal agencies (Mandarano et al., 2008).
Adaptive governance emerged as a way to deal with these changes. Unexpected stresses
on water systems can endanger access to adequate water, resulting in conflicts and requiring
governing bodies to address new issues that may be beyond their capacity and expertise. Water
stress can involve new stakeholders who may challenge unfamiliar agency policies and
procedures and there may be little understanding of how to resolve the conflicts and solve the
underlying problems. Adaptive governance emerged as a new kind of governance institution that
addresses collective action problems occurring between different types of resource users (Scholz
& Stiftel, 2005).
In situations where multiple actors are involved, successful efforts by one agency can
lead to what Scholz and Stiftel (2005) refer to as “second-order collective action conflicts” (p. 1).
These conflicts emerge from unintended consequences that occur when actions by one agency
negatively impact other agencies and users. Irrigation, hydropower, groundwater pumping, and
industrial and residential development all have spillover effects, some of which are extreme and
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can lead to disputes (Barnett, 2007; Reisner, 1993). Also, a lack of knowledge about managing
large-scale environmental systems is compounded by the unforeseeable effects of global
warming, making it more difficult to plan for and manage resources in an equitable manner
(Doremus, 2011; Mandarano & Mason, 2013). Lastly, adaptive governance represents a
movement away from decision making by agency experts who may lack a real stake in the
process and toward more place-based, democratic governance (Sabatier et al., 2005), an essential
characteristic for watersheds and water resource management.
As a policy model, adaptive governance is based in institutional theory and focuses on
the development of formal and informal institutions for the governance of common pool
resources such as rivers, lakes, and streams. Adaptive governance leans heavily on two
methodological approaches; the works of Elinor Ostrom and others on governing institutions
(DeCaro et al., 2017; Dietz et al., 2003; Ostrom, 1990) and the use of ecological systems theory
for natural resource management (See Cilliers et al., 2013). Adaptive governance incorporates
ideas from political economy, resource and environmental economics, experimental economics,
evolutionary game theory, organizational theory, ecology, systems theory, and complex systems
science and has been seen as an alternative to traditional approaches such as command-andcontrol and predict-and-control (Hatfield-Dodds et al., 2007; Rijke et al., 2012).
Adaptive governance utilizes a collaborative network structure that increases adaptability
through public participation and cooperative behaviors (Chaffin et al., 2016). Like Wright’s
overlapping authority model (Agranoff & Radin, 2014; Wright, 1988), adaptive governance is
inclusive with numerous relationships between different levels and branches of government and
includes NGOs, non-profit organizations, corporations, and other stakeholders as actors. Also
similar to the overlapping authority model, adaptive governance recognizes the importance of
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bargaining that emerges from a network structure in which power and influence are both limited
and disbursed across multiple jurisdictions or persons (See Chaffin et al., 2016; Scholz & Stiftel,
2005; Wright, 1988).
A number of components can contribute to developing successful adaptive governance
institutions. These include clearly defined boundaries that constrain freeriding and interference
by outside interests, polycentric governance in which political authority is vested in multiple
centers of non-hierarchical power, and public participation in which the presence of effective
representation, including both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, guarantees
legitimate and meaningful participation. Other important aspects of adaptive governance are a
decision process that captures and articulates the needs of affected users and melds them into
realistic policies that can result in consensus; data and technological expertise to provide
scientific perspectives on policy issues, outcomes, and assumptions that may conflict with new
information; and public learning that leads stakeholders to become aware of the reasons for
specific actions, the larger consequences of those actions, and ways to mitigate harms and
increase benefits. Additional important factors are access to adequate funding, monitoring to
audit conditions and behavior and mechanisms to resolve conflict; and the ability to produce an
efficient, equitable, and sustainable solution to the problem (Huitema et al., 2009; Leach &
Pelkey, 2001; Ostrom, 1990; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005).
The adaptive governance approach has a number of strengths; inclusiveness, flexibility
and adaptability, and focus on the specifics of each situation. Even so, several problem areas
must be considered. For example, who should be included in the decision process and how much
authority should they have? Ideally, all stakeholders should be involved in the democratic
process. However, total participation can quickly become unwieldy and costly. Moving to a more
24

representative model has its own costs in that it can reflect differential opportunities for
participation (Ruhl, 2005; Stiftel & Scholz, 2005). Other difficulties include disagreements about
the science involved (Ozawa, 2005), issues with the use of river basins as boundaries and a lack
of decision making power for stakeholders (Huitema et al., 2009).
In spite of some noteworthy problems, adaptive governance institutions have a significant
but somewhat limited role in resolving conflicts within a federalist system. They can work with
various authorities to coordinate policies. They can enhance relationships among conflicting
parties and encourage collaborative problem solving. These institutions can also be useful in
convincing ecosystem users to support new policies as well as providing an arena for innovative
policy ideas. They can also be heavily involved in conflict resolution both locally and on a largescale basis involving whole river systems (Scholz & Stiftel, 2005).
It has been suggested that adaptive governance institutions are flexible enough to respond
and adapt to change and the increased levels of ambiguity related to climate change and its
impacts. These institutions can respond to new information and new and different types of
uncertainties while taking into consideration the needs, capacities, vulnerabilities of human and
environmental systems (Honkonen, 2017; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010).
Adaptive governance is a method for addressing the multi-scale and dynamic nature of
different interests in resource management with emphasis on negotiation, information
integration, developing strategies, outcome evaluation, and the sharing of innovative practices
(Bischoff-Mattson & Lynch, 2016). Similar in some ways to Gerlak’s (2014) pragmatic water
federalism5 and Larson’s (2015) interstitial federalism, adaptive governance “involves the

5

Pragmatic federalism utilizes collaborative partnerships, adaptable management strategies, the use of data to drive decisions,
organizational learning, and flexible decision making.
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evolution of new governance institutions capable of generating long-term, sustainable policy
solutions to wicked problems through coordinated efforts involving previously independent
systems of users, knowledge, authorities, and organized interests” (Scholz & Stiftel, 2005, p. 5).
Paul Sabatier (2005) calls adaptive governance “a complex normative framework for the proper
governance of natural resources” (p. 196). As such, adaptive governance can provide a suitable
lens through which to examine the workings of interstate water compacts.
Integrated Water Resource Management
Similar to adaptive governance in its collaborative approach, Integrated Water Resource
Management (IWRM) is predicated on the idea that water use that supports economic and social
objectives while maintaining environmental sustainability can be achieved “…through
integrated, collaborative, and multiple objective strategic and operational planning and
implementation processes that involve stakeholders, rather than fragmented, single focus
planning and implementation with limited participation” (Davis, 2007, p. 427).
Even though the idea of IWRM has existed for decades, it has no specific, official
definition (American Water Resources Assoc., 2012; Davis, 2007). It has been defined as “…a
coordinated, goal-directed process for controlling the development and use of river, lake, ocean,
wetland, and other water assets” (Cardwell et al., 2006, p. 9) while the World Bank describes
IWRM as a “perspective that ensures that social, economic, environmental, and technical
dimensions are taken into account in the management and development of water resources”
(Quoted in Davis, 2007, p. 428). The Global Water Project defines IWRM as “… a process
which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related
resources, in order to maximize their resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (Agarwal et al., 2000, p.
26

22) . The Army Corps of Engineers views IWRM as a holistic and collaborative framework and
as a way to deal with uncertainty and complexity. It also provides a way to address different
water uses with a range of benefits. The Corps of Engineers further defines IWRM as:
…a holistic focus on water resources challenges and opportunities that reflects the
coordinated development and management of water land and related resources.
IWRM maximizes economic services and environmental quality and ensures public
safety, while providing for the sustainability of vital ecosystems. (USACE quoted
in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2014, p. 3)
IWRM represents an important change in the way water resources have been managed.
Previously, much of water resource management reflected a priority for single-use planning that
satisfied only narrow interests. In addition, during much of the 20th century, the command-andcontrol approach did not sufficiently address the human dimensions of water resource
management. Changing social values mean that approaches that focus closely on developing
water supply without attention to social and ecosystem outcomes are no longer adequate
(Akamani, 2016; American Water Resources Assoc., 2012; See Burdge, 2004; U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 2014).
Internationally, IWRM is closely linked with sustainable development. It is also a
component of natural resource management, which is a part of environmental management. In
some areas, IWRM covers both water and land management, linking land use to water quality.
Davis (2007) consolidated benefits of IWRM from a number of sources and suggests that IWRM
can provide a potential forum to address the following:


Incorporating the hydrologic cycle and hydrologic basins into water supply and
demand issues



Coordinating the conjunctive use of surface and ground water



Developing multiple objectives for water utilization



Improving efficiency of water use
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Reducing or mitigating conflicts over water use



Evaluating the effects of dams and hydraulic works and their alternatives



Coordinating habitat and biodiversity protection



Coordinating and improving water quality and quantity



Incorporating equal access and social equity



Involving stakeholders and decision making at the lowest level possible



Expediting improved data collection and its use in decision making processes



Ensuring regulatory compliance, and



Connecting to broad social programs and objectives (Davis, 2007).

Water resource management intersects and overlaps with many other sectors including
the environment, agriculture, energy, public health, infrastructure and others and includes both
vertical and horizontal relationships. IWRM can be seen as a systematic framework for
governance that works to integrate these different sectors, actors, and institutions (Varis et al.,
2014).
In order for agencies to effectively implement IWRM, they must take into account local
political structures, the unity of the resource within the basin, as well as the existence and
capabilities of community organizations. Also, institutional development is not simply about the
creation of formal organizations but also includes formal rules and regulations, customs and
practices, information, ideas, community group interest and involvement, and community
networks. Together, these provide an institutional framework within which water management
decision makers work (Davis, 2007; Ostrom, 1990).
An important precept of IWRM is that traditional top-down management strategies must
be at least partially replaced by bottom-up approaches. Bottom-up approaches help to ensure that
the process is demand driven and can provide gains for the entire range of users. As a result, it
may be necessary to develop new institutions such as community-based organizations that are
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active participants in the management process. Other solutions might include democratically
elected, representative advisory committees or even market-based strategies. However, the
presence of bottom-up approaches does not mean that complete devolution of decision making to
the local community is needed or feasible (Agarwal et al., 2000). Instead, IWRM institutions can
be viewed as hybrid with both top-down and bottom up functions. Top-down structures would
provide an appropriate environment for facilitating macro-level objectives, implemented through
basin-wide governance; bottom-up structures would facilitate collective action (Davis, 2007).
IWRM has proven to be difficult to implement at the watershed level for a number of
reasons, including difficulties drawing boundaries, developing decision making structures and
processes, and maintaining accountability. Blomquist and Schlager (2005) state, “Collective choices
about the scope of management, who participates and how, and how collective decisions are revised
and challenged cannot be avoided by creating a single watershed authority with broad powers to
comprehensively address watershed problems” (p. 113). Even so, IWRM approaches are being
promoted as demands on water resources increase (Cardwell et al., 2006) and there is movement
toward more widespread adoption of this method in many locations (Davis, 2007).

Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts provide a way for states to work together to solve pressing regional
problems such as water allocation but also issues such as pollution, flood planning and
management, and comprehensive water basin development. However, water allocation is one of
the largest, most critical issues in water resource management and results in significant and
sustained conflict between states (Bennett, 2013; Stephenson, 2000; Wehr, 2014). In addition,
allocation disputes often impact other water resource issues, making it an overriding matter for
states sharing water resources. While transboundary water allocation issues can be addressed by
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the Supreme Court or by Congress, the interstate compact has been recommended as the most
appropriate method for doing so (See Colorado v. Kansas, 1943, p. 392; Muys & Sherk, 2016).
Interstate Water Allocation Methods
In the United States, water is allocated among users in different states in three ways. First,
Congress has the power to apportion water between two or more states by way of the Commerce
Clause.6 According to the Supremacy Clause,7 apportionment by Congress takes precedence over
any contradictory actions by the states (Clemons, 2004). This is a significant advantage in that
congressional apportionment can address conflicts between states without the necessity of all
parties reaching an agreement. Another advantage to legislative apportionment is that Congress
also has access to substantial resources enabling them to conduct thorough investigations into
conflict situations (Reid, 1995).
Even with these positive features, congressional apportionment has been used very
sparingly. Legislators often lack sufficiently detailed information on which to base decisions
about “water wars.” There are also political realities such as the desire of the Senate to not be
seen as favoring one state while disadvantaging another. Legislators from states not involved in
an apportionment action do not wish to vote to enact an unpopular allocation on a state for fear
of the same fate at some point in the future (Sax et al., 2006). Other factors impacting the use of
congressional apportionment include pressure from special interests that could result in less than
equitable settlements as well as the desire for the federal government to abstain from interfering
in what is often a local matter. Congressional apportionment has been done only twice and given
the regional nature of most water disputes, without some significant federal interest, Congress

6
7

Article I, §8
Article VI, cl. 2
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has little incentive to intervene in water conflicts between states (Copas, 1997; Muys, 1995;
Wehr, 2014).
The second method used to allocate water is equitable apportionment8 by the United
States Supreme Court. The Court adjudicates water allocation disputes through its original
jurisdiction over cases involving the states (Abrams, 2002). In utilizing equitable apportionment,
first introduced in Kansas v. Colorado (1907), the goal of the Court is to recognize the rights of
all riparian states to share fairly in the benefits of the resource. In writing the opinion for the
Court, Mr. Justice Brewer had this to say:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that of
equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with all the rest. It can impose
its own legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to
none. Yet whenever… the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural
laws, into the territory of another State, the question of the extent and the limitations
of the rights of the two states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them,
and this court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize
the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice between them.
(Kansas v. Colorado, 1907, pp. 97–98)
While equitable apportionment has become a principal method of settling interstate
disputes, following just behind negotiation (Sax et al., 2006), it can involve a nearly unlimited
number of variables, significantly complicating efforts to bring about a satisfactory outcome
(Abrams, 2002; Copas, 1997).
Even though the United States Supreme Court has the authority to apportion interstate
waters, it is not required to become involved (Bernadett, 2014). The Court has shown
considerable reluctance to intervene in cases where it does not consider the magnitude of the

8

The equitable apportionment doctrine, established by the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Colorado (1907), is the
judicial apportionment remedy for interstate water conflicts (Nelson, 2020, p. 1827).
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problem sufficient to exercise its considerable power over the conduct of the states toward each
other (Sax et al., 2006).
Although both Congress and the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over water allocation
between states, there is general consensus that states working together cooperatively is a more
appropriate option to either Congressional legislation or Supreme Court litigation (Muys &
Sherk, 2016). In Texas v. New Mexico (1983) the Court admonished the states that:
Time and again we have counseled States engaged in litigation with one another
before this Court that their dispute "is one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of
representatives of the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any
court however constituted.” (quoting New York v. New Jersey, 1921, p. 575)
There are a number of reasons why litigation in the Supreme Court may not be the most
appropriate method for solving interstate water conflicts. First, the Court lacks the high degree of
expertise necessary to decide on the exceedingly technical aspects of these cases. In Nebraska v.
Wyoming (1945), the Court warned that by taking on the apportionment of an interstate river they
would “embark upon an enterprise involving administrative functions beyond our province” (p.
616). Also, litigation is expensive and ensuring that the justices are provided with sufficient
information is both time consuming and costly. Even after the case is initially settled, the only
recourse for a state with a grievance under a judicial order is more litigation, expending further
time and resources. Because the Court lacks the resources to monitor the parties to the case and
small increases in water use will likely go unnoticed, there are incentives for noncompliance.
Even if excessive withdrawals are exposed, the time and expense to re-litigate the issue can be
prohibitive (Boyce, 1996; Clemons, 2004; Copas, 1997; Wehr, 2014). While litigation is
commonly utilized, the Court firmly established in Colorado v. Kansas (1943) that such cases
should be settled by negotiation and agreement using the compact clause.
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The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States in such
cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes…they involve the interests
of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the
possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration rather
than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may
appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact
clause [emphasis added] of the federal Constitution. We say of this case, as the
court has said of interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual
accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement,
instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power. (1943, 320 U.S. 383, p. 392)
The third method for solving water allocation issues between the states is the interstate
compact. Early on, the founding fathers understood the dangers that states banding together
could pose to the power and authority of the federal government or to other states (Sax et al.,
2006). Even so, there were problems such as border disputes, navigation, and other issues that
transcended state boundaries or required regional solutions. A mechanism was required to allow
states to work together to solve common problems without challenging the supremacy of the
federal government.9 This requirement is often filled by the interstate compact10 (Frankfurter &
Landis, 1925; Government Accountability Office, 2007).
Overview of Interstate Compacts
Compacts are legal agreements between states, similar to treaties (Schlager & Heikkila,
2009), that allow them to work together within bounds approved by Congress. Compacts are
negotiated between states and are known as interstate compacts, or between the states and the

The Supremacy Clause – “ This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and
all treaties made, or will be made, under the authority of the United Sates, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding”
(Article VI, §2)
10 The Compact Clause - “No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in
time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay” (Article 1, §10, cl 3).
9
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federal government, known as federal-interstate compacts.11 They are ratified first by the state
legislatures and then by Congress emerging from the theory of horizontal federalism in which
states work with each other to solve common or regional problems without Congressional
intervention (J. F. Zimmerman, 2012).
Compact development requires that two or more states negotiate an agreement (compact)
to address a shared problem. Legislatures from each participating state then enact an identical
law, signed by the respective governors, defining the compact agreement in detail. Congress
reviews the proposed compact and decides upon ratification. Prior to approval, Congress may
add conditions, however, the substance of the compact is left to the states (Government
Accountability Office, 2007).
Sax, Thompson, Leshy, and Abrams (2006) point out that compacts provide benefits not
available under ordinary state regulation. Compacts ratified by Congress carry the force of
federal law; therefore, the compact takes precedence over non-conforming state laws via the
Supremacy Clause. As a result, a state’s compact obligations are enforceable under federal
authority. Compacts can establish commissions or other joint governing bodies that have the
authority to manage the shared water resource within the tenets of the compact document. In
addition, by approving the compact, Congress negates issues with the “dormant” Commerce
Clause, the principle that states cannot enact legislation that improperly discriminates against
interstate commerce (Christie, 2013; Sax et al., 2006).
Compacts have a number of unique features. Legally, compacts are contracts between the
states and, as such, any actions carried out by an interstate agency qualify as state action under

11

The Delaware River Basin Compact is a federal-interstate compact.
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the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Actions performed under the auspices of an interstate agency such
as a compact commission are determined under the Civil Rights Acts to be “under color of state
law” and subject to conviction and punishment. On the other hand, because the authority of a
commission or governing board stems from a federal statute, they are considered federal
agencies for reporting under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Compact agencies
are also not subject to a local Freedom of Information Act. Unlike other individuals exercising
“significant” federal authority, neither commission members nor board members of compact
agencies are subject to the Appointments Clause requiring appointment by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate (Dellapenna, 2005).
Compacts can be relatively simple agreements, unidimensional and limited in scope or
they can be comprehensive, multidimensional instruments and therefore widely applicable. As
policy instruments, compacts are extremely flexible, allowing for nearly unlimited combinations
of organizational structures, goals and purposes (Frankfurter & Landis, 1925). These
characteristics allow states to address future uncertainty while, at the same time, serving as a
platform for inter-governmental cooperation (Kearney & Stucker, 1985; Muys & Sherk, 2016).
While most interstate water compacts primarily focus on water allocation, compacts are
extremely versatile. They also address waste management and pollution, flood control, natural
resource management, watershed protection, and water supply among others (The Utton
Transboundary Resources Center, 2005).

12

Due Process clause as it applies to states
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Compact History
Compacts originated early in American history, having been used initially to settle
boundary disputes between the colonies, especially along the increasingly populated eastern
seaboard. To settle these disputes, the dissenting colonies often empowered joint commissions to
work out an agreement acceptable to all parties. These negotiations could take years of what
Frankfurter and Landis (1925) refer to as “tortuous discussion” (p. 692). If the negotiations were
successful, the agreement was submitted to the Crown for approval. If this method failed, the
colonies could appeal to the Crown which would refer the dispute to a Royal Commission, a
process similar to litigation (Frankfurter & Landis, 1925).
After the Revolution, the Articles of Confederation were adopted by the former colonies,
limiting the power of the central government and recognizing each state as an independent
sovereign. At the same time, the central government sought to curb the power of the states to
enter into any agreements that might be used to ferment rebellion. States were forbidden to enter
into alliances with foreign governments, nor were they allowed to enter agreements among
themselves without the consent and specification of congress by means of a compact (Blumstein
& Cheeseman, 2019; Florestano, 1994; Frankfurter & Landis, 1925).
Initially, interstate water compacts focused on navigation and fishing rights. These early
compacts included the Delaware River compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania (1783),
the Potomac River compact between Maryland and Virginia (1785), and the 1788 Savannah
River compact between Georgia and South Carolina (Cech, 2018). Because of the arid nature of
the western states, most early compacts there addressed water quantity. In the east, early
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compacts were more likely to be concentrated on water quality or flood control.13 Compacts are
also used for licensing and regulatory functions, planning and development, and water supply
(Cech, 2018; The Utton Transboundary Resources Center, 2005).
The number of compacts in the United States varies according to the source of the data
and the type of compact. Currently the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service lists 26 compacts for water
apportionment, seven for pollution control, and seven for water resources and flood control (U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, n.d.), the Council of State Governments (2018) lists 38 interstate
water compacts, and the Utton Center Model Compacts Project (The Utton Transboundary
Resources Center, 2005) lists a total of 50 compacts. The Utton Center, however, lists both
compacts that are currently in force as well as those that have expired or have not been ratified.
Opportunities and Challenges in Utilizing Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts have several significant advantages over other multi-state water
conflict resolution methods. Given the potential for unfavorable outcomes from Congressional
apportionment or Supreme Court litigation, compacting states can choose to maintain control
over their water resources rather than ceding their authority to federal regulation. States can also
make compacts as broadly or narrowly focused as needed when addressing issues specific to
their region. Because of their regional focus, compacts allow states to address problems and
solutions that would not be possible constrained by state boundaries. The ability of the federal
government to enforce agreed upon compact terms makes these methods a desirable choice for
settling interstate disputes (McCormick, 1994; Muys & Sherk, 2016).

13

Based on data from Cech (2018)
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Compacts aid in addressing issues of concurrent jurisdiction by allowing for a single
regional governance system (McCormick, 1994). Early compacts, such as the Colorado River
Compact, were limited to little more than apportioning water among participating states. Later
compacts developed regional governing bodies, usually called commissions, that are authorized
to administer the shared water in conjunction with the terms of the compact (Clemons, 2004).
According to Stephenson (2000), compact commissions are “…how interstate water compacts
make their greatest contribution to water resource management” (p. 99). Because of their highly
integrated hydrology, river basins optimally require comprehensive planning and management as
a single unit, regardless of political boundaries. Compact commissions can provide this kind of
approach (F. L. Zimmerman & Wendell, 1976).
Depending on the compact, commissions can provide either minimal authority and
structure or they can engage in comprehensive planning including monitoring water use and
allocating water, hydropower development, pollution regulation, watershed management, flood
protection, recreation and water supply. In addition, commissions can develop and enforce
regulations, gather and process information, levy fees, and issue permits. Compact commissions
can also provide a forum for the discussion of water resource issues and allow for stakeholder
participation in decision making. They can also mediate conflicts and provide transparency and
accountability (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961; Schlager & Heikkila, 2009; Stephenson,
2000).
Because of the diverse nature of river basins, one of the most important advantages of
using a compact is its adaptability. Given the character of most water conflicts, commissions can
adjust allocations to meet changing conditions. Anticipated challenges such as water scarcity and
climate change can best be addressed through the flexibility that can be built into interstate
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compacts (Muys & Sherk, 2016).
States are never free from the fear that the federal government will impose unwanted,
top-down solutions to their water resource problems (Christie, 2013). One of the most important
advantages of compacts is that they allow states to protect their sovereignty by providing
mechanisms to avoid escalating conflicts to the point that they fall under federal jurisdiction
(Muys, 1995). In addition, compacts can provide governance with bottom-up input from
stakeholders in the basin and including various local, state and regional interests (Christie, 2013).
There are also several drawbacks to compacts. Before the negotiating process can begin,
states must be committed to the idea that severe water problems exist and that the solutions must
be addressed regionally. Once begun, negotiations and ratification can take an extraordinary
amount of time and resources and states must fully support and participate in the compact
process (Christy, 2014; F. L. Zimmerman & Wendell, 1976). Occasionally, member states are
less committed to a regional governance approach than they are to preserving or promoting their
own interests (Christy, 2014; Muys & Sherk, 2016). Overriding self-interest by states has often
led to compact failure and continued conflict (Wehr, 2014). The failed Apalachicola,
Chattahoochee, Flint (ACF) compact between Alabama, Florida, and Georgia is an example of
such a situation.
Most compacts in effect today were developed over fifty years ago. Many of these are of
limited scope (J.C Muys, Sr. cited in Muys & Sherk, 2016) and based on information that is no
longer valid. Often, there is little room for change with compact provisions “frozen in time”
(Payne, 2019, p. 691). The lack of flexibility to plan for future change is a major challenge for
some compacts and severely impacts their ability to function (Muys & Sherk, 2016; F. L.
Zimmerman & Wendell, 1976). There are indications that the need to respond to increased
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demand, dwindling supplies, more volatile environments, and increasing demographic, social,
and political pressure may call for increasingly complex institutions in the future (Roper, 2014).
This means that some compacts will require substantial revision in order to function effectively
in the face of future uncertainties.
The Rio Grande Compact is one example of this type of problem. Developed to prevent
controversy over water between Colorado, Texas and New Mexico, the compact is based on
water conditions that were in existence in the late 1920s. Since then, the population in the Rio
Grande basin has experienced high growth rates, with the corresponding increase in water use.
At the same time, the basin is experiencing a decrease in water supply due to changing weather
patterns. Because the compact requirements to supply water have not changed with the
circumstances, honoring New Mexico’s water obligations at the 1929 rate leaves almost no water
for the state itself and resulting in an unsustainable situation (Payne, 2019).
Compacts can be adversely impacted by failing to develop a regional governance body,
usually a commission, which has the requisite authority to settle disputes between compact
states. Without a method to mitigate conflict between states within the compact, the states must
resort to incurring the time and expenses associated with using the courts (Muys & Sherk, 2016).
Another challenge faced by compacts is that, while state governments make enforceable
commitments to each other within the compact, neither they nor their commissions have
regulatory power over the citizens of the basin. As a result, it is up to the states to enforce what
may be unpopular compact requirements. Depending on the requirement or regulation, there may
be little or no incentives for states to take these steps (Schlager & Heikkila, 2009).
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Despite these drawbacks, compacts are a reasonable and viable choice to address
transboundary water resource issues. Muys and Sherk (2016) sum up the argument for interstate
compacts as follows:
Whatever challenges lie ahead in terms of increasing water scarcity and climate
change, cooperative regional action through interstate agreements remains a highly
desirable alternative when compared to the prospect of a federally-based system of
water allocation. Even assuming that a reasonable federal system for allocating
water rights could be fashioned and pass congressional muster, compacts offer the
best opportunity for states in interstate basins to effectively address highly localized
impacts of water scarcity and climate change. (p. 317)
Although not an answer to all the problems associated with transboundary water resource
management, interstate compacts have become a critical asset. Without them, there is an increase
in uncertainty regarding a viable water supply and disputes will possibly need to revert to
litigation or legislation (Christie, 2013). Given the utility of the interstate compact in addressing
water sharing issues between states, it is critical to understand how and why interstate compacts
are successful.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DESIGN, AND METHODS
This study expands prior research that has focused on using interstate compacts to
address transboundary water resource sharing issues in the United States. This dissertation
develops and reports on a case study of the Delaware River Basin Compact to provide an indepth description and analysis of a single, highly successful federal-interstate compact. A
grounded theory design, utilizing a systems approach, was employed to develop a broad
explanation of the policy development, structures, processes, and mechanisms involved in
successfully managing a transboundary resource (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002; Stewart &
Ayres, 2001).
The Policy Process and Interstate Compact Development
Policy can be described very succinctly as a broad statement of goals and objectives
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) while the policy development process includes identifying a
problem, developing and adopting a solution, implementation, and evaluating the outcomes
(Anderson, 2015). Both of these aspects of policy studies are utilized here to help determine why
this specific compact was successful and how these lessons might be applied to future compacts.
The simplest policy process model is an input-output systems model in which inputs are
demands on a system from the public and the outputs are policy decisions aimed at addressing
these demands. However, a major criticism of the input-out model is its simplicity. In this model,
there is no explanation for how inputs are transformed into outputs. Critical policy functions are
carried out with no knowledge of how they are taking place. Instead, the actual mechanisms and
processes that change the inputs into outcomes are hidden in a “black box” (Birkland, 2016),
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resulting in a dearth of knowledge as to what is causing the outcomes and why they are occurring
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Rossi et al., 1999). This model can be extended to include not
just immediate outcomes such as policy decisions, but can also encompass subsequent stages in
the policy process such as implementation and evaluation. Expanding inquiry to include these
subsequent stages and opening the black box to examine the processes and mechanisms that
occur there is a way of subjecting the policy process to a more rigorous analysis (Birkland,
2016). It can also provide answers for those critical “how” and “why” questions.
In order to better understand why a specific compact has experienced significant success
while many other interstate water compacts have not, this study examines the policy
development process as well as the policy mechanisms and processes that comprise a compact.
This analysis examines how the problem of sharing a transboundary water resource rose to the
level of an agenda item by way of focusing events that sharpened the need for a solution (See
Kingdon, 2011). It further follows the emergence of the compact through numerous failed policy
attempts before the current compact was finally adopted. These repeated failures provided
significant insight into the final development process of a successful compact.
After a policy is adopted, how that policy is implemented is crucial to its success.
According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), “…the politics of implementation is [sic] the
ultimate determinant of outcome” (p. 216) with implementation the key to the causal links
between policy and outcomes. It is in the implementation stage that crucial mechanisms are often
developed to carry out the purpose of the policy (Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2016).
Implementation became a key part of this study as it was in this stage that critical commission
mechanisms were developed and deployed.
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Evaluation is the last stage14 in the policy process, providing feedback on progress in
solving the initial problem (Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2016). An analysis of relevant literature,
an extensive review of documents and reports, post-compact developments and a survey of basin
stakeholders aided in assessing the success of the Delaware River Basin Compact in achieving its
goals. In addition, close examination of these resources also provided substantial understanding
of compact mechanisms, how they were developed, and how they contribute to the compact’s
success.
The Delaware River Basin Compact: A Model for Success
The Delaware River Basin Compact has been cited extensively as an example of a highly
successful transboundary interstate water compact (Dellapenna, 2006; Draper, 2002; Moore,
2021; Muys, 1976, 1995; J. F. Zimmerman, 2012) having generated an impressive list of
accomplishments since its founding (Christy, 2014). Signed into law in 1961, the compact has
exemplified best practices with particular emphasis on its governance structure (Egan, 2014).
Weston (1989) claimed that, “The Delaware River Basin provides the Nation with perhaps the
best case study of experience with alternative methods for resolving interstate conflicts over the
water rights and water management” (p. 1). Jeffery Featherstone, in his evaluation of federal
interstate compacts, declared that the Delaware River Basin Compact had “addressed complex
water resource problems requiring regional solutions and for 38 years has served as the model
for this institutional form” (1999, p. 187). In 2002, the American Society of Civil Engineers
noted that the compact “has been extraordinarily successful in resolving interstate conflicts over
water rights and water management of the Delaware River Basin….” (Draper, 2002, p. 84).

14

While evaluation often appears as the last stage of the policy process, it provides feedback to the initial stage, beginning the
process again (See Birkland, 2016, p. 28)
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Joseph Dellapenna observed that the Delaware River Basin Compact goes “beyond anything
found elsewhere in either the eastern or western states, and deserve(s) some extended attention”
(1999, p. 4). In 2014, Gerald Kauffman explained that:
Since JFK formed the DRBC in 1961; the Harvard Water Program, National
Academy of Sciences, and Interstate Council on Water Policy have touted the
Commission as an ideal river basin governance organization with unique authority
by Federal/state compact to reduce water pollution using an economic benefit-cost
approach. (p. 89)
Connor Egan wrote in 2014 that, “The Delaware Compact is a prime example of how a
compact can work effectively, and as of now, it has done so. Unfortunately, this compact stands
as an exception” (p. 337). As evidenced by these diverse sources, the Delaware River Basin
Compact has been recognized for its success and lauded as a model compact. Because of these
documented outcomes, the Delaware River Basin Compact provides an ideal case study for an
inquiry into the mechanisms that contribute to this success.
Research Questions
In order to avoid future conflict and better manage shared water resources, it is critical to
understand what mechanisms contribute to successful water compacts, why they are effective,
and how they might be applied more widely. This research explores these mechanisms utilizing a
case study method to build grounded theory. To guide this research the following questions were
addressed.
RQ1 What is the context in which the Delaware River Basin Compact was
developed?
RQ2 What is the nature of the problem(s) that brought about the compact?
RQ3 What previous solutions had been tried to address these problems and what
were the outcomes?
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RQ4 What are some of the reasons that previous efforts failed?
RQ5 How did the Delaware River Basin Compact emerge?
RQ6 What mechanisms were developed to address the issues?
RQ7 How were the mechanisms in the Compact aligned with the problems to be
addressed?
RQ8 How was the Compact implemented?
RQ9 What mechanisms emerged from the Compact and why were they successful?
RQ10 What were the major outcomes from these mechanisms?
RQ11 What theoretical concepts emerge from this grounded theory study of the
mechanisms and outcomes of the Delaware River Basin Compact?
RQ12 Using these theoretical concepts, how might these mechanisms be applied
more widely to current transboundary water conflicts?
RQ13 Are there situations in which these concepts should not be applied?
RQ14 What are these situations?
RQ15 Why would these mechanisms not be suitable in these situations?
The answers to these research questions provide an in-depth description of the
conditions leading to the development of the Delaware River Basin Compact and the
strategies and outcomes that resulted from its implementation and operation. This analysis
increased understanding of the causal factors that precede compact development and the
resulting institutions and relationships. By showing how policies structure and influence the
system, this study reveals important decision-making processes and how they affect compact
performance. The theory that emerged from this study can assist policy makers in crafting
new compacts to address both current and emerging water crises that might arise in in the
future.
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Case Study Design
According to Berg (2007), a case study15 involves “systematically gathering enough
information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to
effectively understand how the subject operates or functions” (p. 283). He later expanded that
definition to say that case studies are suitable for examining both simple and complex
phenomena, having units of analysis ranging from single individuals to large organizations. Case
studies are characterized by very rich, detailed, and in-depth data. In focusing on a single case, it
is possible to discover interactions between significant factors as well as the nuances, patterns,
and other fundamental components that might be overlooked by alternative methods (Berg,
2007).
A major strength of case study research is the opportunity to utilize many different
methods of data collection as well as a variety of data sources (Evers et al., 2012). Data for a
case study may be qualitative, quantitative, or both (Eisenhardt, 1989). Data collection for a case
study is often extensive; utilizing archival records, observations, interviews, documents, artifacts
and other sources (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2018).
Data analysis in case study research is rooted in several dominant traditions. One
tradition, associated with Robert Yin, is that of using field work to document changing
organizations. Yin’s work has a strong emphasis on hypothesis testing and uses theoretical
propositions about causal relationships to focus a study. Miles and Huberman utilize methods
such as matrices and charts, network analysis, flow charts, and other graphically oriented
approaches for analysis. These enable them to reduce the data and represent it visually.

15

Case studies can be confusing as the process of conducting a case study can be combined with both the unit of study, the case,
and the outcome of the research, the case study (Merriam, 2009).
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Grounded theory, a method closely associated with the work of Strauss and Corbin, uses
inductive reasoning and the constant comparison method to identify categories and core concepts
as the data is analyzed. From the categories and core concepts, theory is developed (Evers et al.,
2012; Swanborn, 2010).
Case studies are broadly used in political science, public administration, and policy
analysis. They can address a documented need for conditional findings as well as providing a
comprehensive understanding of cause and effect relationships lacking in many other
methodologies (Garson, 2002; Jensen & Rodgers, 2001; Merriam, 2009). Heclo (1972) has
suggested that there is a “great untapped potential in the use of case studies for policy analysis”
(p. 93). Case studies, he noted, are well suited to discovering “how things work” (p. 93). He also
pointed out that case studies have unique advantages for theory construction. One of these is the
ability to follow policy changes over time. In addition to the capacity of case studies to address
the dynamic nature of policy studies, they can also provide a rich and flexible range of analytical
tools. Heclo (1972) further describes the case study as a way to deal with policy innovation in a
systematic manner as well as a means to provide context for differences in policy outputs. Case
studies are useful in investigating situations lacking a clear, single set of outcomes (Dopson,
2003). Case studies can also be used in situations where the research question is a “how” or a
“why” question (Yin, 2018) as well as for generating theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Several dissertations using case study methods have made significant contributions to
water resource policy by closely examining and providing in-depth descriptions and analyses of
how policy and governance function in multi-state water resource management venues.
Featherstone’s (1999) evaluation of the Delaware River Basin Commission (the DRBC)
determined that it had been effective in meeting most of the objectives of the Delaware River
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Basin Compact while only being partly successful in others. He concluded that the example of
the Delaware River Basin Compact can be useful as a guide for other river basins across the
United States. Kauffman’s (2014) dissertation focuses on water quality improvement in the
Delaware Basin and how this is accomplished within the political context of the Delaware River
Basin Commission. Christy (2014) uses a multiple case study approach to examine collaborative
organizations and collective choice institutions in complex, large-scale water resource
management systems, one of which is the Delaware River Basin Commission.
Other examples of case studies addressing water policy include “Using Sustainability
Criteria to Evaluate River Basin Decision-Making: The Case of the Colorado River Basin”
(Berggren, 2018), which uses multiple methods to study how decisions are made about
sustainability issues in the Colorado River Basin. “Settlement of the ACF Controversy: Sisyphus
at the Dawn of the 21st Century” (Abrams, 2008) is a case study of the conflict over the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint river basin in the southeast. Weston’s (1989) “The Delaware
River Basin: Courts, Compacts and Commissions” provides a detailed study of issues related to
basin management. By providing detailed descriptions and analyses of their topics, these case
studies add layers of complexity to the understanding of important phenomena, contributing
significantly to future research.
Case studies, especially single-case studies, are often faulted on a number of fronts.
Critics point out that case studies are primarily descriptive in nature and lack rigor and
theoretical or policy significance. Case studies are also criticized for their inability to determine
causality and for their small sample sizes, which preclude generalization to larger populations
(Garson, 2002; Kennedy, 1979; Yin, 2018). However, these issues have been addressed by
several authors, some at length. Garson (2002) cites two classic works, Pressman and
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Wildavsky’s (1973) Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in
Oakland and Allison’s (1971) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis as
examples of distinguished case studies. In addition to detailed descriptions, these case studies
provide in-depth analyses of the pitfalls of program implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky,
1973) and models of government decision making (Allison, 1971).
In addressing the issue of generalizability, Auerbach and Silverstein (2003) propose
using the concept of transferability instead. They suggest that the more abstract concepts that
emerge from grounded theory can be transferred to different samples or cases. However, the
specifics of the concepts may differ depending on the makeup, or context, of a case or sample.
Nowell and Albrecht (2018) suggest that generalizability and replicability do not apply to
inductive studies the same way as it does in deductive works. Instead, well-executed inductive
studies provide an interpretation of the findings that is detailed, contextualized, and empirically
based. By providing a full, in-depth, and systematic description and analysis, these studies
provide insight into what might be occurring in similar cases. Other authors suggest that case
studies can be combined in a meta-analysis to allow for a form of generalizability (Jensen &
Rodgers, 2001; Rudel, 2008). Patton (2002) suggests that, while a single case does not allow for
broad generalization, logical applications can often be made using the weight of the findings
resulting from a single critical case.
Rigor can be built into case studies in several ways. Triangulation, or the method of
testing hypotheses or propositions using data from multiple methods, increases validity by basing
conclusions on several sources of information. These sources can include surveys and interviews,
focus groups, narrative analysis, document analysis, secondary data analysis, and other
qualitative and quantitative methods (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Evers et al., 2012; Garson, 2002).
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In this study, an extensive document analysis including official documents from the Delaware
River Basin Commission such as reports, administrative manuals, program documents, meeting
minutes, public comments, and other relevant documents was utilized. An broad study by
Syracuse University (Martin et al., 1960) offered a real-time assessment of the basin and its
environs during the development of the Delaware River Basin Compact. Court documents
provided important information and insights. Surveys, and interviews were used to provide
additional material and to corroborate findings. Nexis Uni (formerly LexisNexis) provided news
articles related to the DRBC and especially to current challenges the Commission is facing.
Correspondence from individuals as a result of the survey was also valuable in verifying findings
and providing new directions for inquiry.
Grounding an analysis in existing literature increases internal validity and
generalizability, especially in theory building studies. In situations where there is a small number
of cases, links to previous studies help to validate what might otherwise be considered an
anomalous finding (Eisenhardt, 1989). For this study, literature on a range of topics was
consulted including but not limited to public policy, policy development and implementation,
compacts, compact development, transboundary water resource conflicts, water resource
management techniques, and program implementation and evaluation.
Another method to increase rigor includes weighting evidence based on the strength of
the data (Miles et al., 2014, 2020). By verifying data using multiple methods, this study was able
to utilize highly reliable information. Other methods to increase rigor entails looking for negative
evidence and rival explanations, examining and explaining outliers, and ruling out spurious
relationships (Miles et al., 2014). Constantly comparing new data to previously collected data
and looking for contradictory evidence and competing explanations also strengthened the
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analysis. The surveys and interviews were especially useful in pinpointing areas where
discrepancies might be found and resolved. Commission meeting notes and related public
comments were also useful in finding and resolving inconsistencies.
While there is still support for the traditional view that only quantitative methods can be
used to determine causality, there are also strong arguments against that assessment. Maxwell
(2004) asserts that using a realist view of causation, it is obvious that some causal processes can
simply be observed without resorting to statistical applications, confirming the value of single
case studies in certain situations. He also emphasizes the value of context in causal processes,
illustrating the explanatory power of description. He also comments upon the different
approaches to causality by qualitative and quantitative researchers. “…(Q)uantitative
researchers” he says, “tend to be interested in whether and to what extent variance in x causes
variance in y. Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, tend to ask how x plays a role in causing
y, what the process is that connects x and y.” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 31)
In explaining the potential for case studies for organizational analyses, Dopson (2003)
states that case studies are able to help explain causal links in real-life situations that are too
complex for surveys or experimental methods. As Morrison (2009) explains,
…it is the theoretical underpinnings and assumptions that embody causation, and
the role of statistics might support, challenge, extend and refine these underpinnings
and assumptions. Behind the statistics lie theories and models, and it is in the
construct validity of these that causation lies. (p. 99)
Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014) offer several methods for describing causality including
causal chains, causal networks for cross-case analysis, and causal networks for within case
analysis.
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Grounded Theory
In addition to using a case study design for this dissertation, this study utilized a
systematic grounded theory approach to develop a broad theoretical explanation of the processes
and mechanisms that contribute to the successful operation of the Delaware River Compact.
Grounded theory is an approach for identifying categories and concepts that emerge from data
and linking them to theories (Bernard, 2002; Creswell, 2014). Unlike research design in fields
such as sociology where theories are generally developed a priori, proponents of grounded
theory believe that theory should emerge from data collected in the field (Creswell, 2013).
However, not all scholars agree. According to Yin, studies using a theory-before-research model
may be important in a number of ways. First, the use of theory can assist in case selection and
deciding whether to use single or multiple cases; second, theory can aid in defining what
constitutes a complete and appropriate description. Third theory can stimulate the development
of rival theories in explanatory cases; and lastly, a priori theory can support generalizations to
other cases (Yin cited in Berg, 2007).
A grounded theory approach is useful when existing theories fail to adequately address a
problem. This method is especially appropriate for quantitative researchers who want to utilize a
qualitative procedure that is both rigorous and systematic (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Creswell,
2008, 2013; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
This work employs both inductive and deductive methods to develop the case study of
the Delaware River Basin Compact. An inductive method is especially relevant for situations
where process is a critical component and that involve social issues where political action is
necessary. Inductive methods are also useful in complex situations in which the relationships
between variables are intertwined and in which there can be multiple paths to an outcome. This
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method is also useful in identifying and describing constructs that are difficult to quantify
(Eisenhardt et al., 2016) such as those found in complex institutions like those sometimes used to
manage transboundary water resources.
Deductive strategies involve prior constructs that can be observed or even tested in the
field (Miles et al., 2014). The Utton Transboundary Resource Center model interstate compact
(Muys et al., 2007), Deil Wright’s overlapping authority model (Agranoff & Radin, 2014;
Wright, 2013), and Ostrom’s institutional approach (Ostrom, 1990) were instrumental in this
study. Adaptive governance (Huitema et al., 2009; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005) and integrated water
resource management (Agarwal et al., 2000; Varis et al., 2014) as well as the many facets of
federalism provided an initial framework for inquiry and helped to provide rigor for this study.
This combination of the case study method and the grounded theory approach brings
together a strong data collection and analysis component with theory construction based on
highly developed empirical evidence. The case study method is eminently appropriate for this
study because of its in-depth, detailed description and analysis of a discrete, bounded object (See
Creswell, 2013) – in this case, an interstate water compact. The “thick” descriptions of the
compact provides data from which new themes emerged as well as information to inform
constructs from previous literature.
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests a number of reasons to build theory from cases. First is the
likelihood of generating a novel theory. Developing theory from case studies often results in
contradictory evidence. Attempts to reconcile this paradoxical evidence increases the likelihood
of reframing old conceptualizations into new theory. Second, emergent theory is more likely to
be testable using constructs developed in the theory building process as they have already been
measured and verified. This is also true of hypotheses developed during the process. Third, the
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resulting theory is more likely to be empirically valid because the theory-building process is so
closely tied to the evidence from the beginning of the research.
On the other hand, Eisenhardt (1989) cautions against building an overly complex model.
The study result can be a richly detailed theory but one that lacks parsimony which is an
important characteristic of good theory. Another weakness of this method that must be
considered during the research is that the theory may be too narrowly drawn and will lack a
sufficient level of generalizability. This issue has been addressed by a number of authors
(Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Jensen & Rodgers, 2001; Nowell & Albrecht, 2018; Rudel,
2008) and their suggestions inform this work.
Systems Analysis
Lastly, systems thinking informs this analysis. As Peter Senge wrote, “Systems thinking
is a discipline for seeing wholes. It is a framework for seeing interrelationships rather than
things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static ‘snapshots’” (2005, p. 441). Addressing an
issue using systems theory suggests that the solution to a policy problem cannot be understood
separately from the context within which it exists. For complex problems such as those related to
environmental management and regulation, systems concepts offer a method of describing and
explaining relevant circumstances and providing possible areas for change (Pahl-Wostl et al.,
2010; Stewart & Ayres, 2001). Unlike a linear approach, systems thinking allows for
conceptualizing interactions between the economic, demographic, environmental, and political
factors that affect river systems and their governance (Dyehouse et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2017).
A systems approach can be useful in policy analysis in several ways. For example, a
systems approach can help to find and explain underlying causal factors. These factors are often
important contributors to policy success or failure but can remain unrecognized without a
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significant effort to identify them. A systems perspective can also facilitate modeling the effects
of existing policy through the description of structures and incentives. Furthermore, by showing
how policy structures a system, it is possible to see which mechanisms are most important in the
decision-making process (Stewart & Ayres, 2001).
Systems thinking helps to partially explain why organizations may have limited success
with solving complex problems such as those found in transboundary river basins. First, by
utilizing a reductionist approach that seeks to address a problem at its most basic level, it is easy
to ignore the complexity and interrelatedness of systems. This can lead to unanticipated
consequences or even system failure. Second, in using piecemeal or incremental approaches to
problem solving that fail to take into consideration the interrelated nature of systems, changes
might occur at the margin but contribute little to overall change. A third reason for lack of
success in solving complex problems is failure to integrate solutions so that they are effective
across broad systems (Banathy, 1995).
While a search for studies using systems theory to analyze interstate compacts yielded no
results, several water resource studies have used variants of systems theory such as systems
dynamics (e.g., Manzano-Solís et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2017). However, for this study, a systems
approach was used as a framework to conceptualize the Compact and its environment. It also
informed data collection and analysis by highlighting the interconnectedness of the components
of the Compact, its governing body, and the river basin.
Sample Selection
In case studies, it is usually necessary to utilize two levels of sampling. Initially, the case
itself is selected then there is sampling within the case (Merriam, 2009). For this research, both
sampling levels utilized a purposeful technique guided by theoretical perspectives emerging from
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the study focus (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). This method, unlike the representative samples used in
quantitative work, focuses on selecting information-rich cases that can inform the specific
questions being studied (Patton, 2002).
The preliminary sample, a single case in this study, was chosen for its obvious connection
to the research problem. The emerging data from the initial case (the Delaware River Basin
Compact) guided the selection of additional samples from within the case (Commission
documents, court cases, meeting minutes, reports, etc.). The entire process was informed by the
developing theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Merriam, 2009). Opportunistic or snowball sampling
is especially beneficial for inductive theory building (Miles et al., 2014) and was used to expand
the sample as well as to provide either confirming or disconfirming information about previously
collected data.
The case selected for this study, the Delaware River Basin Compact, was chosen because
of its documented success. For the past sixty years, it has addressed complex water resource
problems at the regional level and has served as a model for other compacts (Dellapenna, 2006;
Draper, 2002; Kauffman, 2014; Muys, 1976; J. F. Zimmerman, 2012). Sampling within the case
focused primarily on documentation that would provide an extensive description and analysis of
the circumstances leading up to the development of the compact, the context in which the
compact was developed and implemented, what mechanisms and strategies were utilized, and
how these contributed to important outcomes.
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Data Collection16 and Analysis
In a systematic grounded theory design, data collection and analysis are iterative
processes with the results of the analysis informing subsequent data collection. Data analysis was
carried out using a constant comparison method in which new data was constantly compared
against previous data for similarities and differences. Data collection was carried out until no
significant new information emerged (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Creswell, 2013).
As ideas and concepts emerged from the raw data, they were merged into larger concepts.
Similar concepts were merged into categories which are again merged to form more abstract
categories. These categories provide the basis for the emerging theory. Written memos
documented relevant information about analytical procedures, categories, propositions or
hypotheses, and other details of the research process (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, 2008; Creswell,
2013; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Detailed charts and tables aided in organizing and focusing data
collection and refining analyses (See Miles et al., 2020).
Document Analysis
Data collection for this study focused primarily on an extensive document analysis
utilizing journal articles, reports, court documents, web pages, administrative documents, news
articles, letters etc., with considerable reliance on the Delaware River Basin Commission. The
DRBC provides extensive data on its website, including a substantial collection of archived data.
The DRBC also provides video access to its quarterly business meetings. A list of select study
sources can be found in Appendix A.

16

This study was conducted under Clemson University Institutional Review Board approval number IRB2021-0098.
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Surveys and Interviews
Purposeful, convenience, and snowball sampling were used to select samples for surveys
and interviews. In using purposeful sampling, potential survey participants were identified using
web searches focusing on the Delaware River Basin and the DRBC. Nexis Uni was queried using
the search terms “Delaware River Basin” and “Delaware River Basin Commission” for news
reports that mentioned relevant events, organizations and/or individuals. A major source for
sampling was the Watershed/Stakeholder Groups and Partners page on the DRBC website
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021f). Also utilized was the membership lists of the
DRBC Advisory Committees (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021b).
Potential survey participants were chosen from governmental and non-governmental
organizations, universities, business and industry, and research facilities, and included private
citizens who were likely to have knowledge about the Delaware River Basin and the DRBC (See
Appendix B for a list of organizations). Exhaustive efforts to identify key informants not
affiliated with an organization yielded minimal results, only two percent of the sample. Only
those with email addresses were sampled. Additional potential respondents were contacted as a
result of emails from participants suggesting further contacts.
Two separate surveys were used for this portion of the study; one for DRBC staff (DRBC
survey) and one for those individuals affiliated with organizations or agencies that have links to
the basin or the DRBC or private citizens who have an interest in the basin (the “general
survey”) (See Appendix C and D respectively for these surveys). The surveys were developed
and deployed using Qualtrics online survey software.
The survey questions for the general survey emerged from earlier and on-going data
collection and analysis. Both the DRBC Survey and the general survey asked respondents to rate
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the overall performance of the DRBC as well as performance in specific program areas such as
water quality protection, water supply allocation, drought management, and others. Respondents
were also asked to rank the top four program areas in order of importance to the Commission
(the DRBC survey) or to their organization (the general survey). In the DRBC Survey,
respondents were asked about the biggest challenges facing the basin today and in the next fifty
years and opportunities to meet these challenges. The general survey was focused more on
outcomes, both positive and negative and asked how the DRBC could improve its activities in
the basin.
The general survey was designed to discriminate between individuals who were
“somewhat familiar” or “very familiar” with the DRBC and those that were “not at all familiar”
with the Commission. Respondents who were not at all familiar with the DRBC were shown
more general questions about the basin whereas respondents who were either somewhat familiar
or very familiar with the DRBC and whose organization was affected by the actions of the
DRBC were shown specific questions about the Commission.
DRBC surveys were deployed by email with reminder messages approximately one
month later. The general surveys were also deployed by email with follow-up reminders just
over two weeks later. Of the 21 surveys sent to the DRBC, there were three responses (a
response rate of 14%). For the general survey, 195 surveys were deployed and 55 responded for
a response rate of 28%.17 A list of organizations that were identified by respondents is included
in Appendix B.
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Of the 195 surveys, 11 were undeliverable, five responded that they were no longer working there, had retired, or were retiring,
and three did not feel qualified to answer the survey. One respondent did not feel that the survey was compatible with the role
of her office, and one was not comfortable filling out the survey.
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Even though 55 individuals responded to the general survey, there were only 38 who
completed it sufficiently to be included in most of the analyses. Examples of respondents for the
general survey included directors and executive directors of various governmental and nongovernmental organizations, environmental engineers, program managers and coordinators,
scientists and researchers, biologists, hydrologists, extension specialists, university faculty, a
policy director, a business owner, and a corporate manager.
Two interviews were conducted, one with an official at the Delaware River Basin
Commission and one with an expert in water policy working closely with the DRBC. Both have
first-hand knowledge of the basin and its operations (See Appendix E for the interview
questions). Efforts to secure an interview with the alternate federal representative to the DRBC
were not successful.
Coding
The first stage of coding was open coding in which the data were separated into discrete
concepts. These concepts were then coded into increasingly abstract categories. There were
several iterations of this process as additional questions emerged and as the data were grouped
and regrouped. As categories became more abstract, properties of the categories were used to
make finer determinations. These categories were used to build a visual model or axial coding
paradigm. In the final stage, selective coding, propositions emerged from the interrelationships
of the categories in the axial model and merged into theoretical constructs (Corbin & Strauss,
1990; Creswell, 2008, 2013).
During analysis, data were constantly compared against previously collected information
for similarities and differences, helping to decrease the incidence of bias and achieve greater
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precision and consistency (Eisenhardt et al., 2016). Data for this study were analyzed using
Microsoft Excel, the SPSS statistical software package, and NVivo Pro software.
Validity and Reliability
Validity and reliability were addressed using a triangulation approach. Data came from
multiple document sources, surveys, and interviews. The research is also strongly grounded in
previous literature on transboundary water conflicts, water policy, and interstate water compacts.
This robust link to previous research increases internal validity and generalizability and enhances
the level of theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989). Evidence was evaluated and weighted based on
the strength of the data. Strong data is from highly reliable and valid sources and was more
heavily weighted in the analysis. Negative or disconfirming evidence and rival explanations were
examined to determine their possible impact on theoretical constructs. Causal relationships were
closely examined to verify that there were no confounding data resulting in spurious
relationships. In situations where there were multiple pathways to an outcome, these were
examined as a causal network (Miles et al., 2014).
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CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS
Chapter Four presents this case study of the Delaware River Basin Compact, focusing on
in-depth descriptions of the Delaware River Basin, influences on Compact development, the
Delaware River Basin Compact, the Delaware River Basin Commission and post-Compact
developments. These descriptions provide an explanation of the causal conditions, the context in
which the causal conditions emerged, the strategies and policies that were developed and the
outcomes. These findings were used to develop a framework and a substantive theory to help
explain compact development.
The Delaware River Basin
The Delaware River forms the boundaries of four states; New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Delaware.18 It begins on the western slopes of the Catskill Mountains in
south-central New York state.19 From these mountains, which reach heights of up to 4,000 feet,
the Delaware flows southward into the Delaware Bay and Atlantic Ocean (Byun et al., 2019).
The Delaware River is the longest undammed river east of the Mississippi, stretching 330 miles
from the convergence of its east and west branches at Hancock, New York to the Atlantic Ocean.
The Delaware River Basin consists of more than 2,000 tributaries, 216 of which are major
contributors to the Delaware River.20 The largest of the Delaware River tributaries are the
Schuylkill and Lehigh Rivers in Pennsylvania (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020a).
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See the map of the Delaware Basin with county boundaries and select cities in Appendix F.
There are also eight square miles of the Delaware River Basin in Maryland, but this area is not part of the Compact and is
generally not included in reporting.
20 See the map of the Delaware Basin with select reservoirs, cities, and tributaries in Appendix G.
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From the headwaters in New York to the fall line near Trenton, New Jersey, the river is
non-tidal with clean, high quality water. A large segment of this section of the river is designated
part of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System with additional segments of the river added
in 1993, 2000, 2006, and 2014 (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020a, 2020c). From
Trenton, south to the Atlantic Ocean, is the Delaware Estuary, a part of the National Estuary
Program (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020a). The basin also contains one of the
nation’s most visited National Park units, the Delaware River Gap (Coalition for the Delaware
River Watershed, n.d.).
The Delaware River Basin lies in two major physiographic regions, the Appalachian
Highlands and the Atlantic Coastal Plain. These regions, in turn, are composed of areas with
unique geological, landform, and hydrologic characteristics. While the Atlantic Coastal Plain is
composed of unconsolidated sediment such as alternating strata of sand, clay, and gravel, the
Appalachian Highlands consist mostly of consolidated sedimentary rock. The Appalachian
Highlands are further divided into four distinct areas; the Appalachian Plateau, the Ridge and
Valley region, the New England region, and the Piedmont. In the Appalachian Plateau region are
the 1,000 to 4,000-foot-high Catskill and Pocono Mountains. In this area, the Delaware River has
cut deep and narrow valleys through sandstone and folded shale formations (Byun et al., 2019).
The Ridge and Valley region is divided into a northern section which consists of long
forested mountain ridges while the southern section contains the Great Valley, a broad lowland
with gently sloping hills. Just south of the Ridge and Valley region, the relatively small New
England portion is made up of steep, rocky streams draining areas of forested ridges and hills.
Below the New England region, the southern edge of the Piedmont spreads across rolling hills
while good soils for agriculture cover low yielding sedimentary and crystalline rock. The lower
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border of the Piedmont region forms the fall line and abuts the Atlantic Coastal Plain (Byun et
al., 2019).
The Delaware River Basin consists of ten sub-basins beginning at the headwaters; the
East-West Branch, the Lackawaxen, the Neversink-Mongaup, the Upper Central, the Lower
Central, the Lehigh Valley, the Schuylkill Valley, the Upper Estuary, the Lower Estuary, and the
Delaware Bay. The river system drains 6,422 square miles of Pennsylvania or 50.3% of the
basin’s total land area; 2,969 square miles of New Jersey (23.3% of the land area); 2,362 square
miles of New York (18.5% of the land area); and 1,004 square miles of Delaware (7.9% of the
land area) (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020a).
Land use in the Delaware Basin has changed over time especially with regard to the loss
of forested land. Currently, natural landscapes such as wetlands and forests comprise less than
sixty percent of the land in the basin. Once the primary land cover in the basin, forests now
comprise less than half of the landscape, decreasing by more than 100 square miles between
1996 and 2010. Due to no-net-loss policies, wetlands have experienced minimal losses from
development. However, coastal wetlands are threatened by erosion and rising sea levels, a
situation made worse by developments that inhibit the movement of these natural barriers inland.
Between 1996 and 2010, agricultural use and transitional scrub shrub landscapes decreased in all
areas of the basin with the exception of the Upper region. On the other hand, developed land has
increased across the basin but especially in the Lower region. Basin-wide, developed land
comprises nearly 2,100 square miles or 16 percent of the land area (Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2019b)
According to a 2011 study, the Delaware River Basin supplies drinking water to both the
largest metropolitan economy in the United States, New York, as well as to the seventh largest,
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Philadelphia (Kauffman, 2011). In 2016, the Delaware River Basin supplied 6,565 million
gallons per day (mgd)21 for approximately 8.3 million people in the basin and an additional 5
million in New York City and northeastern New Jersey. Of this amount, 607 mgd were exported
including 82 mgd to New Jersey and 525 mgd to New York City (Byun et al., 2019)
Three sectors accounted for over 80% of withdrawals in the basin. Thermoelectric and
hydroelectric generation used 4,037 mgd with thermoelectric generation utilizing the majority of
water used for power production (3,792 mgd). Public water supplies were responsible for 1,003
mgd while industrial uses comprised 588 mgd. These were followed by irrigation (130 mgd),
self-supplied domestic uses (117 mgd), and other uses (84 mgd) (Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2020a). Over time however, withdrawals for public water supply and industrial
uses have shown a slightly decreasing trend while the thermoelectric sector has shown an overall
decreasing trend (Byun et al., 2019).
Consumptive uses and out-of-basin transfers made up approximately 15 percent of total
withdrawals. The largest consumptive use in 2016 was the 607 mgd transferred out of the basin.
These transfers accounted for approximately 10 percent of the total withdrawals from the basin
but comprised about two-thirds of the total consumptive use. Interbasin transfers were followed
by irrigation (117 mgd), public water supplies (100 mgd), thermoelectric generation (96 mgd),
industrial consumption (27 mgd), self-supplied domestic uses (12 mgd), and other uses (10 mgd).
While consumptive use by the industrial sector has held steady and the public water supply has
trended downward, the thermoelectric sector is showing increasing consumptive use (Byun et al.,
2019; Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020a).

21

Includes both ground and surface water although 95% of water used in the basin is surface water.
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Although 95 percent of the water utilized in the Delaware River basin is surface water
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020a), two major areas have experienced groundwater
depletion. These are primarily found in the Upper Estuary and Schuylkill Valley and have been
determined to be critical areas: the Southeastern Pennsylvania Ground Water Protected Area and
Critical Area #2 overlying the Potomac-Raritan-Magothy aquifer in south central New Jersey.
New or additional withdrawals in this area are limited and managed by regulations based on a
sustainable long-term yield (Byun et al., 2019).
Pennsylvania and New Jersey are both the largest and most populous states in the basin.
The 2016 population of the Delaware River basin is estimated to be 8.3 million people.
Pennsylvania has by far the largest population (5.6 million or 67%) in the basin. New Jersey is
second with 1.9 million or 23 percent of the total basin population. Delaware has 0.7 million
people in the basin and New York has 0.1 million in the basin itself. Between 2010 and 2030, the
population in the basin is expected to increase by almost 700,000 to nearly 9 million. Most of
this growth is predicted to be in the counties surrounding Philadelphia as well as in the Central
and Bay regions (Byun et al., 2019). An analysis of census data for this study shows the
population in the counties in the Delaware River basin to be over 9 million in 2020.22 The city of
New York alone, which is not located in the basin but obtains its water from the headwaters of
the Delaware, adds nearly 9 million additional individuals that the river serves. 23

22
23

This estimate is high due to the inclusion of areas of some counties that are not in the basin itself (county-level data).
A more detailed overview of the basin population is available in Appendix H.
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On an annual basis, the Delaware River Basin contributes approximately $22 billion in
market and non-market value to the region. Forests are the largest contributor, providing $5.13
billion per year. Forests are followed by water supply ($3.82 billion), agriculture ($3.37 billion),
navigation ($2.62 billion), water quality ($2.46 billion), public parks ($1.83 billion), fish and
wildlife ($1.55 billion), and recreation ($1.22 billion). Hydraulic fracturing (fracking), which has
been banned basin-wide24 had the potential to add an additional $3.3 billion annually (Friedman
et al., 2020; Kauffman, 2011).
The Delaware River system is an important economic driver, directly or indirectly
supporting over 600,000 jobs valued at more than $10 billion in annual wages. Pennsylvania
alone has an estimated 130,364 jobs directly associated with the basin, resulting in $2.8 billion in
wages. Jobs directly related to the basin provide $1.3 billion in New Jersey, $550 million in New
York, and $340 million in Delaware. Jobs indirectly related to the basin provide an additional $4
billion in wages (Kauffman, 2011).
Farming, for example, provides over 45,800 jobs in the Delaware Basin with $1.9 billion
in wages. The large majority of these jobs (26,000) are in Pennsylvania, delivering $1.1 billion in
wages to that state. Fishing, hunting, and birding/wildlife activities support nearly 45,000 jobs in
the basin worth approximately $1.5 billion followed by coastal employment providing $947
million in wages. Water utilities (public and private) employ 8,750 people with $485 million in
wages. New York leads this category with 5,600 jobs and $310 million in wages. Wastewater
treatment facilities support nearly 1,300 jobs with wages of $61 million. In addition, nonprofit
and environmental organizations engaged in watershed restoration employ at least 200 staff

24

High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing has been banned in the Basin by the DRBC since February 2021.
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members for a total of $9.5 million in wages (Kauffman, 2011). Delaware River ports provide
jobs for over 4,000 workers earning an estimated $326 million while generating $1.3 billion in
economic output (Delaware River Basin Source Water Collaborative, 2020). The Delaware River
Port Complex, with facilities in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, is the largest
freshwater port in the world. The port is the largest in North America for steel and paper and
approximately seventy percent of the oil shipped to the Atlantic Coast traverses the Delaware
River Estuary (Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 2020).
Ecosystem services in the Delaware River Basin were valued at $21 billion in 2010 with
an estimated net present value of $683 billion discounted 3 percent over 100 years. Ecosystems
consist of forests, freshwater wetlands, farmland, saltwater wetlands, urban areas, open water,
marine areas, and beaches and dunes (Kauffman, 2011). Ecosystem services include water
filtration, carbon sequestration, and forest and wetland habitats. The basin is home to over ninety
resident and migrant fish species as well as oysters and blue crabs. It also contains the world’s
largest spawning population of horseshoe crabs. In addition, the basin supports over 400 resident
and migrant bird species, including some that are either threatened or endangered (Coalition for
the Delaware River Watershed, n.d.; Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 2020; U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 2017).
Given the complexity and interrelatedness of the Delaware River Basin system as well as
the growth in population and increased demands on the water resources of the basin, conflict
over water was nearly inevitable. There was also a need to deal with issues such as pollution,
floods, and drought that required multi-state solutions. It was from this realization that a basinwide approach was necessary that the Delaware River Basin Compact emerged.
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History of the Delaware River Basin Compact
A primary driver of conflict in the Delaware River Basin, like that in many other river
basins, is water resource allocation. This broad issue includes interbasin transfers to New York
and New Jersey, consumptive use for hydropower production, industry, and agriculture,
allocation for water supply, and water pollution. Maintaining minimum flows needed for water
supplies in the lower basin and protecting water supply intakes and the Delaware Estuary from
salt intrusion are significant issues as well. In addition, adequate flow is necessary to protect
ecosystems and support recreation. Moreover, floods and drought periodically affect the Basin,
causing extensive damage and even loss of life (Christy, 2014; Kauffman et al., 2008;
Ravindranath et al., 2016; Weston, 1989).
While disputes over use of the river began shortly after the Revolutionary War, the story
of the Delaware River Basin Compact begins in the 1920s (See Figure 1). In 1923, in an early
effort at basin governance, legislators in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania created the
Delaware River Treaty Commission. The purpose of the commission was to negotiate an
interstate agreement governing water projects in the basin. In 1925, an interstate compact was
Figure 1

History of the Development of the Delaware River Basin Compact
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drafted, establishing the Tri-State Delaware River Commission, a permanent regulatory body.
According to this proposed compact, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York would share the
waters of the Delaware equally above Port Jervis and below that point, only New Jersey and
Pennsylvania would share the river. This bill failed to pass the New Jersey legislature and the
compact died. (Duca-Sandberg, 2011; Martin et al., 1960).
In 1926, New York City, realizing that current water supplies were becoming inadequate,
laid claim to the Delaware for its growing population. Estimates by the New York City Board of
Water Supply had indicated that by 1935, new sources of water would become critical as demand
for the city would equal supply. After investigating several alternatives, plans were developed by
New York City to draw water from headwaters of the Delaware, located in New York state. At
the same time, New Jersey and New York were looking to the waters of the upper basin to meet
their increased demands for water. There emerged the prospect of major conflict given that the
Delaware is an interstate river and the threat of litigation necessitated consultation with the other
states prior to appropriating water from those sources. Still working toward basin governance,
the Delaware River Treaty Commission proposed a second compact in 1927 and it was also
defeated (Dellapenna, 2005; Duca-Sandberg, 2011; Martin et al., 1960; Weston, 1989).
Without an acceptable plan, conflict emerged between the upper basin state of New York
and the lower basin states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. New Jersey sued New York in the
United States Supreme Court and the Court, using the doctrine of equitable apportionment,
allowed the state of New York to divert up to 440 million gallons per day from the Delaware
Basin into the Hudson River Basin for New York City (See New Jersey v. New York, 1931). This
was about two-thirds of the water that New York City had originally requested. In turn, New
York was required to release sufficient flow from its reservoirs in the Catskill Mountains to
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protect downstream water supplies in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. In addition, the
decree confirmed Pennsylvania’s request that the diversion to New York not establish a right of
prior appropriation nor grant New Jersey or Pennsylvania superior rights with regard to the
waters of the Delaware Basin (Dellapenna, 2005; Kauffman, 2010; Ravindranath et al., 2016;
Weston, 1989).
The Supreme Court decision in New Jersey v. New York (1931) did little to improve the
overall situation on the river and neither state believed that the problem was solved (Dellapenna,
2005; Jeffers, 2009). The decision by the Court provided no mechanism for comprehensive
management of the basin and the Supreme Court lacked the time and resources to address
reallocation of water between the states each time a new issue or crisis emerged (Dellapenna,
2005). In 1934, after conducting a basin-wide survey, the “308” report,25 the Philadelphia
District of the Army Corp of Engineers recommended the formation of an interstate agency as a
way to plan and manage the Delaware (Mandarano & Mason, 2013; Terenzio, 1962). As a result,
in 1936, an advisory commission was formed by New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania (with
Delaware joining in 1939). Known as the Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin or
INCODEL, it was created by parallel legislation among the states and was based on voluntary
cooperation (Martin et al., 1960).
Prior to INCODEL, all the wastewater discharged into the Delaware River was untreated
except for that originating in Trenton and a small area of Philadelphia which was treated. During
the post-World War II period, INCODEL oversaw the construction of new sewage treatment
plants throughout the basin. INCODEL was also involved in cleaning coal silt from the

25

“308” reports were conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers to determine the feasibility of river basin development.
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Schuylkill River and the Delaware Estuary as well as constructing desilting basins at coal mines
in the upper Schuylkill basin (Albert, 1988). Even so, and despite high hopes based on the basinwide nature of INCODEL, it failed to accomplish many of the responsibilities of an organization
of this scope. For example, the Commission did not deal with issues of water allocation and
basin-wide management. In addition, INCODEL experienced difficulty adjusting the
apportionment resulting from New Jersey v. New York (1931) due to recurring and long-term
droughts. Overall, INCODEL lacked sufficient authority and ended by occupying only a small
role in Basin development (Dellapenna, 2005; Martin et al., 1960).
In an effort to better manage the basin, the four states then entered into two compacts,
with New Jersey alone ratifying a third, proposed compact. The first of these compacts was the
Delaware River Basin Commission Compact (the Commission Compact). This compact was
approved by the states in 1949 and was ratified by congress in 1952. It created the Interstate
Commission on the Delaware River with three members from each state and three members from
the federal government in advisory positions. Unfortunately, the Commission lacked the
authority to regulate uses conforming with state or federal water rights even though these uses
might substantially interfere with arrangements or plans put forth by the Commission. Without
sufficient authority to carry out its goals and objectives, this compact also failed (Dellapenna,
2005).
Derthick (1974) has suggested that the movement toward regional cooperation in the
Delaware Basin began in the mid-1950s, just after the second Supreme Court ruling on the
dispute over water allocation (See New Jersey v. New York, 1954). This ruling permitted New
York City to increase its diversions to 800 mgd contingent on the City maintaining a minimum
discharge to insure adequate downstream flow and control salinity in the Delaware estuary. New
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Jersey also was awarded a 100 mgd diversion at this time. The 1954 decree also included a
provision that enabled the parties to petition the court for modifications at a future date.
However, no changes could be made without the unanimous consent of the decree parties
(Ravindranath et al., 2016).
While the 1954 decree addressed the immediate issues among the parties, it failed to
provide a lasting solution. By this time, it was apparent that there was a pressing need to develop
a mechanism to deal with long term issues in the basin (Featherstone, 1999). A number of
solutions, including various commissions, compacts, and court cases, had been tried and failed to
address the problems of the basin and it appeared likely that the long-standing conflict over basin
resources would continue. The 1931 and 1954 decisions by the Supreme Court had provided no
means for comprehensive basin management (Dellapenna, 2005), INCODEL lacked the
necessary authority to carry out its goals and had only a small role in the basin (Dellapenna,
2005; Martin et al., 1960), and the early compacts, lacking adequate authority, had also failed.
The states were looking to settle disputes in ways that would allow them to influence the
outcomes and that would provide more predictable conclusions than appealing to the Supreme
Court. The movement supporting regional cooperation emerged at the same time the basin state
governors and both of the mayors of the largest cities, New York City and Philadelphia, banded
together to form the 1956 Delaware River Basin Advisory Committee (Derthick, 1974; Martin et
al., 1960).
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Another precipitating event occurred in 1955 when a major flood from hurricanes Connie
and Dianne caused extensive damage and loss of life in the Delaware Basin.26 In the wake of the
flood, state officials were increasingly frustrated by the large number of federal agencies
operating in the basin, many with overlapping functions. This frustration fueled their interest in
an organization that could streamline contact with these agencies. In addition, a then-recent
survey of the Delaware River Basin by the Army Corp of Engineers indicated that there would
likely be significant development on the river. Given the likelihood of major changes, the states
needed to seek a way to participate in the planning process for that development (Derthick, 1974;
Featherstone, 1999).
A study by Syracuse University, commissioned to examine alternative forms of
organization for the basin, originally suggested that Congress create a federal development
agency modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority. Basin officials, however, elected to utilize a
federal-interstate compact instead, choosing a format that would include the federal government,
not just the states (Derthick, 1974). Unfortunately, while the states were eager to develop an
organizational structure that would allow them to work together with the federal government to
govern the basin, federal departments and agencies were less enthusiastic (J. F. Zimmerman,
2012). In fact, the federal government was especially concerned that the Compact would usurp
its powers such that Congress qualified its membership to the point that it was was close to being
unilateral in effect (Terenzio, 1962).

26

Connie moved through the basin from August 11 through August 13 then Diane on August 18 and 19 (Anderson & Nichols,
1973, cited in Featherstone, 1999). The resulting floods cost 100 lives and resulted in damages estimated at over 100 million
dollars. This was just subsequent to the Army Corp of Engineers declaring that the Delaware posed no substantial threat of
flooding (Martin et al., 1960).
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Although the Federal government had experience negotiating interstate compacts, prior to
the proposed Delaware River Basin compact, it had never actually become part of one. An act
such as this would represent a major change in intergovernmental relations and there were
questions as to its constitutionality. However, the Delaware River Basin Advisory Committee
was adamant, fully asserting that without federal participation, the state-only organization would
be rendered insignificant. One Committee official wrote:
As long as the federal government refrains from joining the compact agency, then
roughly 80 per cent of the overall “job” of water resources development will remain
outside the control of the basin agency…. If it is decided to proceed with an
interstate agency then my long-term prediction is that we shall have a rather
disorganized kind of river basin development here at an unnecessarily high level of
cost, and that the interstate agency will become a pleasantly innocuous entity that
is referred to in the press once a year following its annual picnic held at a place
called Pocono Manor. (Whitall cited in Derthick, 1974, p.50)
A major impediment for the federal government was the issue of yielding some of its
constitutional powers to a form of government that was responsible to neither state governments
nor the federal government. Seven federal agencies raised constitutional and conflict-of-interest
issues, including the Departments of Justice and the Interior (Office of the Comptroller General
of the United States, 1981). However, after winning support from the Kennedy White House as
well as generating powerful support in Congress, the Delaware River Basin Advisory Committee
was able to move forward with the federal portion of the compact. Relevant federal agencies
agreed that the federal government would become a signatory to the compact with the inclusion
of certain reservations to protect federal interests (Derthick, 1974). In protecting its interests, the
federal government maintained that the representative of the United States must concur with the
Comprehensive Plan in order to bind the federal government. In addition, the President can issue
an Executive Order to suspend, delete, or modify any provision of the Comprehensive Plan that
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applies to federal agencies or officers if he or she determines that the action is in the national
interest (Office of the Comptroller General of the United States, 1981).
New York was the first state to pass the legislation for the compact on March 17, 1961,
followed by New Jersey on May 1, Delaware on May 26, and Pennsylvania on July 7, 1961.
Congress ratified the Delaware River Basin Compact, approving it on September 27, 1961. On
November 2, 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed the compact, making it law (Delaware
River Basin Compact, 1961).
Influences on Compact Development
Managing interstate water resources in the United States has been a source of conflict for
policy makers at all levels of government for well over two hundred years. Water resource
management has been complicated by the many uses that water serves, priorities for those uses,
competing demands, and the misalignment between hydrologic boundaries and political
boundaries. This is especially true of the Delaware which Mandarano and Mason (2013)
described as “an intensively used, highly contested resource” (p. 367).
Martin et al. (1960)27 stated in their extensive study of the river in the late 1950s, “The
most important feature affecting the Delaware is not the hydrology of the River nor the
undeveloped natural resources of its Valley, but rather its people and the demands they make
upon it” (p. 30). These demands did, and will continue to, determine how the basin is governed
within the confines of the compact.
The following section provides a broad overview of some of the myriad agencies and
organizations that were charged with various programs and activities in the Delaware Basin prior

27

This book, River Basin Administration and the Delaware, is the published version of the Syracuse University study referenced
by Derthick (1974). It provides a comprehensive, real time view of the state of the basin leading up to the 1961 signing of the
Delaware River Basin Compact and is cited extensively in this section.
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to the development of the compact in 1961. An analysis of a study conducted by the Syracuse
University Research Institute (Martin et al., 1960) has allowed for an in-depth understanding of
the scope and scale of federal, state, local, and non-governmental interests in the basin and how
these interests might have affected the choices made in developing and implementing the
compact.
Basin Agencies, Programs, and Interest Groups Prior to the Compact
Just prior to the passage of the Delaware River Basin Compact, Martin et al. (1960)
surveyed several hundred citizens’ groups in the Delaware Service Area. They found that, in
1958, fifty percent of the organizations expressing interest in water resource development were
focused on fish and wildlife protection. This was closely followed by flood control, small
watershed development, pollution control, water-based recreation, industrial and municipal water
supply, irrigation, port development, navigation, hydroelectric power, and a small number of
other responses.
The authors indicated that for each potential area of interest, groups tended to form, often
with significant influence. These groups often sought to have a single governmental agency
responsible for their particular interest area and in which the groups could have particular access
and confidence. As a result, the activities of these special interest groups could be decisive
regarding governmental actions pertaining to basin development (Martin et al., 1960).
Federal Agencies and Programs. There were numerous federal agencies and programs
located in the Delaware Basin along with corresponding non-governmental associations and
interest groups. The Army Corps of Engineers was charged with building dams, improving
channels, and erecting protective works to assist in flood control. The Corps was supported in
their civil engineering efforts by the National Rivers and Harbors Congress. This non78

governmental group supplied general support for funding appropriations as well as specific
support for individual projects. The Weather Bureau, in the Department of Commerce, and the
Geological Survey in the Department of the Interior were tasked with providing warnings of
impending flooding. Emergency response to flooding was provided by the Army Corps of
Engineers and, occasionally, through the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization and the U.S.
Coast Guard, a unit of the Treasury Department (Martin et al., 1960).
Watershed development in the Delaware Basin included flood protection and erosion
control at the watershed level through the Soil Conservation Service in the Department of
Agriculture in concert with the National Association of Soil Conservation Districts. These
organizations worked together to attain fiscal support for their agendas. Other organizations with
interests in the area of small watershed development were the American Farm Bureau
Association and the National Grange. Watershed associations were also active in the Delaware
Basin and represented by the American Watershed Council. The Forest Service, also in the
Department of Agriculture, likewise had interests in the basin (Martin et al., 1960).
Water in the Delaware Basin, like most rivers, served multiple purposes. In the late
1950s, pollution control and water supply were under the Public Health Service, a unit of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The use of reservoirs for water storage meant
that the Army Corps of Engineers was also heavily involved in water supply. Recreation was of
significant interest in the basin represented by differing and sometimes conflicting groups.
Federal programs in this area were overseen by two separate divisions of the Department of the
Interior: the National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service. In addition, numerous nongovernmental organizations such as the National Audubon Society, the National Council of State
Garden Clubs, Ducks Unlimited, the National Wildlife Federation and others, were involved in
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the basin. Other uses of the river include hydropower, overseen by the Department of the Interior
and the Federal Power Commission and irrigation supported by the Department of Agriculture
and more indirectly through the land-grant agricultural colleges. Hydropower interest groups
included the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association and the American Public Power
Association (Martin et al., 1960).
Port development and navigation were important issues for commercial development and
increasingly for pleasure craft in the Delaware Basin. Both were administered by the Corps of
Engineers with assistance from the Rivers and Harbors Congress. The Coast Guard was
responsible for enforcing federal navigation laws and providing navigational aids. On the local
level there were groups focused on various projects such as constructing and maintaining a
protected intracoastal waterway and expanding pleasure boating as well as national associations
supporting these interests (Martin et al., 1960).
State and Local Level Agencies and Programs. Agencies and programs at the state
level were very similar to those at the federal level. However, Pennsylvania was the only state to
have an active flood control program (located in the Department of Forests and Waters). In New
York and New Jersey, studies focusing on flood protection were located in the New York State
Flood Control Commission and the Division of Water Policy and Supply respectively. Delaware
focused only on local drainage, overseen by an independent Board of Ditch Commissioners
(Martin et al., 1960).
The states saw watershed development as more in the realm of soil conservation rather
than water resource management. As a result, it was overseen by the agricultural agencies; in
Delaware, the State Soil Conservation Commission; in Pennsylvania, the Department of
Agriculture; and in New York, the State Soil Conservation Committee. Only New Jersey was the
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State Soil Conservation Committee part of a conservation agency, the Department of
Conservation and Economic Development (Martin et al., 1960).
In each of the states, pollution control and the monitoring and approval of public water
supplies were overseen by the public health departments. These included the Sanitary Water
Board of the Pennsylvania Department of Health, the Division of Environmental Sanitation in
the New Jersey Department of Health, the New York Department of Health’s Water Pollution
Control Board, and Delaware’s Water Pollution Commission operating through the State Board
of Health. However, an additional approval process was required in three of the four states
(Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey) for the use of new or extended water supply sources.
While New York and New Jersey supplied water in some areas, a number of smaller agencies
and districts provided water for municipalities and industry (Martin et al., 1960).
States also administered parks and forests within the basin. In Pennsylvania, New York,
and New Jersey, these were assigned to a conservation focused or similar agency, including
Forests and Waters, Conservation, and Conservation and Economic Development respectively.
Only Delaware separately allocated parks and forests with the State Park Commission overseeing
parks and the State Forestry Commission overseeing forests (Martin et al., 1960).
For fish and wildlife, Pennsylvania divided authority between the state Fish Commission
and the state Game Commission, neither of which reported to the Department of Forests and
Waters. New Jersey consolidated both under its previously mentioned Department of
Conservation and Economic Development while New York also consolidated both under its
Conservation Department. Delaware consigned both to an autonomous Board of Game and Fish
Commissioners with a separate Commission of Shell Fisheries (Martin et al., 1960).
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All four states had agencies charged with the supervision of public utilities and regulation
of rates; The Delaware Public Service Commission, the New York Public Service Commission,
the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
These agencies were tasked with overseeing municipal and industrial water supplies that were
privately operated (Martin et al., 1960).
There were two state port development agencies in the Delaware Basin: The South Jersey
Port Commission of New Jersey, operating the Camden Marine Terminal and the Delaware
Waterfront Commission which, along with the State Highway Commission, maintained the
waterfront and the Delaware Memorial Bridge (administered through the Interstate Highway
Division). Navigation at the state level was largely limited to the licensing and regulation of
pilots, registration of pleasure boats and similar activities (Martin et al., 1960).
Other Programs and Agencies. At the time, there were several interstate commissions
in the Delaware Basin. The Palisades Interstate Commission focused on recreation, the Delaware
River Joint Toll Bridge Commission was tasked with building and operating bridges as was the
Delaware River Port Authority. The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission oversaw
commercial fishing and the Interstate Sanitation Commission dealt with pollution. The
previously mentioned Interstate Commission on the Delaware had a number of functions with
pollution abatement at the forefront (Martin et al., 1960).
In addition to federal, state, and interstate agencies, there were an estimated 891 counties,
cities, towns, townships, boroughs, and villages in the Delaware River Basin prior to the
development of the compact. Many of these operated water supply, sewage disposal,
recreational, and other water related activities. As Martin et al. (1960) indicated,
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…the assignment of statutory responsibility for these functions to the
municipalities, while other programs are operative at the state and federal levels,
has the effect of discouraging the coordination of effort among the agencies dealing
with water. One of the most serious problems of this kind has been the difficulty in
relating water supply storage to such other water activities as flood control, stream
flow augmentation, promotion of recreation, and hydroelectric power generation.
All these goals (and others as well) often are attainable through the same reservoir
system but, assigned by law to different governmental levels, are rarely united in a
comprehensive program of development. (p. 52)
In addition to the previously mentioned governmental and non-governmental agencies,
private businesses made significant demands on the water resources of the river. Martin et al.,
(1960) observed that the business and industrial sectors were the largest segment of the
population with major interests in the development of the river as well as appearing to have the
most influence on matters concerning it. As a result, there were business groups engaged within
each of the areas of water resource management; each with their own, sometimes conflicting,
demands on the many agencies and programs in the basin (Martin et al., 1960).
At the time of compact development, the basin was “subject to the duplicating,
overlapping, and uncoordinated administration of some forty-three State agencies, fourteen
interstate agencies, and nineteen Federal agencies which exercise a multiplicity of powers and
duties resulting in a splintering of authority and responsibilities” (Delaware River Basin
Compact, 1961, p. 1). Other concerns driving compact development included increased demands
due to population growth as well as the complex technical, costly, and time-consuming aspects
of water resource management. Long term planning for floods, drought, and other purposes was
also critical to the future of the basin (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961). Figure 2 illustrates
how the basin context and various conditions influenced the development of the Compact as well
as how the Delaware River Basin Commission became the primary strategy or mechanism for
solving the problem.
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Figure 2

Delaware River Basin Compact Development

The Delaware River Basin Compact
The Delaware River Basin Compact was the first basin-wide, federal-interstate water
resource management agreement in the United States. Given the multiplicity of issues leading to
the creation of the Compact, it was designed to serve a variety of purposes. As the Delaware
River Basin Advisory Committee stated in Article 1, Section 1.3 (e):
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In general, the purposes of this compact are to promote interstate comity; to remove
causes of present and future controversy; to make secure and protect present
developments within the states; to encourage and provide for the planning,
conservation, utilization, development, management and control of the water
resources of the basin; to provide for cooperative planning and action by the
signatory parties with respect to such water resources; and to apply the principle of
equal and uniform treatment to all water users who are similarly situated and to all
users of related facilities, without regard to established political boundaries.
(Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961, p. 4)
There are certain limitations included in the Compact. Recognizing the unease with
which the federal government viewed the agreement, Section 1.4 reaffirms the power of
Congress to control navigable waters within the basin as well as the right to regulate commerce
among the states and with foreign nations granted under the Constitution. It also provides
Congress with the power to withdraw the federal government from the Compact or to modify the
terms and conditions under which it would remain a party to the agreement. Further protections
for the federal government are included in the Effectuation section of the Compact. The Compact
also preserves existing offices and agencies of the government to the extent that they are
compatible with the Compact and directs the DRBC to work with these agencies to the fullest
extent possible (Delaware River Basin Commission, 1961).
The duration of the Compact is for an initial period of one hundred years from its
effective date; thus it will remain in effect until 2061. It continues in effect for additional periods
of 100 years if, within a specified period, no signatory state notifies the Commission of an
intention to terminate the Compact.
When the Compact was signed into law in 1961, it represented the acknowledgement by
the signature parties that the problems of the basin were of a multi-state nature and would
therefore require a cooperative, regional approach. As such, they designated the boundaries of
the Compact to be those of the river basin, regardless of political borders. The basin boundaries
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were designed to help address, “…the duplicating, overlapping and uncoordinated
administration…” (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961, p. 2) that characterized the Delaware
Basin at the time the Compact was created. This basin-wide approach also recognized the
systemic, interrelated nature of the basin with its natural, political, and social environments and
the ensuing need for a single governing body.
The remainder of the Compact discusses the creation of the Delaware River Basin
Commission, the powers and duties of the Commission, intergovernmental relations, budgets and
financing, planning and programs, and general provisions. In addition, the Compact allows for
amendments and supplements to be added if enacted by legislative action by any of the signatory
parties with the agreement of all other signatories. Conversely, if any part of the Compact is
declared to be unconstitutional or inapplicable to any signatory party, agency, or person, the
remainder of the Compact will remain unaffected (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
The Delaware River Basin Commission is the mechanism most responsible for the
success of the Delaware River Basin Compact. It represents the joint authority of the states and
the federal government over the water resources in the basin. As such, it has extensive authority
to carry out its mission (Sax et al., 2006). The Commission was also authorized by the Compact
to develop and implement its own decision-making structures and processes. This organizational
flexibility has allowed the Commission to determine how to best address the problems of the
basin as well as the ability to adapt to new and unique situations.
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The Delaware River Basin Commission
While the main purpose of the Delaware River Basin Compact was to resolve conflicts
over the waters of the river, the Delaware River Basin Commission has been, and continues to
be, instrumental to the success of the Compact (Derthick, 1974; J. F. Zimmerman, 2012). Not
long after the DRBC was formed, Frederick L. Zimmerman and Mitchell Wendell, two students
of federalism, remarked that:
Something new in American government has been invented on the Delaware….
For the first time anywhere in the United States, a major interstate basin is to be
served by a governmental agency which is at once a part of the government of each
of the affected states and the United States government….In place of the
competition, overlapping, duplication and jurisdictional no man’s lands which have
characterized the separate efforts of a multitude of local, state and federal agencies,
a unified program may be substituted. (Cited in Derthick, 1974, p. 47)
The decision to allocate water among the states administratively was the result of the
relatively rigid apportionments that emerged from previous water allocation compacts as well as
from the desire to avoid expensive and time-consuming litigation in the Supreme Court (Muys,
1973). Commissions established under federal-interstate compacts such as the Delaware River
Basin Compact have planning authority and extensive powers to manage and control both the
water and related land resources of the basin significantly reducing the need to resort to the
courts. Commissions are also able to act in situations where a signatory member cannot (e.g.,
allocating water during a drought) (Office of the Comptroller General of the United States,
1981).
The DRBC is a federal-interstate agency created to provide a coordinated, comprehensive
regional approach to governing interstate waters in the basin without regard to political
boundaries (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021h; Office of the Comptroller General of the
United States, 1981). The vision of the DRBC is to 87

(P)rovide trusted, effective, and coordinated management of our shared water
resources. The vision… is built upon the Compact signed in 1961 by Delaware, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and the federal government. It is defined in the
Delaware River Basin Compact as, “the conservation, utilization, development,
management and control of water and related resources of the Delaware River
Basin under a comprehensive multipurpose plan will bring the greatest benefits
and produce the most efficient service in the public welfare.” (Delaware River
Basin Commission, 2019b, p. 2)
The mission of the DRBC is to –
“(D)evelop and effectuate plans, policies and projects relating to the water resources of
the Basin” through:
• Watershed-based planning and management
• Effective, efficient, and coordinated regulatory programs
• Policies and practices informed by science
• Collaboration with and among our state and federal signatory partners
• Adaptive and innovative water resource management
• Public education and outreach
• Public and stakeholder input
• Dedicated and engaged staff in a high performing workplace
To accomplish this mission, the Commission will continue to lead and collaborate
with the signatory parties to: protect and improve water quality; manage river
flows to meet diverse and at times conflicting Basin needs; reduce damage caused
by floods; provide for the reasonable and sustainable development and use of
surface and ground water; and promote water conservation and efficiency
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019b, p. 2).
In addition, the Commission is guided by the following core values:
 Service: to the public, the regulated community and our DRBC colleagues.
 Respect: for each other, the public and the Basin’s water resources.
 Professionalism: defined by high ethical standards, integrity, continuous
improvement, and accountability (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019b,
p. 2).
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Commission Composition
The DRBC consists of the four basin-state governors (usually their alternates) and a
federal representative, the Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers North Atlantic
Division. The federal representative coordinates with and represents the perspectives of all
federal agencies on basin-related matters brought before the Commission. Each Commissioner
has one vote and a majority is required for most issues. However, votes on apportionment of the
budget and to declare a state of emergency require unanimity. DRBC business meetings,
hearings on policy matters, and water resources projects falling under regulatory review are open
to the public as are the meetings of the advisory committees (Delaware River Basin Commission,
2020d).
The Powers and Duties of the DRBC
The DRBC has extensive powers in the basin to carry out the duties of the Compact. It
has the authority to develop and implement plans, policies, and projects relating to the water
resources in the basin including coordinated policies for conservation, use, and management. The
DRBC is also charged with encouraging the planning, development, and financing of these
projects in accordance with those plans.
The Commission must consult with water users and interested public parties in order to
develop immediate and long-term plans for basin water resources. In addition, it must develop
and adopt a water resources program, based upon the Comprehensive Plan, which assesses future
water quality and quantity needs for the area to be balanced against existing and proposed
projects. Lastly, the Commission must develop an annual budget covering the water resources
program and consistent with the projects and facilities for that budget period (Delaware River
Basin Compact, 1961).
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Article 3, Section 3.3 of the Compact gives the Commission the power to allocate the
waters of the basin among the signatory states and their respective political subdivisions using
the doctrine of equitable apportionment. As part of this authority, the Commission is also able to
impose certain conditions and requirements related to the allocated waters within specified
limits. The DRBC cannot adversely affect the provisions of the 1954 Supreme Court decree (see
New Jersey v. New York, 1954) when apportioning the waters of the basin without the unanimous
consent of the parties to the decree. However, in the event of a state of emergency, with the
unanimous consent of its members and in consultation with the river master, the Commission
may change any allocation or diversion under that decree for the time necessary to meet the
emergency (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
The Compact provides a number of general powers to the Commission. These include:
1. The ability to plan, develop, and operate any facilities, projects, activities, or services
that the DRBC determines the be necessary, convenient, or useful in carrying out the
purposes of the Delaware River Basin Compact;
2. The authority to establish planning, design, and operating standards for all the
projects and facilities in the basin that affect water resources;
3. The ability to conduct and sponsor research on the planning, use, and management of
the basin’s water resources and collect information on systematic stream stage and
ground water level forecasting and to publicize this information as needed;
4. The ability to conduct special ground water investigations to inform and administer the
Comprehensive Plan;
5. The authority to negotiate for loans, grants, and services to finance or implement any
of the purposes of the Compact; and
6. The authority to exercise powers delegated by the Compact or otherwise pursuant to
law and to “have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to carry out its
express powers or which may be reasonably implied therefrom” (Delaware River Basin
Compact, 1961, p. 8).
90

The DRBC is also granted the ability to charge various rents, rates, charges, tolls, etc., for
the facilities owned or operated by the Commission. These rates can be adjusted after public
notice and an appropriate hearing. However, these charges are controlled solely by the DRBC
and are not regulated or controlled by any agency or office of any of the signatory parties.
The DRBC is also vested with substantial power over water resource development in the
basin (§3.8, Referral and Review). Any project that significantly affects the waters of the basin
must first be submitted to and approved by the Commission. A project will only be approved if it
does not substantially impair or conflict with the Comprehensive Plan. However, any plan
rejected by the Commission is subject to judicial review in any court of competent jurisdiction
(Delaware River Basin Compact,1961).
The Commission is also charged with coordinating and cooperating with federal, state,
municipal, and private agencies operating in or with an interest in the Delaware River Basin. In
this role, the DRBC can advise, consult with, assist financially, or otherwise support such
organizations. The Commission can also authorize advisory committees made up of
representatives of the public as well as those of federal, state, county, and municipal
governments, water resource agencies, industries, interest groups, labor and agriculture groups
(Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
If a disagreement with the actions of the DRBC with respect to out-of-basin diversions or
compensating water releases emerges, the aggrieved party can invoke the original jurisdiction of
the United States Supreme Court within a year of the action. Any other action of the Commission
related to allocations, diversions, or releases is subject to judicial review by any court of
competent jurisdiction (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
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The powers of the DRBC are extensive. Article 1, Section 1.2 of the Compact provides
several definitions critical to the powers of the DRBC and the governance of the basin.
“Facilities” describes the extent of the Commission’s authority over water related infrastructure
and is defined as including any real property, inside or outside of the basin, and any
improvements of those properties. Facilities include:
…any and all rights of way, water, water rights, plants, structures, machinery and
equipment, acquired, constructed, operated or maintained for the beneficial use of
water resources or related land uses including, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, any and all things and appurtenances necessary, useful or convenient for
the control, collection, storage, withdrawal, diversion, release, treatment,
transmission, sale or exchange of water; or for navigation thereon, or the
development and use of hydroelectric energy and power, and public recreational
facilities; or the propagation of fish and wildlife; or to conserve and protect the
water resources of the basin or any existing or future water supply source, or to
facilitate any other uses of any of them;. (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961, p.
3)
“Projects” describe any work, service, or activity undertaken in the basin that is planned,
financed, or identified by the DRBC. Projects also include any separate facility within a specified
area that can be used independently or in addition to an existing facility to conserve, utilize,
control, develop, or manage water resources. “Water resources” are defined broadly to include
“water and related natural resources in, on, under, or above the ground, including the related uses
of land, which are subject to beneficial use, ownership, or control” (Delaware River Basin
Compact, 1961, p. 3).
DRBC Operational Areas
Articles four through ten of the Compact deal with the operational areas of the DRBC:
Water supply, pollution control, flood protection, watershed management, recreation,
hydroelectric power, and regulation of withdrawals and diversions. The Compact gives the
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Commission the authority, without limitation, to develop and implement plans for the utilization
of the water resources of the basin for domestic, municipal, agricultural, and industrial uses. As a
result, the Commission may construct or acquire dams, reservoirs, and other means of utilizing
surface and ground water resources. However, the Commission is not authorized to engage in
water distribution (The Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
The DRBC also has the power to investigate as well as develop and operate projects to
control or abate pollution in the Delaware Basin. In addition, the Commission can utilize the
power and jurisdictional authority of water pollution abatement agencies of the Compact
signatories. The Commission can also develop and operate projects to store and release water on
the Delaware River and its tributaries in order to reduce flood damage. It can also utilize flood
plain zoning, the acquisition of lands susceptible to flooding, and post flood and stream stage
warnings in vulnerable areas (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
Watershed management in the basin consists of projects and facilities to promote rigorous
practices including those to constrain runoff and prevent soil erosion, manage forests, and fish
and wildlife habitats. This section of the Compact calls for cooperation between the Commission
and the appropriate agencies of the signatory parties as well as other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The Compact also prohibits actions or activities in the area until it has
satisfied a requirement that no other appropriate unit or organization is available to carry out the
action or activity. This prohibition serves to preserve the authority and functions of existing
offices and agencies. At the same time, the Commission holds the power to use these offices and
agencies to the fullest extent that it finds feasible and useful for the purpose of the Compact
(Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
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The DRBC is also charged with developing water related recreational facilities by
cooperating with the appropriate public and private agencies. In addition, the Commission is
responsible for recommending standards for the development and administration of these
facilities, operating facilities owned or controlled by the Commission, and for controlling private
concession contracts at these facilities (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
Hydroelectric power generation and regulation of withdrawals and diversions of basin
waters are under the authority of the DRBC. In accordance with the Comprehensive Plan, the
waters of the basin may be impounded and used by the Commission or under its authority to
generate hydropower. The Commission may also provide transmission facilities for the
wholesale distribution of power in areas where they are not reasonably available although the
Commission is not permitted to sell power directly to consumers. The Commission also oversees
the development of hydropower by public utilities. The Compact specifies that the rates and
charges resulting from hydropower development be reasonable, without discrimination, and just
(Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
Article 10 of the Compact gives the DRBC the power to regulate withdrawals and
diversions of both surface and ground water in the basin. This section of the Compact allows the
Commission the power to enter into agreements with the signatory parties so that they might
assume any necessary authority that the DRBC considers necessary or desirable. The
Commission is also empowered, after public hearing and due notice, to specify areas within the
basin that experience water stress as “protected areas.” In protected areas, no entity can withdraw
water in amounts greater than those provided by general regulations with the exception of the
possession of a permit granted under the auspices of the Compact or a permit or approval from
any of the signatory states. In the event of a water supply emergency, again after a public
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hearing, the Commission is empowered to set withdrawal quotas by general regulation or by
special permit. Permits are issued so as to avoid depleting streams and ground water that will
impact the Comprehensive Plan or the equitable rights of other users. Permits are also issued in
ways that seek to balance and reconcile alternative and conflicting water uses. If it becomes
necessary for the Commission to invoke emergency powers provided in this article, any
diversion or withdrawal permits issued by the states are superseded in that area that conflict with
the Commission’s regulatory powers. Again, actions of the DRBC under this section of the
Compact are subject to judicial review in any court of competent jurisdiction (Delaware River
Basin Compact, 1961).
Intergovernmental Relations
The Compact defines the various ways that the DRBC interacts with other government
organizations to avoid conflict and maximize the effects of the regional agency. For federal,
state, and local agencies and projects, the Compact requires that the planning of all projects
falling under the authority of the DRBC are to be undertaken in consultation with the
Commission. Also, the Compact forbids expenditures or commitments to be made for any
federal, state, or local project in the basin unless it has been included in the DRBC’s
Comprehensive Plan. Otherwise, any of these agencies that are lawfully authorized to develop
and implement projects in the basin has the ability to do so except as specified by the Compact.
The ability to levy taxes and fees on water withdrawn from their respective areas of the basin is
reserved for each state (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
It is also within the purview of the Commission to establish standards and procedures for
evaluating, determining benefits, and allocating costs for projects affecting the basin. The DRBC
is also responsible for determining project priorities as they align with the Comprehensive Plan.
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The Commission also develops equitable cost sharing and reimbursement policies for the
Compact signatories. This includes:
1. Creating consistent procedures for allocating project costs among different purposes
in multi-use programs;
2. Providing for shared financial responsibilities among the signatory parties,
governmental and non-governmental organizations and supervising the performance
of these agents;
3. Developing and supervising a system of accounts for reimbursements, payments, and
charges;
4. Determining and apportioning amounts of reimbursable revenues paid to the Compact
signatories or their political sub-divisions as well as the payments to them in place of
taxes (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
The Compact also provides for the DRBC to provide technical services and consulting
services to authorized agencies of the signatories relating to the basin’s water resources. At the
same time, the signatory parties are to provide technical and administrative services to the
Commission when requested and when within the limits of available appropriations. The
signatory parties are also required to generally cooperate with the commission with the cost of
services rendered to be reimbursed when determined to be appropriate (Delaware River Basin
Compact, 1961).
Capital Financing
The Delaware River Basin Compact provides for extensive capital financing for the
DRBC. Article 12, Section 12.1 states that the Commission may borrow money, issue negotiable
bonds, or otherwise incur debt for any purpose of the Compact. Any debts incurred are to be
paid, not through taxation, but by utilizing the properties and revenues of the Commission. The
Compact also provides the ability to secure, without limitation, funding for all costs for planning,
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designing, acquiring, constructing, completing, improving, or reconstructing any project or
facility. However, the Commission may not utilize the credit of nor impose any obligation for
bond payment on any signatory party or their political sub-units.
In addition to borrowing, the signatory parties are required to provide capital funds for
projects authorized by their respective statutes and in accordance with the cost sharing plan
developed under Article 11. However, signatory parties are not required to be obligated to
support projects for which they have not assumed responsibility. The Commission and the parties
to the Compact can make loans, procure grant funding, seek appropriations, secure advances and
payments of reimbursable or non-reimbursable funds or property in any form to support the
capital and operating functions of the DRBC (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
Plan, Program, and Budget
Section 13.1 describes the development and adoption of a comprehensive plan for the
basin. The Comprehensive Plan covers immediate and long-range development. It also covers
any projects that emerge from any court decree or judgement.
The DRBC must also adopt a water resources program on an annual basis that is
grounded in the Comprehensive Plan. This program consists of the projects and facilities
proposed by the Commission to be undertaken by the DRBC or other agencies during the
following six years or a reasonably foreseeable period as determined by the Commission. The
Water Resources Program consists of the following elements:
1. A presentation on water quality and quantity needs for the designated period;
2. Existing and proposed projects and facilities, public and private, projected to satisfy
these needs and;
3. A statement of projects proposed to be undertaken by the DRBC in the specified time
(Delaware River Basin Compact,1961);
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The Commission is also required to annually adopt a capital budget to support the
estimated costs of each project and resources for funding. The Commission must also adopt an
expense budget for each fiscal year. This budget covers the estimated administration, operation,
and maintenance and repairs expenses for each project along with its cost allocation and must be
balanced against estimated resources. Each signatory party agrees to include apportioned
expenses in their respective budgets (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
General Provisions
Section 14.1 delineates the auxiliary powers of the Commission and the functions of the
commissioners. The Commission, under the powers delegated by the Compact may:
1. Adopt and use a corporate seal, enter into contracts, as well as sue and be sued in any
court of competent jurisdiction;
2. Receive payments, appropriations, grants, gifts, loans, advances, and other funds from
any signatory party or other agency or organization and agree to reimbursements for
all or part of the transfers;
3. Provide for detailed engineering, administrative, financial and operating plans to
support facilities and projects;
4. Control and regulate the use of facilities owned or operated by the Commission;
5. Acquire, operate, maintain, or sell real and personal property necessary, useful, or
convenient for any project or facility and;
6. Possess and exercise all corporate powers essential to the purposes of the
Commission.
Subject to the Compact, commissioners are charged with:
1. Serving the Commission and discharging its powers and duties except otherwise
specified by the Compact;
2. Determining the character of and necessity of the DRBC’s obligations and
expenditures and the way in which they will be incurred, allowed, and paid within
Compact law;
3. Providing the internal organization and administration of the DRBC;
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4. Appointing the principal officers of the Commission and delegating administrative
functions and powers to them;
5. Staffing the commission and providing terms for employment;
6. Letting and executing contracts to carry out the powers of the DRBC (Delaware
River Basin Commission, 1961).
In addition, the Commission may make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for
the implementation and enforcement of the Compact. However, rules and regulations dealing
with any issue other than the internal management of the Commission will be adopted only after
public hearing and filing in accordance with the law of the respective signatory parties to which
the rules and regulations apply (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
All meetings of the Commission are open to the public and the minutes from these
meetings are open to inspection at the offices of the Commission. Prior to adopting the
Comprehensive Plan, the water resources program, annual capital and expense budgets and the
issuing of contracts for the sale or disposition of hydroelectric energy water resources, the
Commission is required to conduct at least one public hearing after 10 days’ notice (Delaware
River Basin Compact, 1961).
The DRBC consists of an executive director and additional officers, deputies and
assistants as determined by the Commission. The executive director is appointed by a majority
vote of the full membership of the Commission. All other officers and employees are appointed
by the executive director within the rules as determined by the Commission (Delaware River
Basin Compact, 1961).
Section 14.12 directs the Commission to publish an annual report to the legislative bodies
of the signatory parties and to the public. These reports discuss the DRBC’s programs,
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operations, and finances. The Commission can also publish other public reports as it may deem
necessary (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
The DRBC has, through eminent domain, the power to condemn any public property,
other than that of a signatory party or any property held in connection with a diversion
authorized by a decree of the Supreme Court of the United States, for its purposes. Signatory
parties and their political sub-divisions are also authorized to transfer certain properties to the
Commission that are necessary to the authorized purposes of the Commission (Delaware River
Basin Compact, 1961).
Governance: Rules of Practice and Procedure
The Rules of Practice and Procedure govern the exercise of authority over projects in the
basin as well as other actions mandated or permitted by the Compact. These rules include the
adoption and revision of the Comprehensive Plan and the water resources program as well as
project review under Section 3.8 of the Compact. Also included are appeals or objections to
decisions of the executive director in water quality cases, administrative and other hearings,
penalties and settlements, and public access to records and information. While these rules may be
revised, modified, or waived by the Commission, all actions must comply with the Compact
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a).
The Comprehensive Plan. This section of the Rules provides for the submission,
consideration, and inclusion of projects into the plan as specified by the Compact. It includes
public and private projects and facilities that are considered by the Commission to be necessary
for optimal planning, development, and management of water resources for both present and
future needs. The Comprehensive Plan also contains statements of policies and programs that are
critical in managing the development of the basin and includes narrative text, maps, charts,
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schedules, budgets and other items necessary for carrying out the Commission’s mission.
Projects and facilities, policy statements and programs can be modified, combined, or deleted as
the result of changing conditions, new research findings, or new technology. The Comprehensive
Plan also defines how federal and state agencies and their political subdivisions are subject to
specific sections of the Compact (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a).
Applications for new projects or for modifications of previously approved projects can be
submitted by the signatory states and their agencies and subdivisions or by owners or sponsors of
privately-owned projects. These entities, as well as any interested person organization or group,
may also submit proposals for changes to the Comprehensive Plan. Applications must include (1)
the purpose(s) of the project including quantitative assessments of anticipated physical benefits,
(2) the location, physical aspects, and total area of the project, (3) an estimation of the effect on
the utilization of water resources, (4) the relationship of the project to other parts of the
Comprehensive Plan, (5) a discussion of how well the project conforms with Commission
policies in the plan, and (6) a discussion of alternatives that have been considered. After a staff
study and review of each application, the Commission must hold a public hearing after which it
takes appropriate action (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a).
The Comprehensive Plan is reviewed at least once every six years from the date the plan
was initially adopted. Review or consideration of any proposal is based upon the
recommendation of the DRBC’s executive director and the Commission. At the review, proposed
changes are considered and may be adopted. All changes will be incorporated into the revised
plan which is made available to the public (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a).
After a project is included in the Comprehensive Plan, no further action is necessary
unless the plan is revised or amended. However, a project that is significantly changed from the
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description in the Plan becomes a new and different project and will be subject to review by the
executive director to determine if the change is substantial based on these regulations. Any
public project not significantly affecting the water resources of the basin as defined in Subpart C
of these regulations many continue without referring to Article 11 of the Compact dealing with
intergovernmental relations. The Comprehensive Plan, including all related maps, charts,
descriptions, and supporting data, is in the custody of the executive director but remains open for
public scrutiny (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a).
The Water Resources Program. The Water Resources Program is a detailed
augmentation of the Comprehensive Plan that has been recommended for implementation within
the subsequent six-year period or within a reasonable time-frame determined by the
Commission.28 The part of the program dealing with water resource needs of the basin is only
revised as new findings become available and new conclusions emerge. This section of the
Administrative Manual - Rules of Practice and Procedure governs the submission, consideration,
and inclusion of projects into the Water Resources Program (Delaware River Basin Commission,
2019a).
Each project in the Water Resources Program must have been previously incorporated
into the Comprehensive Plan with the exception of those that may be added concurrently to the
plan and the program by the Commission. The following information must be submitted prior to
inclusion in the program; (a) up-to-date data from the Comprehensive Plan for the period
covered by the Water Resources Program, (b) the precise location and dimensions of a structural
project and the explicit language of a standard, policy, or other non-structural project, (c) the

28

The most recent publication is the Water Resources Program FY 2022-2024.
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operational plan of a structural project, (d) the specific outcomes of a non-structural project, (e)
sufficient data to support a feasible financial plan for the project, and (f) an implementation
timeline (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a).
The Water Resources Program is considered and adopted by the Commission on an
annual basis. Projects are classified as follows: A-List projects include those public projects
which require no further review and are considered approved while B-List projects are those not
included in the A-List and are privately sponsored projects proposed or anticipated by the
Commission. Any public project previously included in the Comprehensive Plan but not on the
A-List may be submitted for approval under Section 3.829 of the Compact and in accordance with
these regulations (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a).
Institutional Coordination and Cooperation. Given that planning in the basin emerges
from a collaboration that includes a wide range of stakeholders, adaptive and integrated water
resource management, facilitated by institutional coordination and cooperation, is critical. In this
way, all related aspects of the resource are considered at all levels and within many different
jurisdictions. Institutional coordination and cooperation explains how the local, state, and federal
government agencies interact to manage the basin water resources. This section includes
intergovernmental coordination, data sharing and management, agency funding, partnerships and
internal advisory committees, and how the DRBC utilizes its planning and regulatory authority.
The DRBC is part of several initiatives involving state and federal agencies that lead to
both beneficial environmental outcomes in the basin as well as contributing to the development

29

“Section 3.8 Referral and Review. No project having a substantial effect on the water resources of the basin shall hereafter be
undertaken by any person, corporation or governmental authority unless it shall have been first submitted to and approved by
the commission, subject to the provisions of Sections 3.3 and 3.5 (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961, Reformatted 2020, p.
9).
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of water policy at the regional and national level. Other initiatives focus on improving
collaboration and coordination among state and federal agencies and other authorities in the
Basin including those on the regional level. This type of collaboration supports the exchange of
information, experience, and ideas and benefits member agencies and water resource
management in the basin in general (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019b, 2021e).
The DRBC maintains a Geographic Information System (GIS) that delivers new data for
water resource management but also provides interactive maps on the DRBC website, providing
public access to information on the basin. The Commission also maintains the Integrated
Database, including water charging and use, communications, and project review data,
information critical to implementing the DRBC’s core programs. The Commission’s library and
central files maintain hard copies of dockets and applicant information as well as the means to
capture and log the official actions of the DRBC (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019b,
2021e).
In 2004, the DRBC published the Water Resources Plan for the Delaware River Basin.
The plan is a 30-year, goal based framework designed to serve as a unifying vision and guide for
all governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the basin whose actions affect the water
resources of the Delaware. This plan emerged from a four-year process including the creation of
the Watershed Advisory Council to provide guidance for the plan’s development. Although the
plan acts as a non-binding guide for the signatory parties, the intent behind the plan was to
engage relevant stakeholders in partnerships to protect, enhance, and provide for the efficient use
of the basin’s waters (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2004, 2021k).
The DRBC builds and maintains partnerships with national and international
organizations as well as organizing internal advisory committees for expert advice and support.
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The Commission is a partner with the Association of Clean Water Administrators (ACWA), the
Interstate Council on Water Policy (ICWP) and the American Water Resources Association
(AWRA). Climate change, a challenging fiscal environment, infrastructure requirements, and
ever-changing political environments mean that these partners will be increasingly beneficial to
the Commission. In addition, there are a number of advisory committees that assist the
Commission with policy and standards development. Staff members coordinate between
committees on issues that transcend the interests and expertise of a single committee. Current
advisory committees include the:
1. Advisory Committee on Climate Change (ACCC)
2. Flood Advisory Committee (FAC)
3. Monitoring Advisory and Coordination Committee (MACC)
4. Regulated Flow Advisory Committee (RFAC)
a. Subcommittee on Ecological Flows (SEF)
5. Toxics Advisory Committee (TAC)
6. Water Management Advisory Committee (WMAC) and the
7. Water Quality Advisory Committee (WQAC) (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019b,
2021a; Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
Given the purpose and the duties of the DRBC, it is evident that the most important
mechanism to emerge from the Delaware River Basin Compact is the Commission. As the
governing apparatus of the Compact, the DRBC utilizes its planning and regulatory authority to
“facilitate, coordinate, and effect cooperation among water resource efforts across the Basin”
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019b, p. 58). Findings from this case study show that, in
addition to fostering cooperation among the basin states, the Delaware River Basin Commission
utilizes specific mechanisms in carrying out its mission. These mechanisms include conflict
resolution, strategic planning, data-based decision-making, regulatory functions, program
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operations, public participation, and outreach and education. It is these mechanisms, applied at
the “basin-level” that contribute significantly to the success of the Compact.
Post-Compact Developments
In 1974, Martha Derthick published a chapter on the DRBC in her book, Between State
and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States. As part of that chapter she reviewed
the activities of the Commission just after the Delaware River Basin Compact was implemented.
This analysis illustrates some of the early challenges faced by the Commission and provides a
benchmark for comparison with later years.
The Early Years
In 1961, just as the DRBC was being formed, the Delaware Basin began to experience a
drought that would provide an early challenge for the new agency. As the drought worsened in
1965, New York City’s reservoirs in the headwaters of the Delaware, contained just over 25% of
their capacity. In violation of the 1954 Supreme Court decree, New York City ceased releasing
water from those reservoirs, triggering procedures mandated in the Compact for this specific type
of situation. The Commission held a public hearing, declared an emergency, and developed a
temporary formula for diversions and releases. New York City resumed releasing water at a
lower rate than specified in the decree and continued to do so until the end of the drought in early
1967 (Derthick, 1974).
During that time, the Commission repeatedly extended the emergency declaration and
revised the release formula with changes in the river’s flow. It also negotiated releases from two
privately owned reservoirs and from a federal reservoir on the Lehigh River. These revisions
were calculated to keep the salt front at bay while maintaining adequate supply in New York’s
reservoirs. In this case, the Commission had been able to leverage its authority over water
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resources in the basin and its connections to other public entities to exert a highly successful,
comprehensive approach (Derthick, 1974).
Conversely, Derthick (1974) also pointed out that, in these early years, the DRBC was
not fully utilizing the powers granted by the Compact. She cited the authority granted to the
Commission saying, “Except for navigation control, there is virtually nothing that the DRBC is
not authorized to do with respect to water resources in the basin….” (Derthick, 1974, p. 55).
Again in her words, “In doing less than the compact authorizes, the commission has done less
than its proponents hoped and its opponents feared” (Derthick, 1974, p. 57). She suggested that
the representative nature of the Commission and lack of funding were contributing factors.
According to Derthick, by 1973, the Commission had not yet be able to establish its jurisdiction
and was in decline. She also listed deficiencies in the DRBC’s approach to pollution control as
well as difficulties with coordination with the federal commissioner.
However, in her final appraisal of the DRBC, Derthick (1974) claims that the
Commission has been “most successful” in carrying out the purpose for which it was developed:
managing conflicts over water allocation. She also provides a lesson for anyone seeking to
manage any shared resource: “A coordinating organization will work only to the extent that the
participants share an interest in making it work” (Derthick, 1974, p. 72). She concludes that
although the Commission does not utilize the power afforded it by the Compact, it is able to do a
number of things that organizations that are limited to planning and coordinating are unable to do
(Derthick, 1974).
Successful Outcomes and Remaining Challenges
In 1999, Jeffrey Featherstone, in an evaluation of federal-interstate compacts, determined
that the Delaware River Basin Compact and its Commission had dealt effectively with regard to
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meeting most of the objectives found in the Compact. Successes documented by Featherstone
include eliminating the need for the parties to the Compact to resort to the Supreme Court to
settle differences, improving minimum stream flows, water conservation, groundwater
conservation, and increasing the reliability of water supplies in the basin. The Comprehensive
Plan has also garnered success as a tool for coordinating and planning across levels of
government in the basin. However, the DRBC has experienced the most success in the areas of
water quality and water allocation (Featherstone, 1999; Kauffman, 2014).
Egan (2014) called the Delaware River Basin Compact, “…a pristine example of how an
interstate compact can work effectively” (p.336). Egan (2014) especially praised the
Commission’s policies on voting in which most decisions are made with a majority vote, helping
to prevent gridlock. In addition, he noted the comprehensive, forward-looking nature of the
Compact which contributes to its adaptability (Egan, 2014). The Compact has also been
“extraordinarily successful” in resolving issues over water rights between the states (Draper,
2002).
Over the past 70 years, the Delaware Basin States and their citizens have resorted
to virtually every conceivable approach for addressing interstate disputes over
water – short of invasion and civil war – in the continuing search for viable
management of precious and limited water resources. Yet, today… the Delaware
Basin stands as a prime example of interstate cooperation and commitment to
dynamic, regional water resource management. (Weston, 1989, p. 1)
Weston (1989) goes on to point out that, in spite of serious challenges and changing
conditions, the DRBC had developed a unified drought management plan, engaged in joint
operations of reservoirs in the basin, implemented comprehensive water quality standards,
developed and publicized water conservation standards, and provided a platform for joint
investment in new water management facilities. Later, Dellapenna (1999) observed that both the
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Delaware and the Susquehanna compacts30 create a system of water resource management that
includes both water allocation and ecological regulation. He also noted that these compacts are
“notable exceptions” and “…go beyond anything found elsewhere in either the eastern or the
western states, and deserve some extended attention” (Dellapenna, 1999, p. 4).
Moore (2021) also notes that there has been no litigation between the parties to the
Compact even though management pressures have increased in the basin. He also points out that
the DRBC has led two major negotiated agreements, established protected areas for ground and
surface water, instituted ecological flow management regimens, and implemented salinity
management objectives. Moore (2021) also mentions increased participation by nongovernmental water users, decisively influencing several important management decisions. One
of the more important outcomes of the Compact has been the involvement of diverse
stakeholders in the basin in the recent ban on high volume hydraulic fracturing (See Delaware
River Basin Commission, 2021c).
Drought and flood loss prevention are two areas where the DRBC has been less
successful and the regulatory framework in the basin has been characterized as complicated and
fragmented. However, much of the consistency that exists in the regulatory framework can be
attributed to the Commission and the Comprehensive Plan (Featherstone, 1999).
Another area in which the DRBC has struggled occasionally is that of federal
cooperation. Federal agencies have shown unwillingness to make commitments through the
Commission (Featherstone, 1999). Early in the DRBC’s history, the federal commissioner was
unable to provide commitments from the federal government or state a unified position, instead

30

The Susquehanna River Basin Compact is modeled on the Delaware River Basin Compact.
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simply reporting the positions of the federal agencies. This led a DRBC staff member to
comment that the federal representative was an “ambassador” not a “commissioner” (Derthick,
1974, p. 71). Even today, Moore (2021) has noted a decreasing commitment to basin
management by the federal government.
In 2022, sixty plus years after the Compact was signed, there are indications of a
Commission that is significantly more invested in the power afforded by the Compact to protect
the Basin and its environs. The following two examples of post-compact developments represent
the ability of the Compact and the parties to the Compact to address both existing and emerging
issues in the Basin.
The Good Faith Agreement and the resulting flow management plans reflect an extensive
process of negotiation and agreements that have not completely eliminated contention in the
Basin (Ravindranath et al., 2016). The controversy over rulemaking to address natural gas
extraction by hydraulic fracturing in the Basin and the involvement of the courts has been a long,
drawn-out process that illustrates the struggle to determine the limits of the Commission’s
authority in the 21st century.
The “Good Faith Agreement” of 1983
The 1931 Supreme Court decree giving New York City 440 mgd out of the Delaware
Basin endured until 1952 when New York City sought additional water from the Basin. In 1954,
an amended Supreme Court decree increased New York City’s diversion and gave New Jersey
additional water with the stipulation that New York City would provide adequate releases to
maintain streamflow downstream to protect water supplies from an advancing salt front (New
Jersey v. New York, 1954 cited in Ravindranath et al., 2016). The decree also required New
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York City to release sufficient water from its reservoirs to maintain minimum flows at Montague
and Trenton, N.J. as well as calculated “excess quantity” releases (Mandarano & Mason, 2013).
Problems developed when the drought of 1961-1967 made it impossible for New York
City to divert the water from reservoirs to meet the flow requirements protecting the city of
Trenton from salt intrusion from Delaware Bay. It also became apparent that low flows and high
water temperatures might endanger aquatic life, events not considered by the 1954 decree. These
problems were compounded when, in 1975, the Tocks Island dam project, which would have
provided reservoir storage, flood control, and hydropower, was cancelled. (du Pont et al., 1982;
Mandarano & Mason, 2013).
As a result of low flow issues, the state of New York became concerned about impacts on
fishery resources and recreational opportunities below the reservoirs. In 1976, the legislature
passed the New York State Environmental Conservation Law, unilaterally imposing a
conservation focused policy with new release rules on New York City and, in effect, on the other
decree parties (du Pont et al., 1982; Ravindranath et al., 2016). This new legislation elicited
objections from the other degree parties, and brought about a law suit filed by the City of New
York against New York state since, among other things, it reduced the amount of water stored
behind the dams (Moore, 2021; Ravindranath et al., 2016).
Studies by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYDEC) on
the effect of thermal stress resulting from low flow and extreme heat conditions led to proposed
new regulations to modify the 1954 decree mandated release schedule. The new release schedule
would be one that was reservoir specific and would depend on in-stream temperatures and the
amount of stored water but not alter decree flow targets (Mandarano & Mason, 2013). A review
of the proposals by the New York City Department of Environmental Conservation, the
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Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, and the Delaware River Basin
Commission (including a public hearing) led to the approval of the new “experimental” schedule
by the Commission in DRBC Docket D-77-20 in May of 1977. Conditions associated with this
change included extensive monitoring, the development of a long term reservoir operations plan,
a drought emergency water allocation plan, and the decree parties’ unanimous approval. The
initial approval for the plan was for two years, renewable for one year with the unanimous
agreement of all parties. (du Pont et al., 1982; Mandarano & Mason, 2013).
In December of 1978, the Delaware River Basin Commission, by means of Resolution
No. 78-20, invited all the parties to the 1954 decree to enter into “serious good faith discussions
to establish the arrangement, procedures, and criteria for management of the water of the
Delaware Basin consistent with the Compact” (du Pont et al., 1982, p. 30). These negotiations
brought about the “Good Faith Agreement,” or GFA which was signed by the Governors of the
Basin states and transmitted to the DRBC in February of 1983 (Moore, 2021; Ravindranath et al.,
2016; Weston, 1989). As Sax et al. (2006) noted, this agreement “appeared to succeed where
litigation and uneasy cooperation had failed” (p. 855).
The Good Faith Agreement included recommendations to the DRBC for modified
releases related to New York City reservoirs and diversions by New Jersey in times of drought
and as conservation measures. These recommendations were incorporated into the DRBC’s
water code with the unanimous consent of all parties to the 1954 decree. The recommendations
for increased conservation releases by New York City were made part of the DRBC’s
Comprehensive Plan with several modifications through 2007. At that time, the first of a series
of flexible flow management plans (FFMP) was implemented with unanimous consent of the
decree parties. However, in 2017, New Jersey expressed a desire to increase its diversions from
112

the Delaware resulting in a clash with New York. The Delaware River Basin Commission
mediated the dispute and reached a resolution (Moore, 2021). The current flow management
plan, approved in 2017, is the result of the DRBC staff working in close cooperation with
multiple stakeholders, the use of scientific methodology, as well as the ability to adapt and
collaborate to build knowledge and consensus (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021i; State
of Delaware et al., 2017).
High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking) in the Delaware River Basin
On February 25, 2021, the Delaware River Basin Commission approved a final rule
prohibiting high volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) in the Delaware River Basin. Hydraulic
fracturing involves using high pressure to inject water, chemicals, and sand into tight shale
formations, opening small fractures that allow the trapped gas to flow to the surface (Denchak,
2021). According to the Independent Petroleum Association of America (n.d.), hydraulic
fracturing or “fracking” as it’s more commonly called, is a safe, proven drilling technique that
has been used in the United States for nearly seventy-five years. The Natural Resources Defense
Council, however, argues that there is increasing evidence that fracking impacts drinking water,
air pollution, and the climate. In addition, they suggest that the oil and gas industry is underregulated, benefitting from exemptions and limited regulation within major environmental
legislation such as the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act (Denchak, 2021;
Natural Resources Defense Council, 2013).
Approximately forty percent of the Delaware River Basin is located over either the
Marcellus or Utica Shale formations. All this area (with a small exception for portions of a single
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county) drain into waters designated as Special Protection Waters.31 These waters are valued for
their scenic vistas, ecosystems, and pristine water supply. This area also contains many who are
dependent on ground water for drinking and other uses (Delaware River Basin Commission,
2021d).
While the presence of natural gas suitable for commercial extraction has not been
documented within the Basin, fracking is occurring in Pennsylvania just west of the basin. High
volume hydraulic fracturing, as defined by the Delaware River Basin Commission, is hydraulic
fracturing using a combined total of 300,000 or more gallons for all stages of well development.
This process includes vertical, horizontal or other directional drilling and can utilize fresh or
recycled water as well as chemicals and other additives. Only some of these chemicals are
disclosed to the public, including some that are known carcinogens. The composition of the
mixtures used in the fracking process is often uncertain due to rules that exclude confidential
business information from disclosure (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021d; Denchak,
2021; Fink, 2019) making a realistic assessment of risk unlikely.
Even without that information, a large number of individuals and organizations called for
a ban on fracking in the basin. It would then be up to the DRBC to implement rules and
regulations to either regulate or ban the practice. This account of that rule-making process
provides a detailed example of the DRBC as it engages with basin stakeholders regarding issues
critical to the basin’s future.

31

Special Protection Waters, as designated by the Delaware River Basin Commission, are those streams and rivers where the
existing water quality exceeds the established water quality standards. The goal of this designation is to insure that there will be
no measurable change in the existing water quality unless it is toward natural conditions. As a result, there are stricter
regulations with regard to wastewater discharges and point and non-point source discharges.
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A Timeline for Natural Gas Development
In mid-2008, the Delaware River Basin Commission was informed by the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection that Stone Energy Corporation (Stone Energy) had
proposed to drill for natural gas in the basin. In June 2008, the Commission notified Stone
Energy that it would need to apply for and be granted approval prior to beginning operations in
the basin (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2008).
In May of 2009, Carol Collier, Delaware River Basin Commission Executive Director,
issued a Determination notifying those wishing to extract natural gas within the Basin’s shale
formations and draining into the Special Protection Waters of the Basin that they would need
Commission approval. In this document, the Executive Director explained regulatory
requirements and affirmed the Commission’s right to review all aspects of the natural gas
extraction process within the drainage area of the Special Protection Waters. She noted that her
actions were in accordance with Section 3.8 of the Delaware River Basin Compact which
provides that no project exerting a substantial effect on basin water resources can be undertaken
without the approval of the Commission. Collier also cited Section 2.3.5B.18 of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. These rules specify that the Executive Director
may require any project sponsor or land owner having a project with a potential substantial effect
on the water quality of Special Protection Waters to undergo review of that project. She also
referred to Section 3.40 of the Commission’s Water Code with regard to ground water and its
protection. Having explained that the program was designed to preserve the highly valued
streams and rivers in the basin, she also related that state and sometimes federal agencies would
be performing reviews of these projects and that the Commission would coordinate with these
entities to reduce duplication of effort and redundant requirements. The director included a
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reminder that anyone adversely affected by the Determination could request a hearing within
thirty days of the date of the document (Collier, 2009).
In February of 2010, a public hearing was held on the Stone Energy draft dockets for
surface water withdrawal and a natural gas well pad. This process included a period for written
comments of approximately 2.5 months. During this open comment period, the Commission
received approximately 1,700 comments (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2010b).
At the quarterly meeting on May 5, 2010, the Commissioners moved to clarify the
Delaware River Basin Commission’s intention with regard to developing new regulations and the
issue of pending natural gas development applications. They determined that Commission staff
would be instructed to develop draft regulations on well pads to give notice of proposed
regulations and provide a forum for comment. As part of that resolution, the Commissioners also
postponed review of dockets for well pads until regulations were adopted and indicating that they
would address water withdrawal requests in due time. The meeting ended with a public dialogue
session during which there was extended discussion regarding HVHF with emphasis on issues of
the nature of exploratory wells and the harm resulting from fracking (Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2010b).
In June 2010, Collier issued a supplementary determination that exploratory wells would
also need Commission approval. She noted that, “…any natural gas well drilled in or through
shale is assumed to be targeting a shale formation and is subject to this determination, unless the
project sponsor proves otherwise” (Collier, 2010a, p. 1). The Executive Director also observed
that this supplemental determination effectively removed the regulatory incentives resulting from
the previous decision to allow exploratory wells prior to Commission review. Collier
furthermore indicated in this supplement that projects that had moved forward under the previous
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document would be allowed to move ahead given the relatively small number and corresponding
low risks. In addition, those wells previously approved by a state agency (Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection, PADEP) would still need Commission approval prior
to beginning operations. Copies of this document were posted on the Commission’s website and
mailed directly to project sponsors and potential project sponsors identified by the Commission.
Again, those negatively affected by this action were invited to request a hearing (Collier, 2010a).
At the July 14, 2010 meeting, it was announced that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) would hold a public meeting at the State University of New York (SUNY)
Binghamton to garner public input for a study on the potential effects of hydraulic fracturing on
water resources. Also at this meeting, the Commissioners voted to postpone any action on
dockets for natural gas well pads pending the development of regulations. Director Collier
indicated that the Commission intended to have draft regulations available for public review by
summer’s end with action in December (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2010c).
Due to the relatively large amount of public interest (estimated at 600 individuals) at this
meeting, Mr. Warren, General Counsel to the Delaware River Basin Commission, spoke
concerning several hearing requests regarding natural gas drilling. He indicated that he would
attempt to put natural gas development in the basin in context. Warren gave a general overview
of the 1961 Compact, explaining that it gave the Commission broad authority to plan, establish
standards for the basin, and review projects for development. He then addressed the question of
why the Commission was regulating natural gas extraction in the basin. First, he indicated, is the
problem of water withdrawals. Second, construction of well pads might involve damages to the
landscape or the use of fluids in the fracking process could damage Basin waters. Lastly, waste
water disposal is another important consideration (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2010c).
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Mr. Warren went on to explain that the area of the basin in question is one that is highly
regulated due to the presence of Special Protection Waters, Wild and Scenic Rivers, a national
park program, and other federal interests. He also mentioned the Commission’s interest in
groundwater protection, effluent limits, stream quality objectives, and floodplain regulations. He
shared that the National Park Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had both supported
Commission’s review of natural gas extraction under the new regulations (Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2010c).
At this same meeting, the Commission received requests for hearings on natural gas
extraction as follows:


Delaware Riverkeeper Network and Nockamixon Township – regarded Director Collier’s
decision not to require a project sponsor to obtain Commission approval



Damascus Citizens for Sustainability – similar to the above complaint; lack of project
review



Starlight Forum and Northern Wayne Property Owner Alliance – complaint regarding the
Director’s decision to require sponsors of exploratory wells to obtain Commission
approval



Allan J. Nowicki, Dyberry 33, LLC; Pennswood Oil and Gas, LLC; Pleasant Mount 10,
LLC; Preston 38, LLC; and Stockport Associates - complaint regarding the Executive
Director’s decision to require sponsors of exploratory wells to obtain Commission
approval



Damascus Citizens for Sustainability, Friends of the Upper Delaware River, and the
Delaware Riverkeeper Network and the Delaware Riverkeeper – objecting to the
grandfathering provision in the June 14, 2010 Determination
The Commission moved to consolidate the hearings and assign them to a single hearing

officer. Also, the Secretary of the Commission provided each of the applicants and interested
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parties with an estimated cost to be incurred due to the hearing and required security against
these costs from participants (subject to appeal) (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2010c).
In late July of 2010, Collier replied to a request from the Hess Corporation to be allowed
to proceed with two wells that were in the final stages of permitting by the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection. These wells, Hess claimed, corresponded to wells that
had been “grandfathered” in by the June 14 decision with regard to level of investment. Hess
also argued that the scientific information from Davidson 1V and Hammond 1V wells would be
critical to the company and many hundreds of property owners with leases for natural gas
development (Collier, 2010b).
Hess and Newfield Appalachia LLC, an investment partner, together controlled lease
holdings of more than 100,000 acres in the Basin. In defending her decision to let the wells
proceed, Collier noted that the scientific information that might emerge from the two exploratory
wells would be important in the short term and the risk from two additional wells was marginal
given that permits were required prior to drilling. In addition, she held that allowing the wells to
be constructed “would serve multiple interests and in particular could help indicate the extent of
natural gas development activity that is likely to occur in the Basin” (Collier, 2010b, p. 2).
Meanwhile, the June 14, 2010 supplemental determination remained in effect (Collier, 2010b).
At the September 15, 2010 meeting, the Commissioners granted an administrative
hearing to the Delaware Riverkeeper Network and the Damascus Citizens for Sustainability
which was consolidated with the hearing from the July 14 meeting. This action was eventually
terminated by the Commission at the recommendation of the hearing officer with the
understanding that the drilling companies would voluntarily submit their projects for
Commission review (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2010d).
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At the December 8, 2010 meeting of the Delaware River Basin Commission, Executive
Director Collier announced that regulations for natural gas development projects in the Basin
would be posted on the Delaware River Basin Commission’s website December 9, 2010. The
posting would include a press release, a fact sheet and flow charts. A period for public comment
would be open for ninety days and include public hearings in three locations. Comments could
be received electronically through the public comment system of the National Park Service, by
paper, or by hand. There would be oral testimony and hard copy submissions and each of the
public hearings. In addition, Commission staff would be hosting workshops, focus groups, and
congressional briefings (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2010d).
At this meeting Collier shared key aspects of the proposed rules. She emphasized that the
Basin provides water for over 15 million people, including New York City and Philadelphia. She
went on to say how parts of the Delaware is protected by designations such as the federal Wild
and Scenic River program or the Delaware River Basin Commission’s Special Protected Waters
program. Collier noted that the purpose of the proposed natural gas development regulations was
to protect the waters of the basin during construction and operation of these projects. The new
regulations would apply to water withdrawals, well pad construction and related activities, and
wastewater disposal. She went on to explain that the states would also be involved in the
regulatory process and reiterated that the Commission would work with them to avoid
unnecessary duplication of effort (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2010d).
Most of the Commissioners were supportive of moving forward with the release of the
draft regulations. However, New York representative, Mark Klotz opposed the release. A letter
from Governor David Patterson of New York requested that the Commission stop its efforts to
develop regulations for natural gas development in the state. Klotz pointed out that the New
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York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) had extensive experience
with natural gas extraction including HVHF. He also noted that HVHF was currently banned in
the state until a complete environmental impact review could be completed. The New York
alternate commissioner argued that the Commission lacked experience in the area of natural gas
development as well as inadequate enforcement mechanisms and authority. He pointed out that
the Delaware River Basin Commission’s regulatory program would not have the benefit of New
York’s experience and adding that the proposed regulations would create confusion and
duplication. Lastly, he expresses his misgivings about the fee structure that he said was
disproportionate to the benefits from the Commission’s oversight (Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2010d).
By the March 2011 DRBC meeting, six public sessions focusing on natural gas extraction
regulations had been held at three different locations. Overall, more than 377 individuals testified
with more than a thousand people attending. The Commission had received over 2,500
comments and the counting of the comments was not then complete. Many of these comments
and letters were from individuals and groups deeply opposed to natural gas development in the
Basin, mostly on environmental and public health reasons (See C. J. Stephens, 2011; van
Rossum et al., 2011; Wilinsky, 2011). Others strongly supported development of this resource,
citing job creation and other economic benefits (Dimmitt & Dimmitt, 2011; Suhosky, 2011).
Some opposition to the DRBC’s rule making focused on issues of property rights, including
proprietary information, land use, and governmental overreach (Holbert, 2011; Kantorczyk,
2011) while others concentrated on excessive regulation and the rulemaking process (Klaber,
2011).
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After some discussion, the Commission voted (with Pennsylvania opposed) to extend the
comment period for an additional forty-five days. John Hines, the Pennsylvania commissioner,
expressed concern that the Commission was becoming the focus of a debate between those
favoring drilling and those opposed. He argued that the Commission needed to focus on its core
responsibility of regulation (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2011b).
In June of 2015, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
completed studies on the impacts of natural gas development and prohibited HVHF in the state
of New York. The Department issued a statement that they could find no feasible alternatives to
HVHF that could adequately address environmental impacts and public health risks (Delaware
River Basin Commission, 2017).
In May 2016, Wayne Land & Mineral Group, LLC (Wayne et al.) filed a complaint
against the Delaware River Basin Commission with the United States District Court, M.D.
Pennsylvania. The Plaintiff alleged that the Commission lacked authority under the Delaware
River Basin Compact to review and approve facilities for extracting natural gas on their property
in the Basin. The Delaware Riverkeeper Network sought to intervene on behalf of the
Commission, while Pennsylvania state senators Scarnati, Yaw, and Baker sought to intervene on
behalf of Wayne et al. They contended that the Delaware River Basin Commission was
impinging on the General Assembly’s power to make laws by overriding Pennsylvania laws that
permitted fracking. The Court denied the senators’ motion and granted the Commission’s motion
to dismiss. Wayne et al. appealed and the ruling was upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals, 3rd Circuit. The case has been remanded to the District Court (Wayne Land & Mineral
Group v. Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020).
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On September 13, 2017, the Delaware River Basin Commission instructed Executive
Director Steve Tambini32 to develop and publish for public comment, a set of revised draft
regulations including prohibitions against natural gas production using horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing within the Delaware River Basin. The revised draft regulations were
published on November 30, 2017 and opened for public comment until March 30, 2018
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021d).
After extensive data gathering and analyses, the Commission determined that the danger
to the basin was significant. Even with the dissemination of industry best practices and
government regulation, HVHF and its related activities posed a clear danger to the waters of the
basin. This process had been found to negatively impact drinking water and injured aquatic life
forms in areas where these activities have been carried out. Shale formations located in the basin
are in mostly rural areas where residents are heavily dependent on groundwater for drinking.
These areas also contain the headwaters to Special Protection Waters, making them subject to
special regulation. The areas where shale formations are most likely to produce gas contain
geologic features that would contribute to the migration of fluids, including gases. Waste
products from HVHF such as chemicals, fluids, and waste water would impact drinking water
and water for other uses. Fracking would impact large areas of the basin, including groundwater
infiltration and recharge areas, drainage areas, and roads not built to withstand the heavy traffic
from these operations. On February 25, 2021, the Delaware River Basin Commission adopted a
regulation prohibiting HVHF in the Basin (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021d). On
October 28, 2021, the Commission published new draft regulations addressing interbasin

32

Carol Collier retired as Executive Director of the Delaware River Basin Commission in March of 2014.
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transfers and the discharge of wastewater from HVHF (Delaware River Basin Commission,
2021n).
The Delaware River Basin Today
The next section provides an overview of the health of the basin, with a focus on both
basin management by the DRBC and the way that various compact mechanisms such as databased decision making, planning, and regulation are used. It also illustrates the holistic, systemic
nature of the basin, including factors like land cover and development.
The State of the Basin
In its 2019 State of the Basin report, the DRBC summarized important indicators of basin
health and viability. Among these indicators were watersheds/landscapes, water quantity, water
quality, and living resources. The majority of the thirty-one indictors were rated “Good” or
“Very Good” with trends mostly rated as “Improving” or “Stable.” Other areas, such as
impervious cover, salinity, and invasive species were designated as needing additional attention
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020b).
Watersheds and Landscapes. The watersheds/landscape indicators include population,
land cover, and impervious cover. While population and land cover were not rated, there are
concerns with the increasing population and the loss of forested and agricultural lands. As a
result, the Commission must plan for land development and its effects on the natural resources of
the basin, balancing the need for development against the impacts on water resources. Possible
avenues to address these issues include continued tracking of land cover changes and
conservation efforts. While the overall rating for impervious surfaces is good and areas of such
surfaces trending down, the lower basin area has experienced an increase due to urbanization.
Better coordination of stormwater management across federal, state, and local jurisdictions can
124

help reduce the impact of increasing hard surfaces. There is also a need for better data to more
acurately monitor trends in this area (Byun et al., 2019; Delaware River Basin Commission,
2020b).
Water Quantity. Water quantity indicators include water withdrawals, consumptive use,
groundwater availability, flow, and climate change. Water withdrawals has a rating of “Good”
with a stable trend. Water use by the public water sector and industrial users has managed to
trend downward slightly even in the face of an increase in population in the basin. However,
there is a potential for growth in the thermoelectric sector that will need to be monitored.
Consumptive use also has a “Good” rating and stable trend with some variation across public
supply, industrial, and power generation. Extended accountability and a better understanding of
consumptive water use that results in regulatory efforts that reflect industry standards can reduce
losses (Byun et al., 2019; Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020b).
Groundwater availability received a “Very Good” rating and is exhibiting an upward
trend. There are, however, two major areas that are considered at-risk and are therefore
protected. Proactive management approaches such as shifting to surface water and utilizing
regional alternatives have been used to mitigate the effects of over-pumping and can be used in
areas where groundwater stresses occurs in the future (Byun et al., n.d.; Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2020d).
Annual variability in temperature and precipitation make it difficult to determine trends
in surface water flow and are complicated by issues related to climate change. Long term
averages, however, show both wet and dry periods with increasing temperatures and rainfall
likely dominating in the future. In dry periods, sufficient flow is critical for maintaining water
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quality and quantity as well as preventing saltwater incursion in the estuary while wet periods
can result in flooding and related loss of property and lives.
The basin will also have to deal with the possibility of more extreme weather events
including increasingly active Atlantic hurricane seasons, higher intensity storms, and short but
severe dry periods. An added complication to flow management is the 1954 Supreme Court
decree which obligates New York City to release water to maintain flow at Montague, N.J. to
compensate for water diverted from the basin from its three reservoirs. To mitigate these issues,
it will be necessary to evaluate future water needs, evaluate flow and drought management plans,
and better understand and evaluate the effects of climate change on the hydrology of the river.
The Commission must then use this information to develop plans to address these risks (Byun et
al., n.d.; Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020d).
Water Quality. Assessing water quality is complex and includes a substantial array of
indicators: dissolved oxygen, nutrients, pH, salinity, temperature, contaminants, fish
contaminants, emerging contaminants and whole effluent toxicity. Dissolved oxygen is essential
for growth and reproduction in aerobic aquatic organisms as well as a critical factor in water
quality. While dissolved oxygen is currently rated “Good” in the Delaware Basin and trending
upward, there is high variability from year to year as well as some areas of low concentration.
Even with this variability, adequate levels of dissolved oxygen are expected to continue under
the current regulatory structure with improvement needed in impaired areas. Recommendations
for improvement include assessing the possible revision of the dissolved oxygen criteria,
measuring sources of nutrient and oxygen-depleting materials, and building a water quality
model. Nutrient concentrations in the basin are rated “Very Good” with total nitrogen and
phosphorus concentrations highest in the Upper Delaware River. Continuing to develop and
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monitor nutrient criteria and developing an eutrophication model will assist in maintaining or
improving this performance level. The pH of surface waters can be a critical indicator of
ecological health and viability as well as impacting the effects of pollutants such as metals and
ammonia. The pH level was not rated but all values from monitoring stations were within the
stated criteria. Even so, enhancements to waste treatment in urbanized areas could result in
further improvements in pH (Byun et al., 2019; Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020b).
The presence of salt in the basin is problematic in several ways. Salt can affect the taste
of water and adversely impact individuals with sensitivity issues. Significant salt and chlorides in
water can increase corrosion in infrastructure in areas such as water supply, industry, and
hydropower production. Currently, the salinity issue has a rating of “Good,” however, the salt
front will move upstream pushed by tides and the rising sea level, likely leading to a downward
trend. Creating better models of salinity and rising sea levels and tracking trends in chlorides in
the water can assist in developing and evaluating options to deal with the issue (Byun et al.,
2019; Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020b).
Water temperature is a significant factor in the health and wellbeing of native fish and
aquatic communities. While reservoir releases in the upper Delaware affect the reliability of
readings in the non-tidal portions of the river, evaluation of long-term temperature records at
Trenton indicate stability within DRBC criteria over time, resulting in a “Good” rating.
Nevertheless, there is a need for further investigation of connections between climatological
phenomena and water temperatures as well as continued development of temperature criteria in
the non-tidal segments of the river (Byun et al., 2019; Delaware River Basin Commission,
2020b).
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Contaminants in the Delaware River Basin consist of particular elements and compounds
that are toxic to some degree to human and aquatic life. The rating for contaminants in the basin
is only “Fair” and may be unlikely to change. Although trends for some contaminants may be the
result of regulatory restrictions, changing in loading rates, and normal degradation, effective
management is critical to maintain good water quality and address areas where quality is less
than acceptable. This includes careful monitoring, attention to the use of appropriate analytical
and evaluative methods, and regulatory support. More specifically, high concentrations of certain
chemicals in fish present a health risk to consumers. The current rating for fish contaminants in
the basin is “Good” despite an increasing concentration of contaminants moving from non-tidal
to tidal areas. Mitigation will require cooperation among state and federal agencies to minimize
toxic pollution (Byun et al., 2019; Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020b).
Emerging contaminants such as polybrominated diphenyl ethers (flame retardants),
perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (found in household and industrial products such
as stain repellant textiles, fire-fighting foams, and paper coatings), and other contaminants have
not been routinely monitored leading to a scarcity of information on past trends. Continued
monitoring of contaminants in drinking water and the environment as well as tracking and
evaluating emerging contaminants with no established water quality criteria should be carried
out. Because current regulations are insufficient to deal with these emerging contaminants,
additional research and the development of new policies are critical. Other contaminants found in
the river are effluents from industrial and municipal facilities measured by Whole Effluent
Toxicity (WET) testing. Whole Effluent Toxicity was rated “Fair” with a downward trend
attributed to improved efforts by industry to identify and reduce toxic effluents, reduction
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programs by municipal treatment facilities, and a decline in manufacturing in the basin (Byun et
al., 2019; Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020b).
Living Resources. The section on living resources includes fourteen categories of
organisms that depend on the river. These organisms are ecologically, commercially, and/or
recreationally important to the river. Of these organisms, four are rated “Very Good,” four are
rated “Good,” three are rated “Fair,” and three are rated “Poor.”
White Perch are an important indicator of the ecological health of the basin. They are
rated “Very Good” and stable. Pressures from development in the upper reaches of the tidal
tributaries indicate a need for protective measures including an 8-inch minimum size to ensure
sufficient spawning. Striped Bass are ecologically, commercially, and recreationally important to
the river system. The population is rated “Very Good” with a worsening trend due to overfishing
of spawning stock. Continued monitoring of long-term trends is needed to determine if
intervention becomes necessary. Macroinvertebrates such as insects, snails, clams, aquatic
worms, and crayfish are essential biological indicators as to the health of the ecosystem. They
are rated “Very Good” with a stable trend. Maintaining this population requires abating and
preventing pollution in their environment. Another thriving species on the Delaware River is the
Osprey. One of the largest birds of prey in North America they live almost exclusively by
fishing. Rated “Very Good” and improving, populations are increasing and have become
sustainable (Byun et al., 2019; Delaware River Basin Commission, 2020b).
The preceding section is an example of how compact mechanisms are functioning to
make the Delaware Basin a success. The discussion focuses on some of the risks the basin faces
and the need for long range planning to deal with issues like the impact of extreme weather
events on the basin. It also indicates how development and the outcomes from that, such as
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highly toxic chemicals, are still putting the river at risk. This section highlights the importance of
data driven decision-making, and regulation as well as illustrating how important collaboration
and cooperation are due to the highly interrelated, systemic nature of the basin.
The next section examines the basin from a stakeholder point of view, drawing upon the
results of the surveys and interviews conducted during the course of this study. The small size
and non-representative nature of the sample precludes generalization but this section confirms
previous insights about the effectiveness of the DRBC and the importance that stakeholders in
the basin put on specific program areas. Stakeholder comments also stimulated additional
questions about how well specific mechanisms of the Compact and the Commission were
functioning.
Stakeholder Perspectives on Continuing Issues for the Delaware River Basin
In 2020, the Delaware River was named “River of the Year” by the environmental
advocacy group “American Rivers” (American Rivers, 2020). This represented a significant
change from the 1940s when Navy pilots flying above the Delaware could smell the polluted
waterway and a recently painted hospital ship turned colors when sailed into the river
(Kauffman, 2010). The Delaware River Basin Commission’s 2020 annual report noted that:
Today, what was once a cesspool is a river reborn. Fish populations have returned,
and the river now contributes about $25 Billion in annual economic activity. People
are flocking to the river for business and pleasure, wanting to reconnect with the
river in ways that weren’t possible 50 years ago.” (Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2021h, p. 10)
Even with this incontestable improvement in the basin, recent data indicate that there is
still considerable concern about the Delaware River and its environs. Surveys and interviews
conducted for this study were used explore views on the efficacy of basin governance and to
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provide insight into conditions in the basin from a stakeholder perspective.33 The surveys and
interviews were also used to aid in evaluating data from other sources. With a few exceptions,
survey and interview data confirmed previously collected information and elicited further data
collection to follow up on themes.
Survey and Interview Data.
The general survey was designed to elicit stakeholder perceptions of the Delaware River
Basin Commission, its governance of the water resources in the basin, and how the actions of the
Commission might affect them personally. As a result, survey respondents who were “not at all
familiar” with the Commission were diverted by the survey software to more general questions.
Those that were “somewhat familiar” or “very familiar” were directed to the main survey (for
survey questions, see Appendix D). Of the general survey respondents, 38 (70%) were “very
familiar” with the DRBC, 15 (28%) were “somewhat familiar,” and only one individual (2%)
was “not at all familiar” with the DRBC. One individual did not answer the question.
The activities of the DRBC impacted respondents and their organizations in myriad ways
with many indicating some kind of regulatory relationship. Other activities included, but were
not limited to, managing water resources in the basin (water quality and quantity), setting the
planning agenda, framing discussions and debate, influencing policy, resource protection,
research, providing public participation, and encouraging comity. The ways in which
respondents indicated that they are affected by the Commission and its activities indicate a
relatively high level of engagement and lend weight to their responses.
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Because of the low response rate of the DRBC Survey, unless specifically noted, the information in this section is from the
General Survey.
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Most of the survey respondents indicated that the DRBC is doing a “good” or “excellent”
job of governance in the basin (47% and 38% respectively, n = 34), while 15% rated
performance as “fair.” There were no “poor” ratings regarding governance. Also, most
respondents (69%) indicated that the DRBC is meeting or exceeding expectations in the different
program areas (See Table 1).
As the majority of respondents appear to be significantly engaged with the DRBC and
likely knowledgeable about the Commission, these positive ratings regarding both governance
and program operations help to confirm previous information from water resource scholars
regarding these areas of Compact success (See Draper, 2002; Egan, 2014; Featherstone, 1999;
Kauffman, 2014).
Table 1

DRBC Program Area Performance Ratings (General Survey)
Percentage rating program areas asProgram Area

Exceeding
Expectations

Meeting
Expectations

Needs
Improvement

Do Not
Know

n

Drought Management
Flood Loss Reduction
Recreation
Regulatory Review
Water Conservation
Water Quality
Protection
Water Supply
Allocation
Watershed Planning

23
6
6
23
11
31

51
63
55
49
60
43

9
14
15
14
11
11

17
17
24
14
17
14

35
35
33
35
35
35

14

57

14

14

35

17

49

20

14

35

Average Percentage

16

53

14

16

Note. Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.
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Respondents were asked which program areas that they and/or their organizations
consider to be of critical importance. The majority (11 or 33%) indicated that water quality
protection was the most important program area in the basin followed by water supply allocation
(8 or 24%), drought management (4 or 12%) or regulatory review/permitting (4 or 12%),
watershed planning (3 or 9%), flood loss reduction (2 or 6%) and recreation (1 or 3%).
Comparing the rankings of those program areas that were considered by survey
respondents to be most critical with the performance ratings for these program areas indicates
substantial congruence between the rankings and the performance ratings for the program areas
(See Table 2). With the exception of water conservation, programs that were ranked as most
critical were also exhibiting high satisfaction ratings. These high ratings likely indicate
satisfactory progress in that program area but the need to continue to pursue these issues is still
substantial.
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Table 2

Comparison of Stakeholder Rankings of Most Critical Programs with Program
Performance
Rank

Program Area Ranked Most
Critical

Percent Rating Program
as Meeting or Exceeding
Expectations

1
2
3
3
4
5
6
7

Water Quality Protection
Water Supply Allocation
Drought Managementa
Regulatory Review (Permitting)
Watershed Planning
Flood Loss Reduction
Recreation
Water Conservationa

74
71
74
72
66
69
61
71

Note. Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number
a
There was a tie between drought management and regulatory review.
b

No one selected Water Conservation as “Most Critical.”

The low ranking of the water conservation program on the critical scale along with a
rather high satisfaction rating most likely reflects the significant efforts of the DRBC’s water
conservation program. The Commission has instituted a number of policies addressing water
conservation that include conservation measures in dockets for new or expanded water
withdrawals, metering, leak detection, conservation performance standards for plumbing fixtures
and fittings, and amending the Comprehensive Plan to include water auditing (Delaware River
Basin Commission, 2019c).
Watershed planning is lower on the most critical list and has a lower percentage of
satisfied survey respondents with 20 percent claiming that it needs improvement. This number is
somewhat higher than the average of 14 percent for those program areas needing improvement.
This finding may indicate an area that needs to be addressed or it may be an artifact of the small
sample size. Although nearly 69 percent of respondents replied that flood loss reduction is
meeting or exceeding expectations, its position low on the critical list may reflect lack of interest
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as suggested by one survey respondent. Another respondent took issue with flood loss reduction,
indicating that the Commission has not been able to develop consensus with regard to how flood
damage might be mitigated. Recreation is also low on the critical list and satisfaction scale but
also had a substantial percentage of respondents who were unfamiliar with the performance of
that program area (24%). Survey respondents praised the DRBC flow management practices that
support various interests in the river, among them fishing. However, one respondent suggested
that the DRBC has been challenged with regard to the recreational aspects of the basin and that
other organizations within the basin can better coordinate recreation related activities.
Overall, the survey results show considerable positive regard for the Commission and its
success in the basin as evidenced by the performance ratings for governance and program areas
as well as comments from respondents. Positive comments focused on cooperation and
collaboration, comprehensive regional management, the ability to mitigate disputes, successes in
program areas especially water quality, and the use of Compact authority for the good of the
basin (for example the ban on high volume hydraulic fracturing).
On the other hand, respondents listed what they considered to be challenges for the
Commission: watershed planning that is basic and lacks direction, over-sensitivity to drought in
some areas, lack of flood reduction, political influence especially in the area of agriculture and
nonpoint source pollution but also with regard to development, regulatory hurdles in the
Pennsylvania Groundwater Protected Area, using funds allocated for one purpose for another
purpose, and increasing fees. Other comments focus on regulatory overreach, excess caution
increasing water quality standards, and the need to extend outreach (especially data and other
tools) to the tributaries. Respondents also cited failed opportunities for coordination between the
states, underutilizing portions of the compact in areas such as flood plain acquisition and fish and
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wildlife projects, and transparency, especially with regard to funding. The DRBC was criticized
for deferring to the states in situations where a regional solution is needed and for their stand on
deepening the tidal river channel. Also mentioned were persistent problems with equitable access
to safe and healthy water basin wide.
Two interviews were conducted with individuals knowledgeable about the Delaware River
Basin Compact and the Commission. As with the survey, heading the list of successes are the
DRBC’s efforts to protect water quality and water supply. Given that these are critical objectives of
the Commission, success in this area is especially important. Although it took time to work out, the
Commission’s ability to collaborate with the many state agencies in the Basin is critical. However,
the continued success of the DRBC depends on being able to build consensus with many different
stakeholders, which may be difficult in the current partisan environment.

The DRBC is facing a number of challenges. Climate change and a sinking land mass
means that sea level rise in the Delaware is among the fastest in the world. There are also the
ever-present risks of drought and flood that require planning and preparation. One interview
respondent voiced concern that intensive competition for resources means that funding from
states and the federal government often falls short of their commitments.
DRBC data indicate that while the Commission members reached a tacit agreement in
1988 to apportion state and federal contributions, payments from the parties to the Compact have
not matched the agreed upon sums. Delaware, with the smallest percentage of the budget has
been the most consistent in making full payments to the Commission. New York and
Pennsylvania have consistently and significantly underpaid. The federal government has not
contributed to budget since 1998, with the exception of 2009 and 2010. The cumulative federal
debt from 1996 through 2021 is $16,429,250 (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021m). In
the future, the nexus between inadequate funding and the rising uncertainty of climate change
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may pose a significant threat to the ability of the Commission to function at a sufficiently high
level. One of the interviewees noted that, even as inadequate funding continues to be an issue,
the Commission needs to upgrade and modernize aging infrastructure, hire more staff, and
maintain services. The DRBC is also engaged in regulating natural gas extraction in the basin
and the process and resulting litigation are expensive and time consuming. In addition, while
HVHF is not allowed in the basin, the DRBC is currently (as of December 2021) holding public
hearings on proposed regulations addressing the importing/exporting of water to and from the
basin and the banning of the discharge of fracking wastewater to lands and waters of the basin
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021q).
Some of the suggestions from survey respondents for important improvements with
regard to water resource management in the Delaware Basin were related to improving water
quality, including continued attention to groundwater protected areas, enhanced regulatory
functioning, increased engagement and sensitivity to the regulated community (who help to pay
the bills with use fees), and more and better engagement and coordination with state and federal
agencies. Other suggestions included increased attention to flow management, more of a
“presence” in the basin, an improved governance structure, an increased willingness to innovate,
and continuing planning with a better response to flooding. Several people mentioned improving
funding including restoring federal funding. Most respondents focused on actions that the DRBC
is already engaged in with suggestions for improving such actions.
While the findings from the surveys and interviews were informative, leading to
additional information, input from basin stakeholders largely confirmed previous information on
Compact and Commission performance (See Egan, 2014; Featherstone, 1999; Moore, 2021;
Weston, 1989). However, whether survey responses are positive or negative, these findings
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support the need for compacts to have certain characteristics and mechanisms to achieve their
stated outcomes. These properties and mechanisms are discussed extensively in the Chapter Five.
Synopsis of the Findings
This section provides a synopsis of the case study findings so far and relates them to the
research questions. The following discussion of the Compact history and influences summarizes
the answers to research questions one through five. It provides a brief overview of the context in
which the Delaware River Basin Compact was developed (RQ1), the nature of the problems
from which the compact emerged (RQ2), as well as examining previous attempts at solving the
various problems and the outcomes of those attempts (RQ3) and some of the reasons those
efforts failed (RQ4). Lastly, this section briefly explains the emergence of the Delaware River
Basin Compact (RQ5).
Compact History and Influences
The Delaware, like many other rivers, is a limited resource shared by several states, with
the river occasionally becoming the source of conflict among them. Although there had been
disputes over the river since just after the Revolutionary War, by the 1920s, efforts had begun to
develop an interstate agreement to govern water projects in the basin. Repeated attempts using
commissions and compacts failed either because of lack of support from all the parties or, once
ratified, the compacts lacked sufficient scope and authority (Dellapenna, 2005; Duca-Sandberg,
2011; Martin et al., 1960).
Water allocation issues soon came to the forefront when New York City and New Jersey
attempted to access the waters of the upper basin to meet their increasing needs. Lacking a
suitable platform for negotiating their differences, the states had to resort to expensive, time
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consuming, and ineffective litigation (Dellapenna, 2005; Duca-Sandberg, 2011; Martin et al.,
1960; Weston, 1989).
Anticipated development along the river again highlighted a need for basin-wide
governance and long-term planning on a regional basis. A commission, the Interstate
Commission on the Delaware River Basin (INCODEL) was formed. A voluntary organization,
the Commission lacked adequate authority and failed in completing many of the responsibilities
expected of an basin-wide organization such as this (Martin et al., 1960). Additional efforts at
compacting also failed, often due lack of support or to insufficient authority (Dellapenna, 2005).
Repeated water allocation crises in 1926 and 1952 involving the Supreme Court as well
as extensive flooding from hurricanes Connie and Dianne stressed the need for a viable solution
to the fractured and inefficient management of the basin. The looming prospect of unregulated
growth provided an incentive for the states to find an acceptable solution quickly. Lastly, the
political climate was turning toward regional cooperation, providing a supportive environment
for compact development (Derthick, 1974; Martin et al., 1960).
Not having a centralized system for dealing with high impact issues and the proliferation
of federal, state, and local agencies and programs with overlapping, and sometimes conflicting
authority also contributed to the unrest leading to the Compact. In addition, a desire to maintain
local control over the resource as well as the possibility of more predictable outcomes than those
brought about through litigation added to the push for regional governance (Derthick, 1974;
Duca-Sandberg, 2011; Martin et al., 1960).
At this juncture, officials from the four basin states were in critical need of an effective
and efficient method to manage their shared resource. Population growth; the time consuming,
highly complex, and technical aspects of water resource management as well as the need for long
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term planning provided incentives to begin anew the search for a viable governance method. The
solution eventually chosen was a federal-interstate water compact (Derthick, 1974).
The response of the federal government to this proposal was less than enthusiastic (J. F.
Zimmerman, 2012). There were concerns about the compact appropriating the power of the
federal government as well as about constitutional and conflict-of-interest issues (Office of the
Comptroller General of the United States, 1981; Terenzio, 1962). Support from the Kennedy
White House and Congress as well as numerous protective clauses helped the compact move
forward with the federal government reluctantly in tow (Derthick, 1974). Congress finally
ratified the compact and President Kennedy signed it into law on November 2, 1961 (Delaware
River Basin Compact, 1961).
The following two sections address research questions six through ten. They discuss the
mechanisms that were developed to address basin issues (RQ6) and how these mechanisms
aligned with the problems to be addressed (RQ7). It examines how the Compact was
implemented (RQ8), what mechanisms emerged from the Compact and why they were
successful (RQ9). The last section also looks at the major outcomes that resulted from the
mechanisms (RQ10).
Compact Mechanisms
As part of the development process, the Delaware River Basin Compact was provided
with certain broad means or mechanisms to address problems in the basin (basin-wide
jurisdiction, sufficient authority, self-organization, and avenues for funding) that allowed it to
construct an extremely powerful regional Delaware River Basin Commission (See Sax et al.,
2006). This Commission became the primary mechanism responsible for the success of this
Compact.
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During the implementation process, the Commission was able to develop and deploy a
range of mechanisms to facilitate attainment of important compact objectives. These mechanisms
included conflict resolution, basin-wide strategic planning, data-based decision making,
regulatory mechanisms, program operations, public participation, and outreach and education.
Figure 3 illustrates these Compact and Commission mechanisms as well as Compact properties.
It shows how the mechanisms become increasingly specific as they approach the operational
areas of the Compact.
Figure 3

Framework for the Delaware River Basin Compact

Compact Properties
Legitimacy
Collaboration
Adaptability
Competence
Responsiveness
Accountability
Inclusiveness

Compact Mechanisms
Adequate Boundaries
Sufficient Authority
Decision-making
Structures and Processes
Funding

Commission Mechanisms
Conflict Resolution
Strategic Planning
Data-based Decision Making
Regulatory Functions
Program Operations
Public Participation
Outreach and Education

Compact properties are characteristics of the Delaware River Basin Compact that
emerged from the research and were found to contribute to the Compact’s ability to address
basin issues. Unlike compact mechanisms which are the means by which the compact meets its
goals and objectives, compact properties are characteristics of successful compacts and guide
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their development and operation. Among the properties found to be contributing to the success of
the Delaware River Basin Compact are legitimacy, collaboration, adaptability, competence,
responsiveness, accountability, and inclusiveness. These compact components will be discussed
in greater detail in Chapter Five.
Commission mechanisms are more focused than compact mechanisms and contribute to
objectives such as collaboration, drought management, water allocation, pollution abatement,
flow management, and the protection of the basin’s resources from unsustainable development.
The State of the Basin Report for 2019 illustrates how mechanisms such as data-based decision
making, strategic planning, regulatory functions, and effective program operations can help
develop and maintain a healthy river system. Conflict resolution and program operations
contributed to managing a significant drought and later to developing a successful flow
management program. Public participation and data-based decision-making were critical
components in developing regulations dealing with high volume hydraulic fracturing in the
basin.34
Major Outcomes
More broadly, the Delaware River Basin Compact has been praised for its best practices
and governance structures (Egan, 2014), it methods (Weston, 1989), and its accomplishments
(Kauffman, 2014). It has also provided an institutional framework that has delivered a method
for different levels of government to work together with each other as well as with nongovernmental water users and it has done this regardless of what Moore (2021) calls, “the
inevitable tensions and challenges” (p. 3).

34

Refer to the previous sections “Post-Compact Developments” and “The Delaware River Basin Today” for an extended
discussion of these outcomes.
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This study has examined the emergence of the Delaware River Basin from the initial
problem identification through policy formulation and adoption, implementation, and evaluation
(See Anderson, 2015). The main focus, however, is on the mechanisms that are used to carry out
the purpose of the Compact. As such, Chapter Five will discuss these mechanisms in-depth and
how they can be used to help develop future compacts.
Chapter Five also answers research questions RQ11-RQ15. It examines the theoretical
concepts that have emerged from the study of the mechanisms and outcomes of the Delaware
River Basin Compact (RQ11) and discusses how these mechanisms might be applied more
widely to current transboundary water conflicts (RQ12). It assesses whether there are situations
in which these concepts should not be applied (RQ13), describes these possible situations
(RQ14) and why these mechanisms might not be suitable (RQ15).
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary goal of this study was to discover why the Delaware River Basin Compact
was successful and to generate a substantive level theory for use with future compact
development. As a result of this analysis, a number of important properties and mechanisms have
been identified that were found to contribute to the success of the Compact. These properties and
mechanisms emerged from rigorous examination of the development of the Compact and the
policies, actions, and activities of the Delaware River Basin Commission. Table 3 illustrates how
these properties and mechanisms relate to the Compact and to each other.
Table 3

Properties and Mechanisms of the Delaware River Basin Compact
Characteristics

Means

Compact Properties
The Compact is:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Legitimate
Collaborative
Adaptable
Competently Staffed
Responsive
Accountable
Inclusive

Commission
Mechanisms

Compact Mechanisms
The Compact has:
•
•
•

•

Adequate Boundaries
Sufficient Authority
The Ability to Create
Decision-Making
Structures and
Processes
Adequate Funding
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The Commission
Incorporates:
Conflict Resolution
Strategic Planning
Data-based Decision
Making
Regulatory
Mechanisms
Program Operations
Public Participation
Outreach and
Education

A Framework for Interstate Water Compacts
Frameworks are the broadest conceptual level of theory and model development and a
source of those general classes of variables that are used to explain facts, actions, events or other
phenomena (Schlager, 2007). Framework variables can be shared among researchers to provide a
common language and concepts across a range of occurrences (Schlager & Cox, 2017). A
framework can support multiple theories which have a narrower scope and greater focus than the
framework. Theories also address a smaller range of questions and variables than frameworks.
Unlike theories, frameworks cannot be tested. Instead they offer guidance for descriptive and
exploratory analyses (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018).
Frameworks can be useful for policy analysis in that they can specify classes of variables
and the general relationships between them (Ostrom, 2007). While frameworks can organize
analyses, alone they do not provide explanations or predictions (Schlager, 2007). Instead,
frameworks provide a basis for multiple descriptions, explanations, or predictions spanning
different contexts (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018).
The framework presented in Figure 4 illustrates the major components of compact
development that emerged from this case study of the Delaware River Basin Compact. The
framework identifies components that would be present to some extent in all interstate water
compacts but whose details would vary from compact to compact.

145

Figure 4.

The Interstate Water Compact Framework

The form that a compact eventually takes should be aligned to the functions that the
compact must carry out (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). As a
result, the first steps in compact development are to conduct a detailed analysis of the resource
context, describing the natural, social, and political environments, identifying the problem(s) that
the compact must address, and determining the desired goal(s). These steps are paramount for
taking into consideration how basin issues/problems and goals are related to the different
environments as well as the environment as a whole.
The next step in compact formation is to use the context analysis to determine compact
properties. Compact properties provide a framework for policy development by specifying
general characteristics or attributes that should be addressed in the process of compact formation
(See Anderson, 2015; Ostrom, 2007). Compact properties make important contributions to the
Compact’s ability to reach its goals. For example, collaboration is an essential property of
compacts as they include the interests of multiple states and stakeholders by design. Legitimacy
is a compact property that is important in public policy areas such as interstate compacts because
it signifies legality and authority (Anderson, 2015) as well as garnering recognition as a means to
successful resolution of an issue or problem. For interstate water compacts adaptability is a
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critical characteristic due to their increasingly fluid operating environments resulting from
climate change and increasing demands on the resource (Payne, 2019).
Because the properties described in this framework are not specific to any one compact or
type of compact, they can serve as the basis for many different types. The key factor is to
understand how the properties should be addressed within the context of the resource. Compact
properties from the Delaware River Basin Compact, some of which are shown in Figure 5,
provide the structure from which the more precise compact mechanisms are constructed.
Figure 5

The Delaware River Basin Compact: Linking Context, Properties, and Mechanisms

In the next step of development, the policy instrument, the compact, is created and the
compact mechanisms defined. Mechanisms differ significantly from properties. Properties are
characteristics that guide the development of successful compacts. Mechanisms, on the other
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hand, are the means or processes by which compacts reach their objectives and goals. Compact
mechanisms are embedded in the compact structure and function as the primary tools for
compact implementation (See Birkland, 2016). Compact mechanisms focus on compact goals
and are broad in scope, allowing for a range of applications depending on the environment for
which they are created. Compact mechanisms are specific to a particular type of compact or a
particular water resource.35As part of the compact, they can provide the basis for the governance
or administrative mechanisms or they might provide a stand-alone function. Examples of
compact mechanisms found in the Delaware River Basin Compact include sufficient authority,
decision-making structures and processes, adequate boundaries, and appropriate funding. As
indicated by the dashed line in Figure 4, compact mechanisms should relate back to the
properties from which they emerged.
After the compact is signed into law, the critical implementation stage must begin.
Governance or administrative (commission) mechanisms are created from the compact
mechanisms and focus on specific aspects of the compact’s objectives. Examples of these
commission mechanisms from the Delaware River Basin Commission include strategic planning
regulatory functions, and program operations. Even though these mechanisms are more tightly
focused than compact mechanisms, they also provide sufficient range to address a wide variety
of problems. It is the governance or administrative mechanisms where the compact is most likely
to generate results due to the proximity of these components to the problem/issue areas (May &
Winter, 2009).

35

Compact mechanisms would function best in a comprehensive approach as river basins are complex systems and there is a real
potential for fragmented approaches to fail or even produce negative results

148

In sum, the basin context or environment, compact properties and mechanisms, and the
administrative or governance (commission) mechanisms should all be related, with compact
developers remaining cognizant that these properties have been created using information from
the context analysis as well as focusing on the desired outcomes. The relationships between these
various aspects of the compact should be verified periodically during compact development to
ensure that all components remain aligned with these endpoints. Disparities between any of these
components indicate the need for a more thorough evaluation of these relationships and most
likely remedial action.
A Theoretical Approach to Interstate Water Compact Development
Theories serve as a way to specify which elements of a framework are particularly
relevant for asking certain questions and making general working assumptions about the
elements. Theories focus on a framework and make specific assumptions about framework
elements that will make it possible to describe a phenomenon, explain its processes, and to
predict outcomes (Ostrom, 2007). A substantive-level theory such as the one proposed here,
emerges from relevant data; refers to specific, real world situations and therefore is useful to the
practice of policy development in ways that are lacking in more global theories (Creswell, 2013;
Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
While the framework contains elements or components that can be utilized for essentially
any compact, the theory described here adds additional elements that might be specific to
compacts dealing with shared water resources. The addition of the specific compact and
commission mechanisms provides variables for detailed description, explanation, and/or
prediction. Figure 6 illustrates the progression from compact properties to compact and
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commission mechanisms as well as the need to periodically review the relationship between the
context, the properties, and the emerging mechanisms.
Figure 6

A Theory of Interstate Water Compact Development

Compact Development: Properties and Mechanisms
As discussed in the section on the framework, to develop a successful transboundary
interstate water compact requires a comprehensive understanding of the natural, social, and
political environments in the basin, relevant problems or issues, and the desired outcomes.
Compact developers can then use the compact properties from this study or those developed
from a detailed analysis of the relevant basin context to construct a suitable compact. This
compact will emerge from the compact properties and will contain compact commission
mechanisms that have been carefully constructed to reflect the needs of the basin environment as
well as having the ability to meet change.
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Compact Properties. Compact properties were initially the result of coding from the
Delaware River Basin Commission meeting minutes (Delaware River Basin Commission,
2020e). They were then verified and expanded using additional data sources such as
administrative documents (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a, 2019b, 2021e; Delaware
River Basin Compact, 1961), web pages (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021a) and the
results of earlier analyses. As the properties emerged, they were compared against literature on
governance, especially water resource governance (Jimenez et al., 2020; Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015; United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, n.d.), increasing study validity and transferability
(Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). Compact properties for the Delaware River
Basin Compact include the following:
Legitimacy. Legitimacy is one of the broad principles of good governance. It helps to
build public confidence and encourage inclusiveness (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2015). Legitimacy in public policy is based primarily on law. Decisions such
as policy development are generally seen as legitimate if the relevant officials have legal
authority and they meet the appropriate standards for taking such actions. Legitimacy is also
influenced by actions taken during policy development and the utilization of proper procedures.
Public officials, such as those creating policies, must be aware of the importance of legitimacy in
developing support in that policy effectiveness is decreased by diminished legitimacy in the eyes
of stakeholders (Anderson, 2015).
The legal authority of the Delaware River Basin compact is based on the Compact Clause
of the United States Constitution. The Compact emerged from a process enacted by state
legislatures, ratified by Congress, and signed into law by President Kennedy. The Compact also
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carries its own authority. When compacts are ratified, they carry the force of federal law
(Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961; J. F. Zimmerman, 2012). Because a compact is a legal
agreement between two or more states, it acts as a contract and takes precedence over previous
law and over subsequent legislation by member states (Florestano, 1994).
This study found that legitimacy, for a compact, also requires that there be reasonable
belief that the compact is justifiable, equitable, and does not impose undue burdens. Evidence of
this can be found in the interactions between the Commission and basin stakeholders. When
stakeholders feel that the Commission is taking an unfair or unjustifiable stand, such as often
occurs with environmental issues, the legitimacy of the Commission’s actions are questioned
through public forums. This was especially apparent during the controversy over hydraulic
fracturing.
A number of other factors can contribute to compact legitimacy. Participation in the
development of the compact by individuals who have significant knowledge and expertise as
well the confidence of stakeholders is critical. Being able to articulate the problems/issues facing
the basin and reasonable solutions in ways that can be understood by most individuals can
contribute to recognition of compact utility. It is also helpful to be able to point out significant
advantages in adopting a compact to address basin issues and problems.
The Delaware River Basin Compact was developed by the Delaware River Basin
Advisory Committee, a group consisting of the governors of the four basin states and the mayors
of New York and Philadelphia. The reasons for the Delaware River Basin Compact are spelled
out in the preamble where the Compact articulates its purpose and explains that the basin is a
regional body for which the states share joint responsibility. As such, the Compact proposes a
multipurpose comprehensive plan administered by a basin-wide agency that would be
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responsible for carrying out the goals 36 of the Compact. It goes on to explain that the regional
nature of the Delaware (and its problems) had been established by decisions of the United Sates
Supreme Court (See New Jersey v. New York, 1931, 1954). In addition, an Army Corp of
Engineers report (cited in Derthick, 1974) highlighted the need for an interstate agency as well as
the economic advantages of integrated development and control of the water resources of the
basin.
In the Delaware River Basin Compact, developers referred to the need for long-term
planning to mitigate the effects of floods, droughts, and other natural disasters. There was also
reference to the fractured administration resulting from the number of state, federal, and
interstate agencies in the basin. Compact developers likewise cited concerns for the health,
safety, and general welfare of the population as they are affected by the waters of the basin.
Furthermore, INCODEL had conducted extensive studies of the basin and concluded that
regional development was feasible, advisable, and urgently required. As a result, the committee
was able to articulate significant reasons to move forward with the development of a federalinterstate compact (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
In reviewing public comments in meetings and letters to the DRBC about basin issues,
this case study found that, when defining legitimacy, it should be done in such a way that
constituents are able to recognize the compact as reasonable and justifiable for the problems and
outcomes that are expected of it. This means accurately and succinctly explaining the issues

36

Goals of the compact include “effective flood damage reduction; conservation and development of ground and surface water
supply for municipal, industrial, and agricultural uses; development of recreational facilities in relation to reservoirs, lakes, and
streams; propagation of fish and game; promotion of related forestry, soil conservation, and watershed projects; protection and
aid to fisheries dependent upon water resources; development of hydroelectric power potentialities; improved navigation;
control of the movement of salt water; abatement and control of stream pollution; and regulation of stream flows….” (Delaware
River Basin Compact, 1961, Part 1.)
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under discussion and linking the compact mechanisms to viable and reasonable solutions. It also
means treating all water users equitably.
When the compact is accepted as legitimate by a majority of stakeholders, it is harder for
detractors to undermine its goals and actions. Christy (2014) noted that the DRBC has
experienced some issues with legitimacy as indicated by its problems with federal funding and
failure to be recognized in the Clean Water Act revisions. Also, the federal commissioner was
originally a Cabinet member and that position was later reduced to a general in the Army Corp of
Engineers.
Unfortunately, legitimacy can be negatively impacted because of disagreement on what is
reasonable and justifiable. The controversy over hydraulic fracturing highlighted areas where
certain stakeholders have questioned the legitimacy of the Commission’s authority to regulate
natural gas drilling in the Delaware River Basin. Some stakeholders have instituted lengthy and
expensive litigation against the Commission (Wayne Land & Mineral Group v. Delaware River
Basin Commission, 2017; Wayne Land & Mineral Group v. Delaware River Basin Commission,
2020) or written letters to the Commission protesting potential rule-making regarding fracking
(Kantorczyk, 2011; Klaber, 2011). On the other hand, environmental and other interests have
been supportive of efforts by the Commission to limit fracking in the basin as they link
chemicals used in the process to pollution of surface and groundwater and adverse health
outcomes (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2010a; C. J. Stephens, 2011; van Rossum et al.,
2011). Situations where there is little agreement on the legitimacy of certain issues undermines
the efficacy of the Commission by taking resources away from other areas of concern. On the
other hand, legitimacy would be ill served if there was no recourse for stakeholders who disagree
with the policies and decisions of a public agency.
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Collaboration. Collaboration has emerged as an important part of water resource
management. Collaboration is multi-level, multi-sectorial, and includes multiple stakeholders
(Jimenez et al., 2020). It represents a shift from top down, agency control to a bottom-up
stakeholder driven process (Sabatier et al., 2005). Collaboration and cooperation are also
encouraged as part of adaptive governance as well as integrated water resource management
(Chaffin et al., 2016; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005; Varis et al., 2014). Coordination and cooperation,
closely aligned with collaboration, were mentioned by this study’s survey respondents as being
among some of the most successful outcomes brought about by the DRBC.
As Derthick (1974) points out, “The essence of the compact commission is that it should
make policy simultaneously for all five member governments” (p.53). As such, collaboration is a
crucial property for interstate compacts. Collaboration with the state and federal parties to the
compact is part of the mission statement of the Commission (Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2019b, p. 2). Furthermore, collaboration is necessary not just within the compact or
with other governmental agencies but with stakeholders across the basin. For the DRBC planning
is, “… above all about partnerships. It cannot be implemented entirely by the Commission but
depends on the coordinated effort of many agencies and individuals. Just as it takes a village to
raise a child, it takes all the citizens of a basin to protect a river” (Delaware River Basin
Commission, 2011a, p. 5).
Collaboration in the basin was illustrated early on by the Commission’s response to the
drought that began in 1961, just as the Commission was forming. By 1965, the continuing
drought forced the DRBC to implement emergency procedures to protect both New York City’s
water supply reservoirs and to maintain an adequate flow of water to protect Philadelphia’s water
intakes from salt water incursion. During this crisis, the Commission was able to collaborate with
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a federal agency and the owners of two private reservoirs for supplemental releases to help
maintain flows. A major goal of the Compact was realized when, regardless of threats from New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, none of the parties to the Compact had to resort to litigation before the
Supreme Court (Derthick, 1974).
Adaptability. Flexibility and adaptability should be part of water resource management
institutions beginning with their initial design (Moore, 2021). Adaptability is crucial for water
resource management, especially in the presence of uncertainty (Jimenez et al., 2020). Being
able to meet changing conditions is especially important in unsettled environments such as those
currently faced in shared river basins. These basins must deal with issues resulting from
demographic, economic, and social changes and changes to the natural environment such as
those resulting from climate instability. That can mean planning for sustainable development as
well as for catastrophic disasters.
In 1965, as a result of the ongoing drought, New York City violated the 1954 Supreme
Court Decree by stopping mandated releases from its severely depleted Delaware reservoirs. The
Commission was able to initiate procedures provided in the Compact by declaring a state of
emergency and revising the release formula, adapting as conditions changed on the river. These
actions helped to protect New York City’s water supply from exhaustion and Philadelphia’s
water supply from salt incursion (Derthick, 1974). Adaptability should be built into all
commission mechanisms, especially strategic planning, program operations and regulatory
functions as these mechanism are often affected by changing circumstances. This mechanism is
also part of the Commission’s mission statement and calls for “Adaptive and innovative water
resource management” (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019b, p. 2).
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Competence. Competent individuals, no matter what their position, are required for
developing and operating a successful compact. Due to the complex biophysical environment of
the basin and the use of data-based decision making, much of the DRBC’s work involves
scientific or professional credentials. Staff members include engineers, water resource scientists,
modelers, geologists, and other highly trained individuals (Delaware River Basin Commission,
2022a).
Stakeholders need to be confident that the individuals in responsible positions are
adequately knowledgeable and have the requisite experience. Compact developers must
determine the level of expertise required for staffing and include provisions for recruitment and
retention. Having a “Dedicated and engaged staff in a high performing workplace” (Delaware
River Basin Commission, 2019b, p. 2) is part of the DRBC’s mission.
Responsiveness. Responsiveness can be conceptualized as the reaction of a compact to
receiving input from its environment. As a river basin is a system in which many parts interact
and sometimes conflict, it is necessary that a compact provide ways to monitor and respond to
the demands of the basin’s resources and for basin stakeholders to bring their concerns to the
attention of the appropriate agency or individual. Responsiveness indicates how well these
concerns are addressed.
Responsiveness to basin stakeholders is evidenced by access to hearings and the ability to
appeal outcomes of hearings for those accused of violations of Compact rules and regulations.
An example is the development of a penalty matrix for violators in lieu of standardized sanctions
prescribed by the Compact. The Compact sanctions stipulate that violators of rules, regulations,
or orders of the Commission may be liable for a penalty of as much as $1,000 for each offense
and $1,000 per day for a continuing violation (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2009).
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As an alternative to these rather inflexible penalties, the Commission’s Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a) provides that a violator may request
settlement of a penalty proceeding by agreement rather than by initiating the specified penalty. If
the Commission’s executive director determines that an agreement is in the best interest of the
Commission, the violator may submit a proposed agreement. The Rules of Practice and
Procedure (2019a) provides for mitigating circumstances including lack of previous violations,
whether the violation was willful and deliberate, if the violation caused environmental harm and
the extent of any harm, and if the violation benefited the accused economically. Cooperation of
the violator is also considered (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2009).
This method of sanctioning allows a flexible approach to basin violations while
maintaining sufficient authority to avoid excessive rule-breaking. This approach also validates
other aspects of the Compact and Commission that contribute to its success; legitimacy,
adaptability, conflict resolution, and decision making processes. It also helps to allay perceptions
of overly harsh sanctions by the Commission, a concern voiced by one of this study’s survey
respondents.
Accountability. Accountability and transparency are critical to the legitimacy of any
governmental or non-governmental organization (Rossi et al., 1999). Any compact, no matter
how configured, must provide for accountability and transparency in a way that is appropriate to
compact operations, open to review, and accessible to the public.
Transparency is critical for accountability (United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, n.d.) and is especially important with regard to the
sustainability of water resource institutions (Berggren, 2018). Transparency means that sufficient
information about an issue is available, understandable, and accessible to those who are affected
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by decision-making (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,
n.d.). In the interest of accountability and transparency, the DRBC provides substantial access to
public records and information. However, as Berggren (2018) suggests, there are a number of
records that are not subject to disclosure as illustrated in the following excerpt.
The Commission will make the fullest possible disclosure of records to the public,
consistent with the rights of individuals to privacy, the property rights of persons
in trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information, and the need
for the Commission to promote frank internal policy deliberations and to pursue its
regulatory activities without disruption. If a record contains both disclosable and
nondisclosable information, the nondisclosable information will be deleted and the
remaining record will be disclosed unless the two are so inextricably intertwined
that it is not feasible to separate them or release of the disclosable information
would compromise or impinge upon the nondisclosable portion of the record.
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2019a, p. 37)
Limits to transparency, while obscuring some information from public view, are
necessary for the functioning of the Commission or any similar organization. However, to the
extent possible, any compact and its governing or administrative body should provide access to
information and be accountable for their actions.
Inclusiveness. Inclusiveness or public participation is “the systematic provision for
affected publics to be informed about and participate in the planning/decision process. The key
component is an effective, open exchange among proponents, agencies, organizations and all
interested and affected publics” (Burdge & Robertson, 2004, p. 217). In transboundary water
resource management, inclusiveness means that all water users in the basin are considered and/or
have a reasonable voice in compact development and governance. This property is a reminder
that today’s water resource management is no longer just a top-down process but also includes
bottom-up, “grass roots” elements to enable collective action (Agarwal et al., 2000; Davis,
2007). To build inclusiveness, compact developers must plan to actively reach out to
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stakeholders and create structures and processes that encourage participation in decision-making
processes.
The DRBC recognizes that inclusion is important to their mission. At their second quarter
business meeting in June of 2020, Director Steve Tambini opened the meeting by sharing a
message, part of which stated:
At DRBC, our work in managing, protecting and improving the water resources of
the Delaware River Basin is stronger when diverse voices are included and heard;
when every individual is valued and can fulfill their potential in our Basin
communities; and when all the Basin’s water users share equally in the benefits and
stewardship of our shared water resources.
We commit to listening, learning and finding ways to do more to meet these vital
goals. (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2022b, para. 2)
Currently, Commission staff are participating in the Coalition for the Delaware River
watershed’s workgroup on DEIJ37 and the Commission has formed an internal workgroup to
develop a strategic plan that will result in policies and practices to support DEIJ goals. Also,
opportunities for additional training, learning, and outreach opportunities for staff are being
investigated and will be implemented. In addition, each signatory state has an office to address
environmental justice. The DRBC website also includes links to the Coalition for the Delaware
River Watershed’s DEIJ Toolkit for Organizations, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:
Environmental Justice, and the USEPA’s EJScreen: Environmental Justice & Mapping Tool
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2022b).
In some instances, however, inclusion is stymied by the refusal of others to collaborate.
For example, inclusiveness is a defining feature of federal-interstate compacts such as the
Delaware River Basin Compact due to the presence of the federal government as a signatory

37

Diversity, Equity, Inclusion & Justice
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party. However, early on, Derthick (1974) strongly criticized federal coordination through the
DRBC for its unwillingness to make commitments through the Commission or to declare a
unified position. Refusal by one of the signatory parties to the Compact to collaborate can
hamper functioning significantly. Compact developers must make themselves aware of possible
issues in this area and be prepared to address them.
Compact Mechanisms. While Compact properties are broad characteristics that frame
the development of a compact, compact mechanisms are the means by which the more focused
and specific governance or administrative (commission) mechanisms are created. The following
section describes compact mechanisms, why they are important and how they might be used.
Compact mechanisms include the following:
Appropriate Boundaries. Appropriate boundaries delineate both the geographic area and
who has access to the resource (Ostrom, 1990). Boundaries are especially important in the early
stages of compact development as what is included in the compact has a formative influence on
the remaining structures and processes. For most interstate water compacts, the river basin, along
with its hydrologically connected groundwater is considered an ideal boundary (Muys et al.,
2007). In this way, the compact can avoid many of the problems of overlapping agencies and
governance and treat the basin as a whole. Appropriate boundaries also aid in defining the basin
system for management functions and activities. The Delaware River Basin Compact area is
bounded by the drainage area for the Delaware River, its tributaries, and includes the Delaware
Bay (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961).
Authority. A compact must have sufficient authority to carry out its goals. A major
reason that compacts are a suitable choice for regional governance is that, once a compact is
signed into law, it has the force of a federal statute and is enforceable under federal authority. As
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a result, it takes precedence over non-compliant state laws, enhancing the power of a compact to
govern regionally (Dellapenna, 2005; Sax et al., 2006). In order to take full advantage of its
regional nature and to avoid conflict due to overlapping jurisdictions with federal, state, and local
agencies, a compact must specifically address how these intergovernmental relationships can be
structured.
Authority for a compact can be a significant problem during the development and
operational phases. As Derthick (1974) points out, “A coordinating organization will work only
to the extent that the participants share an interest in making it work” (p. 72). When states refuse
to yield to the authority of a regional body, even one of their own making, the likelihood that
there will be a successful outcome is negligible.
Decision-Making Structures and Processes. Decision-making structures and processes
largely determine how a commission will be organized. Great care must be taken in specifying
organizational structures so that the compact will have both the ability and the capacity to carry
out its mission. Close examination of the problems/issues and the goals in relation to the context
of the environment and the framework properties can help insure that the decision-making
structures and processes will be adequate. In addition, decision-making structures and processes
need to be configured in such a way as to provide for continuity yet able to adjust to new
situations.
Decision making structures should provide for ways to secure input from the
environment. This can be accomplished through data from the basin environments as well as
interaction with stakeholder groups and partners, and experts on the advisory committees. Also,
considerations from earlier circumstances, such as court decrees, may also need to be addressed.
Attention also needs to be directed toward where each level of decision-making is located.
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Certain kinds of decisions can be made by those closer to the problem while other types of
decision-making should rest higher up in the decision structure.
Funding. Funding must be adequate to allow the goals of the compact to be met. Funding
for a commission can come from the signatory parties or from borrowing, issuing bonds or other
methods that are consistent with the needs and desires of compact developers. Care must be
taken to protect funding from budget cuts to the extent possible, including sanctions for signatory
parties who refuse to pay their agreed upon portion. This has been a consistent problem for the
DRBC and impacts the ability of the Commission to carry out its work. Muys et. al. (2007)
suggest that failure to pay by any signatory party result in suspension of voting rights and
commission projects or programs until the assessment is paid. Developing a compact is an
expensive investment in resources. To not fund it adequately negates the ability of the compact
to function, wastes the resources expended to develop it, and wastes an opportunity to solve
critical problems.
Commission Mechanisms
The DRBC is empowered by the Compact to provide for its own organization,
procedures, rules and regulations (Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961, Section 2.6). Some
types of mechanisms created by the Commission are found in the literature (See Cox et al., 2010;
Muys et al., 2007; Ostrom, 1990) while others emerged from the data for this study. All of these
mechanisms are utilized by the Delaware River Basin Commission.
Commission mechanisms are more tightly focused on the needs of the basin than
compact mechanisms and need to be adaptable and responsive to the environment. Figure 7
provides an overview of the DRBC structure and shows the relationships between the various
mechanisms. This figure illustrates how the Commission exercises its authority through
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Figure 7

Delaware River Basin Commission Structure and Mechanisms

administrative processes, performs regulatory functions, develops and implements a
comprehensive plan, and works collaboratively through administrative agreements. The
Commission also provides for input from knowledgeable professionals through the advisory
committees, insures transparency and accountability through public access to information, and
includes stakeholder groups and watershed partners.
Conflict Resolution. Interstate conflicts over water are expensive, time consuming and
often lead to less-than-desirable outcomes (Sherk, 1994) as well as being the reason for some of
the most significant compacts to date. Conflict resolution is especially critical for environments
that are highly complex with multiple water users, water uses, and agencies involved. However,
conflict can emerge in even relatively simple compacts and must be reconciled. The Commission
can act as a platform for negotiation utilizing a form of horizontal federalism in which states
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work together to solve problems and reduce conflict (and in the case of federal-interstate
compacts, the federal government).38
Strategic Planning. The ability to engage in regional strategic planning is one of the
reasons that compacts should be developed. The need for strategic planning can vary with the
complexity and volatility of the compact environment as can planning authority and
responsibilities. Strategic planning can exist on a continuum from reviewing the plans of
signatory parties and providing recommendations to the comprehensive planning and
enforcement that is found in the Delaware Basin.
Because there is a multiplicity of competing uses for water along with climate change and
sea level rise, strategic planning in the Delaware Basin is paramount. Working with stakeholders,
the DRBC develops the Comprehensive Plan which includes both immediate and long-term
plans for the basin. In addition, the Commission must adopt a Water Resources Program, based
on the Comprehensive Plan, that consists of projects and facilities proposed for the following six
years or another reasonable time as determined by the Commission. Lastly, the Commission has
to create an annual expense budget and an annual capital budget consistent with the Water
Resources Program and covering the DRBC’s projects and facilities for the period (Delaware
River Basin Commission, 2021e; Delaware River Basin Compact, 1961)
This extensive long-term planning provides the Commission with the ability to tap into
diverse ideas and possibilities for problem solving while avoiding the need to respond to most
emergencies with little or no preparation. Short-term planning keeps the focus on emerging
situations and providing an opportunity to finesse longer-term planning.

38

The federal-interstate configuration of the Delaware River Basin Compact does not negate the concept of horizontal federalism
in that the states and the federal government are on an equal footing within the ordinary business of the Compact.
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Data-based Decision Making. Data-based decision making is a component of most
compacts even at the simplest level of organization. The extent to which it is utilized varies
however. In more complex and challenging environments, including those with multiple,
conflicting uses, data driven decisions are increasingly important. Data can be used to determine
the status of a river with regard to flow, pollution, dissolved oxygen, biodiversity and other water
quality characteristics and to formulate adequate responses when needed. The DRBC collects
extensive data to support Commission management programs and to assist in evaluating
emerging threats to the waters of the basin. It also provides data such as water use and projection
data and water quality data on their website for public use as well as links to EPA and USGS
data (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021o).
For a complex environment such as the Delaware Basin, data provide the ability to model
critical aspects of the system. The DRBC, for example, models the movement of water in the
tidal region of the Delaware in order to track spills and monitor the concentration of pollutants.
This model is especially important with regard to protecting drinking water intakes on the river
(Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021g). In 1922, the lack of accurate data for modeling
water quantity for the Colorado led to over allocation of the river and has since adversely
affected resource management in that basin (Adler, 2008).
Program Operations. Program operations are those functions or activities which are
critical to carrying out the mission of the compact. These functions can vary with the complexity
of the environment and the purpose of the compact. They can range from the very minimal, such
as monitoring water quantity and use, to operations carried out by comprehensive compacts such
as those on the Delaware and Susquehanna rivers. Because the Delaware Basin is a complex
system and because of the broad based goals of the Compact, the DRBC’s program operations
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are relatively extensive and program areas include water quality, water supply and planning,
project review and permitting, flood loss reduction, hydrology and flow management, and
natural gas drilling (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021l).
In planning for these operations, compact developers should keep in mind that the
environment is constantly changing and build in the possibility of changing the way that program
operations are conducted. Changing technology, shifting populations, and an increasingly
volatile climate can increase the tempo at which programs must operate. These same changes can
increase the need for a technically sophisticated, highly trained professional workforce. All of
these should be considered as the compact mechanisms are planned.
Regulatory Mechanisms. Regulation is a critical function for compacts, especially for
those in intensely utilized basins. Because river basins are complex open systems, a
comprehensive compact requires sufficient authority to regulate not only the surface and
groundwater in a river system but the natural and built systems that interact with it.
Without regulatory authority, a compact is essentially committed to an advisory role.
Regulatory authority without the power to initiate and enforces sufficient sanctions is ineffective.
Sanctions serve as deterrent against excess violations and help to maintain cohesiveness when
used strategically (Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 1990). As discussed previously, the DRBC has been
using graduated sanctions against violators since 2009 and the Susquehanna has been using a
similar system successfully since 1996 (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2009). Compact
developers can look to their analysis of the context/compact environment for guidance to the
most effective methods for regulation. In addition, they can look to the literature and to similar
compacts for information about implementing effective regulatory structures.
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Public Participation. As a result of the shift from large water development projects to
adaptive and integrated water resource management (Mandarano & Mason, 2013), there has been
a corresponding move to more inclusive participation in water resource management. This means
that the public has become increasingly involved in policy making (Kenney, 1997) and other
aspects of basin management. Compacts with active and vocal constituencies (or the possibilities
of these developing) must make a place for these in their governance structures. This can be
accomplished through citizens’ advisory committees or building in other methods of
participation such as open meetings, hearings, and venues for comments. Public participation can
also involve working as “citizen scientists” to protect and monitor basin water resources.
The growth of social media has made individuals and groups more aware of issues and
provided ways to connect to and support interests they are concerned about. Larger advocacy
groups can leverage significant resources including volunteers, political influence, and legal
resources. Smaller, local groups can make their voices heard through generating interests in their
communities or they can campaign for politicians who are willing to support their interests. For
compacts, this can mean more stakeholder input, for better or worse, into potential policies and
actions. By connecting with the public through outreach and education, compacts are able to
spark stakeholders’ interest and support, share knowledge about the resource, encourage
stewardship, and engage in dialogue for more democratic and inclusive governance.
The DRBC encourages public participation through access to Commission meetings,
advisory committees, and public hearings. There are also social media sites such as Twitter,
YouTube, Flickr, Instagram, and LinkedIn where readers are invited to share content. In
addition, telephone and email contact information for DRBC staff, including the executive
director, is located on the website.
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Outreach and Education. Public outreach encourages participation in basin affairs while
education provides the knowledge stakeholders need to make informed choices regarding basin
use and governance. As part of the DRBC’s outreach efforts, staff members are often invited to
speak on water resource management issues. The Commission has hosted delegations from other
countries who want to learn about basin management and staff members have been invited to
share their expertise with state and federal agencies. The Commission also supports efforts to
foster stewardship and engage the citizens of the basin in crowd-sourcing water quality data.
DRBC staff volunteer for public service projects and the Commission also provides resources for
students and teachers to learn about the basin (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021j). Other
sources of information about the basin consist of news releases, publications, annual reports, and
public records (Delaware River Basin Commission, 2021p).
This study has focused on a single successful federal-interstate water compact. It is the
nature of the framework that the properties described here can be widely applied to new
compacts, those that are in need of revision, or to a number of dissimilar organizations. The next
section illustrates how the theory might be used to construct a successful compact in a situation
where a thirty-year conflict is at risk for further escalation due to growing demands for water and
continued threats from climate change.
Theory Application: The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin
The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin lies within the southeastern
states of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia (See Appendix I for a map of the ACF Basin). The
Chattahoochee has its origins in the northeastern most corner of Georgia near the Blue Ridge
Mountains and flows southwest through Atlanta, eventually emptying into Lake Seminole not far
from the Gulf of Mexico. The Flint River begins in the middle of the state, just below Atlanta,
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and also empties into Lake Seminole, where, combined with the waters of the Chattahoochee, it
becomes the Apalachicola River. The Apalachicola River then flows south into Apalachicola
Bay where it supports an economically important oyster fishery and performs other significant
ecosystem services (Rugel, 2020).
The situation grows increasingly dire with the likelihood of increased water scarcity in
the ACT Basin. The group American Rivers has stated that, “Unless Georgia, Alabama and
Florida reach a transparent water-sharing agreement that protects both people and wildlife
throughout the basin, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers improves water management, the
region will face lasting economic and environmental damage”(Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint River Basin [AL, FL, GA], 2021, para. 2).
The ACF Basin is a complex, heavily utilized system. Rivers in the basin are used for
industry, wastewater assimilation, hydropower generation, irrigation, and recreation as well as
supplying drinking water for nearly four million people, including the growing city of Atlanta.
Agricultural water use has increased significantly in southwestern Georgia and in southeastern
Alabama, a nuclear power plant on the lower Chattahoochee depends on sufficient flow in order
for water to reach critical intakes. Aquatic ecosystems, including economically important
shellfish populations in Apalachicola Bay, depend on freshwater from the basin for survival and
sustainability. The rivers of the basin also contain species such as the Gulf Sturgeon which are
protected by the Endangered Species Act resulting in multiple segments of the basin being
subject to habitat protection plans via the Environmental Protection Act of 1970. In addition, the
Army Corp of Engineers exerts a major influence on water resource management in the basin in
regulating five major dams on the Chattahoochee River (Rugel, 2020; USGS, 2019; Wehr,
2014).
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The interstate nature of these rivers is such that water allocation in the ACF Basin has
been a source of conflict for over thirty years. A major problem in the basin is water scarcity
with the critical issues hinging on water use in the Atlanta metro area, the use of groundwater
and surface water for irrigation in southwest Georgia, and the need for sufficient freshwater
flowing into Apalachicola Bay to maintain the estuaries where numerous marine species develop
(Rugel, 2020; USGS, 2019).
There is an additional issue of the Army Corps of Engineers’ management of the
reservoirs on the Chattahoochee. Citing Supreme Court findings (See Florida v. Georgia, 2018),
Morrison (2019) pointed out that the drought and non-drought operations on the river have less
to do with the weather than the amount of storage in the upstream reservoirs. Low reservoirs
upstream sends the Corps into drought operations, decreasing the water flowing into the
Chattahoochee, and ultimately into Apalachicola Bay. It has been suggested that the Corps of
Engineers work with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and other federal and state agencies to
update the procedures for flow releases, including a supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement with up-to-date information on future water requirements. It was also suggested that
environmental impact assessments extend from the head waters of the system to Apalachicola
Bay (Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin [AL, FL, GA], 2021).
The conflict began in 1990 when Alabama sued the Army Corps of Engineers over a plan
to provide additional water for the growing city of Atlanta. Since then, numerous negotiations,
lawsuits, and even compacts have been attempted but were unable to resolve the conflict
between the ACF basin states (Dellapenna, 2005; Rugel, 2020; Wehr, 2014). As recently as April
of 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a claim by Florida that Georgia’s water use was
excessive and causing damage to Florida’s oyster fisheries (Florida v. Georgia, 2021).
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Even with the conclusion of this latest effort to settle the differences between the ACF
basin states, there is no discernable end in sight to these expensive and time-consuming “water
wars.” ACF Stakeholders, a water users group in the basin (Rugel, 2020), has suggested that the
three governors create a basin-wide transboundary water management institution to encourage
transparent, adaptive governance based on science (Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River
Basin [AL, FL, GA], 2021).
As discussed in this study, interstate compacts can provide viable solutions to these types
of cross-boundary problems. Using the theory developed here and modeled after the successful
Delaware River Basin Compact, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia could develop a compact
agreement that would provide a method for governing the basin as a whole and with equitable
benefits for all water users. However, as Derthik (1974) observed, an organization such as a
compact will only be effective to the extent that the participating parties share the desire to make
it successful. This criteria has yet to be met in the ACF Basin and limits, if not eliminates the
possibility of the development of a successful compact.
Like Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, the Delaware River Basin states faced significant
issues prior to developing an interstate compact. Like the ACF Basin, the Delaware Basin, faced
problems of water allocation and flow maintenance. These issues were also exacerbated by
periodic and prolonged droughts. The DRBC was able to manage these problems through both a
major drought of 1961-1967 and later water crises by using various mechanisms embedded in the
Delaware River Basin Compact.39

39

See “The ‘Good Faith Agreement’ of 1983” in Chapter Four
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The DRBC accomplished this successful approach by treating the basin as a single,
holistic entity, by leveraging its considerable authority to manage reservoir releases, and by
collaborating and cooperating with other agencies and organizations to bring about a satisfactory
conclusion to these issues. The DRBC also developed a series of Flexible Flow Management
Plans by means of close cooperation with multiple stakeholders, the use of data driven decision
making, and the ability to adapt and build consensus across many stakeholders (Moore, 2021;
Ravindranath et al., 2016).
If all parties were desirous of solving the problems in the ACF Basin, applying the theory
developed in this study would enable a comprehensive, holistic approach to solving many of the
ACF Basin issues. A detailed study of the entire basin would provide the information needed to
build a compact that would be able to address the numerous issues that exist in a complex system
such as a river basin. One of the reasons that many approaches are unsuccessful in complex
systems is that they fail to integrate solutions to address the entire system (Banathy, 1995).
Managing the basin as a single entity would allow for a method that would take the needs of the
entire basin into consideration.
As indicated earlier, a detailed study of the basin environment would also allow for the
development and prioritization of desired outcomes. In the ACF Basin, one of these outcomes
might be the states and the Army Corp of Engineers collaborate to balance flows using databased decision making, like the Good Faith Agreement in the Delaware. In this way, it would
likely be possible to preserve a sustainable environment in the Apalachicola Bay while
maintaining sufficient water for upstream users.
The ACF Basin is very different from the Delaware River Basin in that the Delaware is a
transboundary river its entire length. In the ACF, Georgia currently enjoys certain advantages as
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an upstream state with the headwaters of both the Chattahoochee and the Flint rivers. With
increasing uncertainty due to climate change and the growing demand for water, there will likely
be a time when Georgia, Alabama, and Florida will face problems similar to those of the
Delaware Basin prior to the current compact. The ACF states can continue as they have been,
resorting to expensive and time consuming litigation or they can decide to work together and
develop a compact. With a compact, states can protect their sovereignty and avoid coming under
federal jurisdiction with the resulting unwanted, top-down solutions to their water resource
issues (Christie, 2013; Muys, 1995).
Using the properties and mechanisms in the theory to guide compact creation provides a
structure that allows developers to tailor a compact that “fits” the basin environment while
adapting to changing circumstances. Obviously, shared river basins are vastly different based on
geography, climate, even factors such as political institutions. The properties and mechanisms
discussed here will not be appropriate for every circumstance. Situations where states are unable
to agree to a regional solution in which some sovereignty will be lost will not be able to use this
type of policy instrument. States that are unable to build a collaborative environment will also
not be able to use this type of agreement.
The preceding discussions help to answer the final research questions, RQ11-RQ15. They
examined the theoretical concepts that emerged from the study of the properties, mechanisms
and outcomes of the Delaware River Basin Compact and used them to develop a framework and
substantive theory for future compact development. They discussed how the framework and
theory could be used in various situations and how its application might be limited.
The compact features discussed here emerged from a rigorous examination of the
creation of the Delaware River Basin Compact and its administrative body, the Delaware River
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Basin Commission. As a result, the framework and theory are grounded in a real-world situation
with implications for real-world results.
Conclusions
The framework that has emerged from this study is significant in that it articulates
properties that have not previously been accounted for when developing interstate compacts. The
concept of using compact properties to develop new compacts or evaluate previous compacts has
never became a well-articulated, well defined concept. With this framework, the properties
emerge as a reference point for thinking about viable compact development for addressing future
water resource needs.
The theoretical model, developed as a result of this case study, adds granularity to the
compact framework. It provides mechanisms that can be operationalized and measured,
providing a basis for description, explanation, and prediction. Adding control variables to
account for different aspects of the environment, e.g., climate change, may add additional utility
when developing or comparing compacts.
A substantive-level theory such as the one developed here can move the practice of
compact development forward because it is built on the already successful Delaware River Basin
Compact. The Susquehanna River Basin Compact was created in 1970 based on the success of
the Delaware River compact. However, the Delaware and Susquehanna basins are similar and
certain aspects of these compacts would not be suitable for inclusion in basins with significant
geophysical or other differences (Draper, 2002). With careful application of this theory,
however, it may be possible to build a compact that provides a better “fit” with its environment
while retaining the agility for change that current water resource management demands.
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Most compacts developed now or in the foreseeable future will likely be in complex,
highly utilized environments. However, interstate water compacts can provide a way to address
these problems in a comprehensive way. Compacts, though, are not a one-size-fits all
construction. Instead, they are designed and work in many different types of environments. Not
only that, but these environments can change rapidly and require that the compact respond
appropriately. The substantive theory that emerged from this case study can aid compact
developers in generating a compact that most matches the needs of the basin yet has the
flexibility to respond to sometimes volatile circumstances.
The framework and theory proposed here emerged from a rigorous, systematic analysis
of multiple data sources and using different methods of analysis. It was grounded in existing
literature across a number of disciplines and benefited from input from individuals who have
worked closely with the DRBC. Even so, as a work in progress, further research is needed to
determine if either of these theoretical constructs can be effectively utilized for compact
development. Perhaps they would be useful as a diagnostic tool for assessing a current compact.
Because the framework and theory are both rather broad in concept, conceivably they may be
applied to a wider variety of organizations.
In the end, the compact framework and theory are tools and like most tools, the outcome
depends considerably on how they are used. In addition, all knowledge is built on what has gone
before. It may be that future research may confirm parts of these tools and challenge others.
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Appendix A
Select Study Resources


2017 Agreement for a Flexible Flow Management Program



2018 Delaware River and Bay Water Quality Assessment



2019 Delaware River Basin Commission Annual Report



2020 Delaware River Basin Commission Annual Report



Administrative Manual: Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR Part 401)



Borough of Morrisville et al. v. Delaware River Basin Commission (399 F.Supp. 469 (1975))



Comment of DRBC Proposed Natural Gas Regulations (America’s Natural Gas Alliance)



Comments on Proposed Natural Gas Development Regulations for the Delaware River Basin



Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Delaware River Basin Commission, (In Re:) DRBC Draft
Hydraulic Fracturing Regulations – Public Hearing Number 1



Delaware River Basin Commission: Administrative Manual. Rules of Practice and
Procedure



Delaware River Basin Commission Comprehensive Plan (July 2001 updated)



Delaware River Basin Commission Current Expense and Capital Budgets For the Period July
1, 2020 through June 30, 2021 (Adopted September 2020)



Delaware River Basin Commission Quarterly Business Meeting Minutes March 2010 through
June 2021



Delaware River Basin Commission Water Resources Program: FY 2019-2021



Delaware River Basin Commission Water Resources Program: FY 2022-2024



Delaware River Basin Compact



Delaware River Basin Source Water Collaborative



Delaware River Basin Water Code 18 CFR Part 410



Delaware River Basin Commission website. https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/



Delaware Riverkeeper Network



DRBC Comment and Response Document: Proposed Amendments to the Administrative
Manual and Special Regulations Regarding High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing Activities;
Additional Clarifying Amendments (February 25, 2021)
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Select Study Resources (Continued)


Letter from American Rivers commenting on the DRBC’s Draft Natural Gas Drilling
Regulations



Letter from Cherry Ridge Realty, Inc. (RE:) Natural Gas Development



Letter from Manko, Gold, Katcher, & Fox, LLP on behalf of Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
with regard to natural gas development



Letter from Wayne County Planning Commission RE: Draft Natural Gas Regulations



Letter requesting extension of the public comment period for the DRBC’s Draft Natural Gas
Regulations



Letter to Governor Wolf of Pennsylvania from the Marcellus Shale Coalition regarding natural
gas development




New Jersey v. New York et al. (283 U.S. 336 (1931))
Petitions and Sign-On Letters Submitted as Comments on DRBC’s Proposed Natural Gas
Regulations



Public Comment – Draft Natural Gas Development Regulations- Damascus Watch via the
Widener University School of Law Environmental and Natural Resources Clinic



State of New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection, New Jersey Water Supply Plan
2017-2022



State of the Basin 2019



State of Kansas, Plaintiff v. States of Nebraska and Colorado (135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015))



Technical Report for the Delaware Estuary and Basin



“The Public Speaks Out Opposing Gibbstown LNG Export on Delaware River” (news release
from the Delaware Riverkeeper Network)



Title 18, Part 440 – High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing



Water Resources Plan for the Delaware Basin (September 2004)



Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC v. Delaware River Basin Commission, Maya Van
Rossum, The Delaware Riverkeeper; Delaware Riverkeeper Network (Interveners in District
Court) *Senators Joseph B. Scarnati, III; Lisa Baker; Gene Yaw, Appellants *Pursuant to Fed.
R. App. P. Rule 12(a). (959 F.3d 569 (2020))
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Select Study Resources (Continued)


Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC, Appellant v. Delaware River Basin Commission, Maya
Van Rossum; Delaware Riverkeeper Network (894 F.3d 509 (2018)



Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Delaware River Basin Commission,
Defendant, and Delaware Riverkeeper Network Maya K. Van Rossum, the Delaware
Riverkeeper, Interveners-Defendants (2017)
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Appendix B
Organizational Affiliation of Survey Contacts and Respondents 40
Academy of Natural Sciences of Drexel University*
American Water
Artesian Water Company, Inc.
Associations of New Jersey Environmental Commissions
Audubon (Pennsylvania)*
Berks Gas Truth
Carbon County Commissioners
Chester County Water Resources Authority
City of Lambertville
City of Wilmington
Coalition for the Delaware Watershed
Columbia University*
Columbia University Water Center*
Cornell University
Delaware Center for the Inland Bays*
Delaware County Dept. of Emergency Services
Delaware Dept. of Natural Resources and Environmental Control*
Delaware Division of Waste and Hazardous Substances
Delaware Emergency Management Agency*
Delaware Geological Survey
Delaware Highlands Conservancy
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission
Delaware Riverkeeper Network*
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Delaware State University
Drexel University

40

Those marked with an asterisk had at least one individual who responded to the survey
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Organizational Affiliation of Survey Contacts and Respondents (Continued)
Exelon Corporation*
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Friends of the Upper Delaware River
Johnson & Johnson
Kent County Coop Extension
League of Women Voters of PA
Lehigh County Board of Commissioners
Maryland Fish, Heritage and Wildlife Administration* (Not on contact list)
National Park Service*
National Parks Conservation Assoc.
National Weather Service
Natural Lands Trust
New Jersey Audubon Society
New Jersey Department of Agriculture
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection*
New Jersey Department of Health
New Jersey Department of Parks and Recreation
New Jersey Division of Fish & Wildlife*
New Jersey Office of Emergency Management
New Jersey Water Resources Research Institute
New York City Dept. of Environmental Protection
New York Dept. of Environmental Conservation
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation*
New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services
New York State Water Resources Institute
No affiliation/private citizen
North Jersey Research Conservation & Development
Office of the Delaware River Master
Open Space Institute
PA Chamber of Business and Industry
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Organizational Affiliation of Survey Contacts and Respondents (Continued)
Partnership for the Delaware Estuary
Pennsylvania State University
Pennsylvania Audubon Society
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection*
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission
Pennsylvania Water Resources Research Center
Philadelphia Department of Environmental Protection
Philadelphia Water Department
Rutgers Climate Institute
Rutgers University – Department of Human Ecology*
State of New Jersey*
Stevens Institute of Technology
Stroud Water Research Center
Stroudsburgh (PA) Borough Human Relations Commission
Talen Generation, LLC
The Chemours Co.
Trout Unlimited*
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service*
U.S. Geological Survey
Unitarian Universalist Church of Reading
University of Delaware (Cooperative Extension)*
University of Delaware Water Resources Center*
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh
Upper Delaware Council*
USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service
USGS, Office of the Delaware River Master
Water Resources Agency/University of Delaware
183

Organizational Affiliation of Survey Contacts and Respondents (Continued)
Water Resources Association of the Delaware Basin*
William Penn Foundation
Wissahickon Valley Watershed Association DBA Wissahickon Trails*
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Appendix C
DRBC Survey Questions
Consent to Participate in a Research Study
I am Cindy Roper, a researcher at Clemson University, studying interstate water
compacts as a way of managing shared water resources in the United States. This research is an
effort to better understand how interstate compacts function and what mechanisms contribute to
their success. I invite you to share your insights and expertise about these institutions. While you
may not benefit personally, your input can increase knowledge about how to develop and
implement more effective and sustainable shared water resource governance.
If you are willing to participate, I’m asking that you complete a confidential survey
about various aspects of shared water resource governance in the Delaware River Basin as it
relates to the Delaware River Basin Commission.
The survey should take about 15 minutes. This survey is completely voluntary. You have
no obligation to answer any questions that you’re not comfortable with and you are free to
withdraw from the study at any time.
Identifiable information collected during the study will be removed and the de-identified
information could be used for future research studies on water resource policy without additional
informed consent from you or your legally authorized representative. If quotations are used in
the study, you will be contacted for your permission. If you agree to a quotation, you may choose
to be identified by name, identified only by your role or position, by a pseudonym, or you can
choose to not be identified at all.
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The information from the survey will be stored in a secure, password protected file and
access will be limited to the research team. The results of this study may be published as a
doctoral dissertation, in scientific journals, professional publications, or used in presentations.
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please
contact the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-0636 or
irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the ORC’s
toll-free number, 866-297-3071. The Clemson Institutional Review Board (IRB) will not be able
to answer some study-specific questions. However, you may contact the Clemson IRB if the
researcher cannot be reached or if you wish to speak with someone other than the person
conducting the research.
If you have any study related questions or if any problems arise, please contact Cindy
Roper at Clemson University at cgroper@clemson.edu or 864-656-0607.
This study is under the direction of Dr. Catherine Mobley, a faculty member at Clemson
University.
CONSENT
By participating in this research, you indicate that you have read the above information,
have been allowed to ask any questions, and you are voluntarily choosing to take part in this
study. You do not give up any legal rights by taking part in this research study.
1. What is your name? (optional)41
2. What is your position at the DRBC? (optional)

41

Questions are numbered for the reader’s benefit. In the survey, they are not numbered.
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Remember, your answers to the following questions are totally confidential. Nothing you
say in this survey will be connected to your private information without your written
permission.
3. Overall, how well is the Delaware River Basin Commission performing with regard to
governance in the basin?
a. Excellent
b. Good
c. Fair
d. Poor
4. Please provide a brief explanation for your rating in the previous question.
5. Understanding that ideally every program area would be meeting or exceeding expectations
but that resources are scarce and there are many factors that affect basin management, how
would you rate the state of the basin in the following areas?
[Choices: Exceeds Expectations, Meets Expectations, Needs Improvement, and Do Not
Know]
a. Drought management
b. Flood loss reduction
c. Recreation
d. Regulatory review (Permitting)
e. Water conservation
f. Water quality protection
g. Water supply allocation
h. Watershed planning
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6. Given the current state of the Delaware River Basin, which would you say are the top four
program areas in order of importance to the Commission with "1" being the most critical.
a. ______ Drought management
b. ______ Flood loss reduction
c. ______ Recreation
d. ______ Regulatory review (permitting)
e. ______ Water conservation
f. ______ Water quality protection
g. ______ Water supply allocation
h. ______ Watershed planning
7. What are the biggest challenges facing the basin today?
8. What are some strengths or opportunities that you see for governance in the basin to meet
these challenges? These can be in the areas of policy, regulation, intergovernmental relations,
organization, technical support, infrastructure, or any relevant area.
9. What are the biggest challenges facing the basin in the next fifty years?
10. What will the DRBC need to do to meet these challenges? These can be in the areas of
policy, regulation, intergovernmental relations, organization, technical support,
infrastructure, or any relevant area.
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Appendix D
General Survey Questions
Consent to Participate in a Research Study
Assessing Water Resource Management in the Delaware River Basin
I am Cindy Roper, a researcher at Clemson University studying interstate compacts as a
way of understanding how states can effectively manage shared rivers, lakes, streams, and
groundwater.
This research is an effort to better understand how interstate compacts function, under
what circumstances they are successful, and what mechanisms contribute to their success. You
have been identified as an individual with knowledge about the Delaware River and its
governance and, as a result, I am inviting you to share your insights and expertise about these
agreements. Although you may not benefit directly from this study, your input can increase
knowledge about how to develop and implement more effective and sustainable shared water
resource governance.
The results of this study may be published as a doctoral dissertation, in scientific journals,
professional publications, or used in presentations.
If you are willing to participate, I’m asking that you complete a confidential survey about
various aspects of shared water resource governance in the Delaware River Basin, especially as it
relates to the Delaware River Basin Commission. The survey should take no more than 15
minutes. This survey is completely voluntary. You have no obligation to answer any questions
that you’re not completely comfortable with and you are free to withdraw from the study at any
time. This survey carries no known risks.
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Your personal information will be protected. Access to the data will be limited to the
research team. Data from the survey will be stored in a secure, password protected file.
Identifiable information collected during the study will be removed and the de-identified
information could be used for future research studies on water resource policy without additional
informed consent from you or your legally authorized representative. If quotations are used in
the study, you will be contacted for your permission. If you agree to a quotation, you may choose
to be identified by name, identified only by your role or position, by a pseudonym, or you can
choose not to be identified at all.
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please
contact the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-0636 or
irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the ORC’s
toll-free number, 866-297-3071. The Clemson Institutional Review Board (IRB) will not be able
to answer some study-specific questions. However, you may contact the Clemson IRB if the
researcher cannot be reached or if you wish to speak with someone other than the person
conducting the research.
If you have any study related questions or if any problems arise, please contact Cindy
Roper at Clemson University at cgroper@clemson.edu or 864-656-0607.
This research is being conducted under the direction of Dr. Catherine Mobley, a faculty
member at Clemson University.
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CONSENT
By participating in this research, you indicate that you have read the above information,
have been allowed to ask any questions, and you are voluntarily choosing to take part in this
study. You do not give up any legal rights by taking part in this research study.

1. Your Name (optional)
2. What is the name of your organization or agency? (optional)
3. What is your role or position in the organization or agency?
4. How familiar are you with the Delaware River Basin Commission?
a. Very familiar
b. Somewhat familiar
c. Not at all familiar [Respondents choosing this option would be taken to an alternate
block of questions. Here they are located at the end of this appendix. The following
question was seen only by those indicating that they were very familiar or somewhat
familiar with the DRBC]
5. Do the actions of the Delaware River Basin Commission affect your organization or its
stakeholders either directly or indirectly?
a. Yes [Respondents answering yes were taken to the main survey, question 6 in this
appendix]
b. No [Respondents answering no were taken to the alternate questions at the end of this
appendix]
6. Overall, how well is the Delaware River Basin Commission performing with regard to
governance in the basin?
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a. Excellent
b. Good
c. Fair
d. Poor
7. Understanding that ideally every program area would be meeting or exceeding expectations
but that resources are scarce and there are many factors that affect basin management, how
would you rate the Delaware River Basin Commission's performance in the following areas?
[Choices: Exceeding Expectations, Meeting Expectations, Needs Improvement, and Do Not
Know]
a. Drought management
b. Flood loss reduction
c. Recreation
d. Regulatory review (Permitting)
e. Water conservation
f. Water quality protection
g. Water supply allocation
h. Watershed planning
8. Given the current state of the Delaware River Basin, which would you say are the top four
program areas in order of importance to your organization with "1" being most critical.
a. ______ Drought management
b. ______ Flood loss reduction
c. ______ Recreation
d. ______ Regulatory review (permitting)
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e. ______ Water conservation
f. ______ Water quality protection
g. ______ Water supply allocation
h. ______ Watershed planning
i. ______ Other
9. In what important way or ways do the activities of the Delaware River Basin Commission
impact your organization and/or its stakeholders?
10. What would you consider the most successful outcomes brought about by the Delaware
River Basin Commission that directly affect your organization and/or its stakeholders?
11. What would you consider to be the least successful outcomes brought about by the Delaware
River Basin Commission that directly affect your organization and/or its stakeholders?
12. What has been the Delaware River Basin Commission's most important impact, positive or
negative, on the Delaware River Basin as a whole?
13. In what three ways do you think the Delaware River Basin Commission could improve their
activities in the basin? Please list these with 1 being the most important.
a. 1. ________________________________________________
b. 2. ________________________________________________
c. 3. ________________________________________________
14. Do you have any additional comments that you would like to share about the Delaware River
Basin Commission and its activities?
15. If you wish to provide additional information, you can upload a document by clicking in the
box below (PDF, DOC, DOCX, TXT, ODT, CSV, XLS, XLSX, ODS, JPG, PNG, or GIF
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files are supported). Files must be less than 100MB. For security reasons, executable files are
not allowed.
ALTERNATE QUESTIONS
1. In what ways do you and/or the stakeholders of your organization interact with the waters of
the Delaware River Basin? Please check all that apply.
a. Recreation (swimming, fishing, boating, bird watching along the banks, etc.)
b. Employment (working on the river or in a job that depends on the river)
c. Commercial or industrial operations
d. Residential/Commercial/Industrial development
e. Environmental conservation
f. Regulatory issues
g. Flooding of home or business
h. Research (please specify the general focus of your work)
________________________________________________
i. Other. Please indicate below other ways in which you and/or members of your
organization/agency interact with the waters of the Delaware River Basin.
2. What are the three most important issues that you or your organization would like to see
addressed concerning the waters of the Delaware River Basin with 1 being the most
important?
a. 1. ________________________________________________
b. 2. ________________________________________________
c. 3. ________________________________________________
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3. Are there any other issues not listed above that you consider important to address concerning
the waters of the Delaware River Basin? Please list them and why you consider them
important.
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Appendix E
Interview Questions
Assessing Water Resource Management
in the Delaware River Basin
1. Various scholars have pointed out that, for sixty years, the Delaware River Basin Compact has
provided an extraordinarily successful method for resolving interstate conflicts over water
resources. First, do you agree or disagree with this conclusion and second, what factors or
compact mechanisms, in your opinion, contribute(s) significantly to this outcome?
2. What do you see are the greatest challenges facing the DRBC now? In the next fifty years?
3. What are some of the opportunities for governance in the basin to meet these challenges?
4. What will need to change for the DRBC to be able to meet these challenges?
5. What would you like for me to understand about the mechanisms and operations of the
DRBC?
Suggested Mechanisms or Factors (not an exhaustive list)
• Governance structure: The presence of a commission form of governance
• Basin wide jurisdiction
• Decision making processes: Decisions are made by majority vote except in specific
circumstances, decision making is collaborative, seeks consensus, and utilizes the principle of
comity.
• Planning: The ability to develop and enforce a basin-wide comprehensive plan.
• Project Review: The Commission must approve projects having substantial effects on water
resources in the basin.
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• Rates and Charges: The Commission can charge fees, rentals, or tolls for the use of facilities
which it owns or operates as well as for related products and services.
• Broad development authority: This includes hydropower development, flood mitigation, and
recreational facilities.
• Regulatory powers: The ability to make and enforce rules and regulations for the enforcement
of the Compact as well as for the administration of projects owned or operated by the
Commission. This includes water withdrawals and diversions as well as pollution abatement.
• Establish standards: This includes standards for all projects and facilities in the basin which
affect its water resources.
• Funding: The Commission is supported by funding from member states but may also borrow
money, issue bonds, and accept funds from other sources as listed in the Compact.
• Delegated powers: The ability to exercise powers delegated by the Compact or pursuant to law
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Appendix F
Delaware River Basin with County Boundaries and Select Cities

Used with permission. Delaware River Basin Commission. www.drbc.gov.
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Appendix G
Delaware River Basin: Select Reservoirs, Cities, and Tributaries

Used with permission. Delaware River Basin Commission. www.drbc.gov.
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Appendix H
Demographic Overview of the Population of the Delaware River Basin
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Appendix I
Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, Flint River Basin

Source: Public Domain
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Appendix J
Permission Letter
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